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Abstract   
 




IT systems are attacked using computers and networks to facilitate their crimes and hide 
their identities, creating new challenges for corporate security investigations. There are 
two main types of attacker: insiders and outsiders. Insiders are trusted users who have 
gained authorised access to an organisation's IT resources in order to execute their job 
responsibilities. However, they deliberately abuse their authorised (i.e. insider) access in 
order to contravene an organisation‟s policies or to commit computer crimes. Outsiders 
gain insider access to an organisation's IT objects through their ability to bypass security 
mechanisms without prior knowledge of the insider‟s job responsibilities, an advanced 
method of attacking an organisation‟s resources in such a way as to prevent the abnor-
mal behaviour typical of an outsider attack from being detected, and to hide the at-
tacker‟s identity.  
For a number of reasons, corporate security investigators face a major challenge in dis-
tinguishing between the two types of attack. Not only is there no definitive model of 
digital analysis for making such a distinction, but there has to date been no intensive 
research into methods of doing so. Identification of these differences is attempted by 
flawed investigative approaches to three aspects: location from which an attack is 
launched, attack from within the organisation's area of control, and authorised access. 
The results of such unsound investigations could render organisations subject to legal 
action and negative publicity. 
To address the issue of the distinction between insider and outsider attacks, this research 
improves upon the first academic forensic analysis model, Digital Forensic Research 
Workshop (DFRWS) [63]. The outcome of this improvement is the creation of a Digital 
Analysis Model for Distinction between Insider and Outsider Attacks (DAMDIOA), a 
model that results in an improvement in the analysis investigation process, as well as the 
process of decision. This improvement is effected by two types of proposed decision: 
fixed and tailored. The first is based on a predetermined logical condition, the second on 
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the proportion of suspicious activity. The advantage of the latter is that an organisation 
can adjust its threshold of tolerance for such activity based on its level of concern for 
the type of attack involved. 
This research supports the possibility of distinguishing between insider and outsider 
attacks by running a network simulation which carried out a number of email attack 
experiments to test DAMDIOA. It found that, when DAMDIOA used predetermined 
decisions based on legitimate activities, it was able to differentiate the type of attack in 
seven of the eight experiments conducted. It was the tailored decisions with threshold 
levels Th=0.2 and 0.3 that conferred the ability to make such distinctions.   
When the researcher compared legitimate activities, including users‟ job responsibili-
ties, with the current methods of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks,the 
criterion of authorised access failed three times to make that distinctions. This method 
of distinction is useless when there is a blank or shared password. He also discovered 
that both the location from which an attack was launched and attacks from areas within 
an organisation‟s control  failed five times to differentiate between such attacks. There 
are no substantive differences between these methods. The single instance in which the 
proposed method failed to make these distinctions was because the number of legitimate 
activities equalled the number of suspicious ones. 
DAMDIOA has been used by two organisations for dealing with the misuse of their 
computers, in both cases located in open areas and weakly protected by easily guessed 
passwords. IT policy was breached and two accounts moved from the restricted to the 
unlimited Internet policy group. This model was able to identify the insiders concerned 
by reviewing recorded activities and linking them with the insiders‟ job responsibilities. 
This model also highlights users‟ job responsibilities as a valuable source of forensic 
evidence that may be used to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. 
DAMDIOA may help corporate security investigators identify suspects accurately and 
avoid incurring financial loss for their organisations. This research also recommends 
many improvements to the process by which user activities are collected before the 
attack takes place, thereby enabling distinctions to be better drawn. It also proposes the 
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creation of a physical and logical log management system, a centralised database for all 
employee activities that will reduce organisations‟ financial expenditures. Suggestions 
are also proposed for future research to classify legitimate and suspicious activities, 
evaluate them, identify the important ones and standardise the process of identifying 
and collecting users‟ job responsibilities. This work will remove some of the limitations 
of the proposed model.     
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background   
The majority of organisations rely greatly on computer systems and the Internet 
to operate and to enhance their businesses, relying on those systems‟ ability to 
process, transmit, store and retrieve data. Studies demonstrate that in 2005, 93 per 
cent of all documents created in U.S. organisations were created electronically, 
70 per cent of which never migrated to paper [46]. Outside attackers can exploit 
the weaknesses of Internet infrastructures or the vulnerabilities of organisations‟ 
resources to gain insider access without detection and to carry out attacks. Gain-
ing insider access prevents the abnormal behaviour of outsider attacks from being 
detected and hides attackers‟ identities. Wilson [104] finds that code obfuscation 
through various randomisation techniques becomes more complex if codes are 
made invisible to the pattern-matching/signature-based methods used by antivirus 
products. Organisations‟ computers, servers and laptops have therefore increas-
ingly become targets of crime, tools for committing crimes or repositories of in-
formation used or generated in their commission [37; 15].  
Computer attacks or threats to information technology may have a significant im-
pact on organisations [23; 50; 51]. These threats usually lead to the disclosure of 
information, modification, denial of service (DoS), illegal use, identity theft or 
repudiation [31]. Threats against IT systems can be internal, stemming from in-
siders, or outsider threats initiated beyond an organisation‟s boundaries [51]. Ac-
cording to the British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in association with 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, who published the Information Security Breaches Sur-
vey 2006, the number of malicious security incidents stemming from organisa-
tional insiders is almost double that of those originating from outsiders [66]. In 
2006, the cost to the U.S. of computer crime was $18,922,410 (£9,209,525) [18]. 
The CSI/FBI 2006 Computer Crime and Security Survey indicates that the finan-
cial losses resulting from computer crime were as follows [18]: 
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 Unauthorised access $10,617,000  
 Theft of property information $6,043,000  
 Insider Net Abuse $2,262,410  
Figure 1 shows financial losses resulting from computer attacks.  
 
 
Figure 1: Financial losses resulting from computer attacks 
 
 
The CSI/FBI 2008 report reveals that the four most common types of incident are 
viruses, insider abuse, laptop theft and unauthorised access to systems [19]. Theft 
of laptops can pose problems if they hold sensitive insider information such as 
usernames, passwords, personal information and e-mail messages. Figure 2 
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Figure 2: Proportionate occurrence 
 
 
Haggerty and Taylor [37] believe that corporate security investigations are mak-
ing increasing use of computer forensics in areas such as fraud, the accessing or 
distribution of pornography, and harassment. However, the increasing sophistica-
tion of methods of computer attack methods creates a new challenge for computer 
crime and corporate security investigators. Attacks occur when insider (i.e. 
authorised) access is gained without detection by outsiders who use such access 
to carry out attacks against organisations‟ IT resources.  
Insider access can generally be gained in a number of ways. Stolen storage de-
vices such as USBs or legitimate users‟ laptops can be obtained in order to use 
the settings stored on such devices to dial in. The vulnerabilities of insiders‟ 
computers or their lack of personal security can be exploited. Fake websites are a 
known method of obtaining insider access by attracting insiders to the site and 
deceiving them into downloading malicious software that is usually designed to 
steal usernames and passwords. The deployment of advanced hacking tools needs 
less technical knowledge on the part of outsiders who wish to launch password 
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insiders, and evidence from investigations conducted according to current models 
would lead directly to those insiders rather than to the parties who launched the 
attack. The most important issue is how to distinguish between insider and out-
sider attacks. Advanced attacks therefore present corporate security investigators 
with two main challenges: they must confront the possibility of distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks, and their investigations must deal with in-
siders who deny carrying out attacks.     
The present research addresses this issue via a proposed Digital Analysis Model 
for Distinction between Insider and Outsider Attacks (DAMDIOA), created by 
enhancing the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) method to enable 
the distinction between insider and outsider attacks to be made. DFRWS has 
many limitations, one of which is that its approach is usually that of a general 
model that does not consider the distinction between insider and outsider attacks, 
for example by providing a guideline of how to conduct an investigation into such 
attacks separately. Another drawback is that it does not include a method of 
relational analysis by which to identify the relationship between the activities 
performed during the period of an attack and an insider‟s job responsibilities. 
Neither does this model develop data collection processes such as deciding what 
data should be collected and why, and how they should be analysed. These 
limitations therefore result in insufficient data being made available to analyse in 
order to identify suspects, a deficiency with a detrimental impact on the decision-
making process. 
DAMDIOA is of material benefit when conducting digital investigations in cases 
where insider access is obtained by outsiders who then proceed to carry out 
attacks against an organisation‟s IT resources, or when insiders deny allegations 
of carrying out such attacks. Four conditions should be met in order for 
DAMDIOA to distinguish between the two types of attack. The first is that an 
outsider should have no prior knowledge of an insider‟s job responsibilities, the 
second is the log system‟s ability to record legitimate and suspicious activities for 
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a certain length of time, the third that a client/server environment should have 
been implemented and the last that users‟ job responsibilities and roles should be 
dependent on IT systems. DAMDIOA supports corporate security investigators in 
identifying suspects. The relationships between DAMDIOA‟s investigative use 
and the four conditions mentioned are shown in Figure 3.  
 
 




This research proposes that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to distin-
guish between insider and outsider attacks when conducting computer incident 
investigations.    
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1.3 Aim and objectivities 
The aim of this research is to determine the possibility of distinguishing between 
insider and outsider attacks. It will also create DAMDIOA in order to help corpo-
rate security investigators identify suspects. 
The objectives of the research are as follows: 
 to critically review the literature in order to identify the main problems in 
distinguishing between the two types of attack 
 to investigate the various types of computer forensic investigation model. 
This analysis will help determine the shortcomings of existing models of 
computer investigation, as well as the requirements of DAMDIOA 
 to determine the methods by which insider access is gained 
 to improve the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) method 
 to improve the collection and analysis of organisations‟ digital inci-
dent/crime investigations  
 to evaluate the model using data gathered through network simulation 
 to recommend improvements to the process by which insider and outsider 
attacks are distinguished. 
1.4 Research methodology 
An extensive search of the literature relating to the current state of the art, par-
ticularly with regard to digital incident/crime investigation models available to 
corporate security investigators, has been undertaken. A hypothesis has been cre-
ated and ways of solving the problem have also been identified. The methodology 
of this research comprises three parts: 
1. Research, which has used journals, conference proceedings, books and 
websites to understand the problem and provide a solution. 
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2. Design, which has improved DFRWS by creating DAMDIOA to address 
the issue of distinction between insider and outsider attacks. 
3. Implementation and evaluation, which has been conducted as follows: 
 A network experimental test has been set up to carry out com-
puter incidents such as the sending of abusive emails 
 Netkit: a software that is used to set-up a virtual network such as 
a Local Area Network (LAN), clients, servers and firewalls 
 Computer incident: this experiment used the following meth-
ods to carry out computer incidents:  
1. Password guessing, in which an outsider gains insider 
access by exploiting that insider‟s weak password 
2. Fake email header, where an insider and outsider use a 
fake email header to impersonate someone else‟s identity 
by using Simple Message Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 
3. Using an organisation‟s email, in which an outsider and 
insider use an organisation‟s email system to send an 
abusive email. 
 Tcpdump, a sniffing tool that is used to collect legitimate and 
suspicious activities carried out by insiders 
 Wireshark, an analysis tool used to analyse the resulting collec-
tion 
II.  The hypothesis has been tested by using the DAMDIOA to gather 
and analyse data in order to ascertain whether the attack was carried 
out by an insider or an outsider 
1.5 Contribution to knowledge 
This research has produced the following results: 
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1. Identification of the main issues involved in distinguishing between in-
sider and outsider attacks. It establishes that none of the current methods 
of making such distinctions, methods involving the location from which the 
attack was initiated, attacks within an organisation‟s control, and authorised 
access, address the problem. Furthermore, the lack of an organisation‟s au-
thentication (for example, a single-sign on or a password policy) allows 
outsiders to gain insider access easily. The use of these current methods to 
make such distinctions therefore results in the collection and analysis of in-
correct data. Such methods will not result in the correct identification of 
suspects, and will additionally incur financial loss for the organisation using 
them.   
2. Creation of DAMDIOA for solving the problem of distinguishing be-
tween insider and outsider attacks. This model is effective when insider 
access is covertly gained by outsiders who use it to carry out attacks against 
organisations‟ IT resources, or when insiders deny allegations of having 
carried out such attacks. This is because most current computer attack in-
vestigation models are designed to deal with traditional attacks, such as 
breaking into networks or computer systems. These models focus on trans-
lating the requirements of legal systems into those of IT systems in order to 
conduct proper computer forensic investigations. However, they do not ad-
dress the distinction between insider and outsider attacks. It is in these cases 
that DAMDIOA helps corporate security investigators correctly identify 
suspects and avoid financial penalties for their organisations.   
o Identification of “insider’s job responsibilities” as a method 
for distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. This 
model recognises that an insider‟s job responsibilities are a valu-
able source of information that can be used to make such a distinc-
tion. A particular job profile is requested from the holder‟s super-
visor or the organisation‟s human resources department in order to 
identify a link between these responsibilities and the activities that 
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were carried out as part of an attack. If there is a link between 
them, it indicates that this is an insider attack, because an outsider 
could have had no prior knowledge of what the insider‟s job en-
tails. 
o Implementation of full content data monitoring. This is an effi-
cient tool that can be used to distinguish between the two types of 
attack, because it intercepts the content of data transmitted be-
tween two parties. It includes not only packet headers but also 
payloads, which are required for collection and analysis for the 
purpose of identifying whether or not these data are consistent 
with the insider‟s discharge of their job responsibilities.  
3. Improvement of the process of distinction between insider and outsider 
attacks. by which insider and outsider attacks are distinguished. This 
model identifies the information that should be collected in order to distin-
guish between attacks, thereby improving the process by which such dis-
tinctions are made. It also improves the analysis stage of the process by us-
ing timeline and relational analyses on the collected data.   
o Evidence of the correctness of the hypothesis that it is possible 
to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. The ex-
perimental results show that DAMDIOA correctly distinguished 
between insider and outsider attacks in seven experiments of eight.   
o The consequent elimination of false positive decision. Tradi-
tional methods of distinction, such as attacks within an organisa-
tion‟s control and locations from which attacks are initiated, mis-
identified five of the eight experiments. In the experiments involv-
ing DAMDIOA, however, only one false identification was made.  
1.6 Measure of success  
The success of thesis is measured in two ways: 
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 Evaluation: a number of digital attack experiments were conducted to test 
the hypothesis. 
 Comparative analysis: this methodology was compared with other meth-
ods of computer forensic investigation.      
1.7 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2: Insider and outsider attacks and digital computer incident/crime 
investigation 
This chapter reviews in detail the existing literature concerning insider and out-
sider attacks and how these occur in the real world; it provides insight into the 
kind of evidence that such attacks may leave for the computer forensic investiga-
tor. This evidence is not enough to distinguish between insider and outsider at-
tacks. The primary aim is to outline the main problem involved in distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks and the research that has been conducted 
into this problem, and to outline the shortcomings of the current models of corpo-
rate computer forensic investigations.    
Chapter 3:  Assumptions and environment  
Legitimate activity and organisational users‟ job responsibilities are discussed, as 
are suspicious activities, by means of extending Hansman and Hunt's 
classification of computer and network attacks. This chapter principally discusses 
outsider methods of gaining insider access by their exploitation of IT systems‟ 
vulnerabilities and users‟ lack of security awareness. It also demonstrates that 
employees‟ job responsibilities can be used as a main source of distinction 
between insider and outsider attacks.   
Through its assumption that all user activities are recorded by an organisation‟s 
IT systems, this chapter enhances the analysis process of computer investigations 
to improve the process of distinction between insider and outsider attacks. It also 
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provides corporate security investigators with the necessary information and 
technology that can help them conduct their investigations. 
Chapter 4: Digital Analysis Model for Distinction between Insider and 
Outsider Attacks (DAMDIOA) 
This chapter discusses the limitation of the DFRWS method and the processes 
involved in the DAMDIOA model including collection, examination, analysis, 
presentation and decision. It also discusses timeline and relational analysis, used 
to examine these legitimate and suspicious activities and identify the relationship 
between activities performed during attacks and users‟ job responsibilities. This 
chapter proposes two types of decision.  
Chapter 5: Experiments   
This chapter aims to test the hypothesis by conducting eight experiments covering 
all possible attacks. The results of these experiments are based on fixed and tai-
lored decisions are compared. This chapter supports the possibility that insider 
and outsider attacks can indeed be distinguished. 
Chapter 6: Evaluation and case studies 
The experiments results based on current methods of distinguishing between in-
sider and outsider attacks (authorised access, attack within an organisation‟s con-
trol and location of initiation attack) and the proposed method of legitimate ac-
tivities are compared as are DAMDIOA and the other models. This chapter out-
lines the real cases with which this model was used to deal, and discusses DAM-
DIOA‟s limitations. 
Chapter 7: Recommendations  
This chapter makes many recommendations that would enhance the process by 
which organisations‟ users are authenticated and the audit logs of security events. 
It also suggests that developing a physical and logical management log will 
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facilitate the process of distinction between insider and outsider attacks. These 
recommendations will lead to improvements in this process.    
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This chapter presents this thesis findings and makes suggestions for future re-
search, including classification and relative weighting of activities, developing 
DAMDIOA into an automated investigation tool and standardising ways of iden-
tifying and collecting user‟s job responsibilities.   
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 to introduce network infrastructure 
 to define insiders and outsiders  
 to identify the main distinguishing issues between insider and outsider attacks  
 to introduce the shortcomings of current digital investigation models    
 
The chapter that follows aims to give a detailed review of the existing literature con-
cerning insider and outsider attacks, and how they occur in the interconnected world, 
and to look at the kind of evidence that may be left behind for the computer investigator 
to find but which may not be enough to distinguish whether an insider or outsider attack 
has been made. The main aim is to present the research that has been conducted until 
now, and to introduce the shortcomings of current models of corporate computer inves-
tigations or digital investigations. 
 
2.1 Network infrastructures 
Corporate security investigators must familiarise themselves with the infrastructure of 
private and public networks as well as the threats to components of the Internet and Lo-
cal Area Networks (LANs), in order to understand potential digital crime scenes. It is 
necessary for investigators to understand the advanced methods of attack used by out-
siders to exploit the weaknesses of the Internet and thus gain insider access without de-
tection from the organisation‟s security network.    
2.1.1 Public networks (Internet) 
The first type of network infrastructure to consider is the public network (Internet). In 
order to comprehend threats to the security of the Internet, it is essential that the investi-
gator first gains a solid knowledge of the components of the Internet [53, 30]. 
Chapter 2                  Insider and Outsider Attacks and Digital Incident/Crime Investigations 





2.1.1.1 The components of the Internet 
The main components of the Internet are the backbone, Network Access Points (NAPs), 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the Domain Name System (DNS).  
 The Backbone 
The first component of the Internet is the backbone. The Internet is defined as a packet-
switched network that consists of a number of private networks, machines and users 
connected together [30]. It is not controlled by a single authority, country, government 
or organisation, but there are many groups involved in the infrastructure and manage-
ment of the Internet, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Inter-
net Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The Internet is usually a very high-speed 
connection of networks and it has three main components, as listed below [30]:   
- Network Service Providers (NSPs): 
an NSP provides national and international interconnecting Internet services to 
Regional Network Providers and large ISPs; 
- Long Distance Carriers (LDCs): 
LDCs are responsible for the physical network of communication channels for 
the Internet and voice/data applications. The general method would be for an 
NAP to contract with an LDC to provide the channels for Backbone communi-
cation; 
 Network Access Points (NAPs): 
The second component of the Internet is the NAPs. These are the actual method by 
which ISPs and NSPs are connected.  
 Internet Service Providers (ISPs)  
The third component of the Internet is the ISP. An ISP is responsible for connecting ac-
tual users to the Internet.  
 Domain Name Systems (DNSs) 
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The fourth component of the Internet is the DNS. This is responsible for translating 
Internet numbers (Internet Protocol (IP) addresses) to Web names. The organisation that 
keeps track of all the names and numbers associated with the DNS is IANA. In fact, 
IANA works as the main coordinator for the assignment of IP addresses, and manages 
the Root Domain Name System. 
2.1.1.2 Applications (activities) of the Internet 
The Internet has five main applications as follows [30]: 
 Email: this application allows the composing, sending and receiving of elec-
tronic mail;   
 News: newsgroups are specialised forums in which users with common interests 
can exchange messages; 
 Remote login: users on the Internet can log on to any machine on which they 
have an account by using the ssh; 
 File transfer: users can copy files from one machine on the Internet to another 
by using the SFTP program;  
 World Wide Web (WWW): it allows a site to set up a number of pages of in-
formation containing text, pictures, sound and video, with embedded links to 
other pages;   
 Virtual Private Network (VPN): it creates a secure communication between 
two or more computers over the Internet;  
 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP): this application allows to make voice 
telephone calls and video-conference over the Internet such as Skype [71]; 
 Bit torrent: this peer- to- peer file sharing application allows to transfer large 
files [67]. 
2.1.2 Local Area Networks (LANs) 
The second type of network infrastructure is the private network. Investment in IT in-
frastructure provides organisations with a number of significant advantages, such as 
high quality services, sharing of resources and reduced costs. Therefore, organisations 
create their own private networks, otherwise called Local Area Networks (LANs). A 
LAN is defined by Gojdman and Rawles [30:12] as “A combination of hardware and 
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software technology that allows computers to share a variety of resources such as 
printers, data, application programs, and storage devices”.   
2.1.2.1 The components of a LAN 
Basically, there are three main components of a LAN: network hardware, software and 
media. This section illustrates these components [30; 45; 54]: 
 Network hardware  
The first component of a LAN is network hardware. The hardware contains two main 
parts:  
1. a Network Interface Card (NIC) which is installed for each server, client and 
device. An NIC is the primary requirement of every network device, such as 
the client workstation, the server hosting the resource and the router. The 
NIC‟s job is to transfer data between a client or server and the shared network 
media. Moreover, an important function of the NIC is to listen to frames with 
their MAC address.   
2. a wire centre which is a physical link by which all network devices, such as 
hubs and switches, connect with each other. A wire centre manages the net-
work as segments, and as a result each organisational department has its own 
signal segment.          
i. A hub device is a connection point for network devices which allows 
them to connect with each other physically on a LAN. Nowadays, it is rare 
for organisations to use a hub. Security issues may arise when using a hub 
device.  
ii.   A network switch is a networking device that connects network nodes as 
network segments. It is sometimes called an intelligent hub. A switch usu-
ally has a table that contains a MAC address for each node. Moreover, each 
port in a switch is independent as a virtual LAN. It appears that a switch is 
more secure than a hub because of reduced broadcast. 
iii.  A router is a network device that is responsible for moving data be-
tween different network segments and examining packet headers to de-
termine the best routes for packets to travel. It recognises paths to all the 
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segments on the network by accessing information stored in the routing 
table. 
 Network software  
The second component of a LAN is network software. There are two types of software 
in a LAN: network protocols and operating system architectures. This software runs on 
a client computer used by the user to access the network‟s resources, and then on net-
work devices to allow them to be shared. 
  
 Operating systems architectures 
There are actually two kinds of network operating system architecture (NOS) in a LAN: 
peer-to-peer and client/server. Today, most LANs use client/server NOS because of 
scalability, centralised management and security issues [54]. This research concentrates 
on client/server NOS because it has become a standard model for networking [54]. The 
computer in a LAN is either a client (requester) or a server (provider). A client is an 
authorised user‟s computer which can request data or services from an organisation‟s 
server. A server is the provider of services or data to the client, such as mail and direc-
tory service servers. Table 1 outlines the principal services that are provided by a server. 
Table 1: A server’s main services 
Server Service 
FTP Transferring data from one computer to another through a 
network 
DHCP Assigning a private IP to an organisation‟s clients  
Network address translation (NAT)  Hiding a private IP address    
Active directory  Database containing computer details, names and services 
Mail Transferring electronic mail messages from one computer 
to another  
Web Accepting HTTP requests from web clients (browser)  
 
 Network Protocols  
As a precondition for smooth communication between two computers, there must be 
agreed methods of communication. The protocol that all hosts on the network use is 
Transmission Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). TCP/IP has four layers, as 
illustrated below [53; 54]: 
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1- Application layer: this layer is responsible for providing services and utilities that 
allow applications to access network resources, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP). SMTP will be discussed later because an email abuse will be selected for ex-
periment in this thesis to represent a method of computer attack.   
SMTP is a protocol which operates over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 25, 
which transfers mail across the Internet. It comprises three main components [94]: 
1- a Mail User Agent (MUA) which is an SMTP client that allows a user to send and 
receive email; 
2- a Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) which is an SMTP server that allows emails to transfer 
from one MTA to another; 
3- a Message Store (MS) which is a server that enables emails to reach their final desti-
nation and be dumped in a user‟s mailbox.         
2- Transport layer: this layer is responsible for delivery and end-to-end communica-
tion. There are two kinds of transport layer protocol: 
 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) which provides the functions of con-
nection-oriented communication using features such as three-way handshak-
ing and sequence and acknowledgement numbers. Sequence numbers are 
used in TCP headers and allow hosts to identify packets sent and received. 
Acknowledgement numbers (ACK) are also used in TCP headers and allow 
two hosts to be given a receipt of delivery. Connections between two hosts 
are always in open status. There are two kinds of open status, i.e.: 
 passive open for a host ready to receive data 
 active open for a host ready to establish communication 
An established connection is called a three-way handshake or three steps. 
The three-way handshake is between a source and a destination. The first 
step is when a source sends an initial packet called a synchronized packet 
(SYN) and a sequence number to a destination host to start to open a connec-
tion. The second step is a response from the destination that sends 
SYN/ACK (ACK is an initiating packet) to the source. The final step takes 
place when the source responds with ACK. The connection is then open and 
data is transferred until the communication is terminated.  
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 User Data Protocol (UDP) provides an unreliable connection and there is no 
guaranteed way of acknowledging the delivery data. It also provides con-
nectionless communication, but it is a faster connection. Table 2 summa-
rises the differences between the two protocols.   
 







Port: is defined as a “logical connection place, specifically using the Inter-
net’s protocol, TCP/IP, as the way a client program specifies a particular 
server program on a computer in a network [15]”. Port numbers are located 
in the TCP or UDP header. They can be assigned to specific functions or ap-
plications. There are three kinds of port number: 
1- Well-known ports are assigned to specific applications. These ports 
are controlled, defined and maintained by IANA [39]. The range of 
these ports is from 1 to 1023. Table 3 gives several examples of 
common, well-known port numbers and services. 
 










Port number Services 
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2- Registered Ports can be registered to a specific function but are not 
controlled by any authority. The range of these ports is from 1024 to 
49151. Table 4 summarises several registered port numbers and ser-
vices [39]: 









3- Private ports or dynamic ports: Any user can use them. They range from 
49152 to 65536.  
Corporate and public investigators should be aware that many ports can be secu-
rity threats in networks. There are several Trojan horse programs that use spe-
cific ports. Table 5 shows several of the critical port numbers which can be ex-
ploited by outsiders or insiders.   
 
                                                   Table 5: Examples of security threats 
 
Port number Type of Port Trojan program 
1243 Registered Sub Seven 
12345 Registered NetBus 
31337 Registered Back Orifice 
54320 Private Back Orifice 2000 
 
 
3- Internet layer: this layer is responsible for encapsulating transport layer data into 
packets, and then addressing and routing them. There are three main types of Internet 
layer protocol: 
 Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and routes packets between hosts and 
networks; 
Port number Services 
1033 Local net info port 
1036 Nebula secure sequence transfer protocol 
1038 Message tracking query protocol 
1155 Network file access 
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 Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) resolves an IP address to an MAC 
address of a host located on the same physical network; 
 Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) sends messages and reports 
errors regarding the delivery of a packet.   
It is very important for digital investigators to understand fully the structure of an IP 
address in order to find a particular host on a private network. IPs are numerical identi-
fications (logical addresses) that are assigned to a particular computer. They are divided 
into two parts: networks and hosts. The network part is what is used to identify the net-
work that the host belongs to, whereas the host part is used to identify the specific host 
on the network.  
There are two kinds of IP address: public and private. Public IP addresses are registered 
with the Network Information Centre (NIC) and are used on the Internet (public net-
work). There are five classes of public IP address, as illustrated in Table 6 below: 
 
                                                                                         Table 6: IP address classes 
 
Class Value Explanation 
A 01-126 First 8 bits define the network and 24 define the host 
B 128-191 First 16 bits define the network and 16 define the host 
C 192-223 First 24 bits define the network and 8 define the host 
D 224-239 Used for multicasting 




On the other hand, private IP addresses are issued by IANA. They are never used on the 
Internet, but private addresses are used in a LAN to address the lack of public IP ad-
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                                                                    Table 7: Private IP addresses 
 
Class Value Number of networks Number of hosts per network 
A 10.0.0.0 1 16,777,214 
B 172.16.0.0 16 65,534 
C 192.168.0.0 256 254 
 
 
4- Link layer: this layer is responsible for sending data into the physical network and 
receiving data from the physical network.  
 Network media  
The third component of a LAN is network media. The media is responsible for the 
physical connection between network devices, and transmits data between nodes. 
2.1.2.2  A LAN’s security controls 
Dhillon [22] and Melara and Sarriegui [50] explain that organisations have three types 
of internal security control: formal, technical and informal. However, when one of the 
three kinds of control measure is not correctly implemented, an insider can pose a major 
risk to an organisation‟s resources [22; 23]. 
1. Formal controls: the network security controls are responsible for establishing 
a proper security policy and procedure to ensure that data integrity, confidential-
ity and availability are maintained. The security policy should include steps to 
secure the network, the procedure for hiring and firing employees, equipment to 
be used and action to be taken in the event of incidents. 
2. Technical controls: the technical security controls are the tools and techniques 
responsible for protecting the system from attacks and recording suspicious ac-
tivities at the technical level, such as IDS antivirus software and access control 
[13; 21; 26; 62]. 
 Firewall: computer software or hardware that enforces a boundary be-
tween two or more networks; 
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 Remote authentication access server: this is responsible for authenti-
cating and allowing an organisation‟s users to gain access to that organi-
sation‟s resources on the LAN from a remote location 
 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): these systems employ different 
techniques to attempt the detection of intrusion into a computer or net-
work by observation of actions, security logs or auditing data. While an 
IDS is used primarily to identify incidents and raise alerts, once an inci-
dent has occurred it can be used as an evidence-gathering and logging 
tool. There are several IDS techniques  two examples of which are:    
o Anomaly detection model: a model whereby intrusion is detected 
by looking for activity that is different from the user‟s normal be-
haviour. An anomaly-based detection system is responsible for as-
certaining a baseline of legitimate activity according to which dif-
ferent types of traffic go across the network as intended for access 
to a specific system and this therefore amounts to normal working 
conditions; 
o Misuse detection model: this model is responsible for detection 
of intrusions, by looking for an activity that corresponds to known 
intrusion techniques or system vulnerabilities (role based detec-
tion). 
  Network traffic: a network sniffer tool that is able to record the header 
and content of network packets. It is responsible for capturing the full 
communication stream; 
 Access Control List (ACL): ACL is a packet filter that compares a 
packet with a given set of rules;  
 Auditing: systematic observation of the log files of network devices, 
scanning for details that can identify the use of network resources; 
 Network forensics: the process of determining how an attack took place 
and the amount of damage caused, along with the process of gathering 
evidence to prove damage   
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3. Informal controls: these controls are responsible for educating and increasing 
the awareness of employees. 
2.2 Security threats 
It is fundamental that corporate security investigators are able to comprehend security 
threats against the Internet and LANs. These threats allow outsiders to gain inside ac-
cess, with the possibility that they can bypass the security mechanisms put in place by 
organisations. In order to collect potential evidence, investigators must understand the 
methodology and techniques used by outsiders to exploit the weaknesses of a system. 
Graves [34] recognises security threats as situations that could lead to serious breaches 
of computer security. An exploit is needed in order to create a computer threat. This is a 
piece of software that takes advantage of a bug, or vulnerability, leading to unauthorised 
access, privilege escalation or Denial of Services (DoS) on a computer system [34].  
There are two types of exploit: remote and local. A remote exploit runs over a network 
and exploits security vulnerabilities without any prior access to the vulnerable system, 
whereas a local exploit needs prior access to the vulnerable system to gain increased 
privileges. Furthermore, vulnerability is defined as the existence of a flaw in the soft-
ware, logic design, or implementation that can bring about an undesirable event in the 
form of giving bad or damaging instructions to the system [34]. In general, security 
threats are categorized as being either intentional or accidental [85]. The aim of this re-
search is to focus only on intentional threats. Intentional threats are deliberate actions 
with the intent of harming and damaging an organisation‟s information. They are di-
vided into passive and active attacks. Based on the purpose of this research, security 
threats to an organisation‟s systems are divided between the Internet and LANs, as fol-
lows:  
2.2.1 Internet threats 
An Internet threat refers to any criminal method that takes advantage of online services, 
and examples include e-mail spam or harassment, illegal access to private networks, 
spoofed web pages, identity theft, and spoofed DNS and web banking. Research con-
ducted in 2006 showed that 60 per cent of homes in the UK had Internet access [96]. In 
Chapter 2                  Insider and Outsider Attacks and Digital Incident/Crime Investigations 





2004, this figure was 49 per cent and in 1999 it was only 13 per cent. The same research 
showed that, in June 2006, 72.6 per cent of all Internet connections in Britain were 
broadband connections [96].  
As the number of Internet users worldwide continues to grow, so too will 
the accounts of cyber-related criminal activity [79] 
The wide use of broadband connections enables the user to be online during the whole 
day; in addition, it allows many users (outsiders) to perform the following tasks: 
 locate a potential target (specific organisations and users) 
 search the Web in order to discover tools that can be employed in an attempt to 
compromise an organisation‟s network 
 exploit the lack of authentication services on the Internet, e.g. to create a fake 
website;    
 target routers by injecting false routing data. Because backbone routers do not 
hold any default routing, a data border gateway protocol is used to learn new 
routes dynamically. A router can be attacked from a LAN. The outsider can in-
ject data into routing tables, because the  Routing Information Protocol (RIP) 
uses UDP packets for exchange of data and does not have any built-in authenti-
cation mechanism; 
 target ISPs to reach the maximum number of potential targets in the shortest 
possible time. This attack will provide outsiders with the user data of an organi-
sation, such as user names, passwords and IP addresses; 
 target the DNS (this attack will be illustrated in Chapter 3) ;      
 gain remote illegal access (such as insider access) to an organisation‟s resources 
by stealing a laptop belonging to that organisation. 
Therefore, because no single body controls the Internet, outsiders can obtain insider in-
formation in a number of ways, such as by creating fake websites. This method prevents 
audit trails and log files from detecting their abnormal behaviour.      
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2.2.2 Threats to a LAN 
These threats allow outsiders to gain insider information by, for example, updating a 
routing table with false information [76]. This false information redirects an insider‟s 
computer to an outsider‟s computer. Security threats on various LAN components may 
be manifested as follows: 
 at wireless network level 
 easy to deploy unauthorised wireless access point 
 encrypted messages can be easily sniffed  
 private networks could be abused by any attackers  
 at cabling level 
 information that can be read by an eavesdropper 
 cabling that can cause denial of service if disconnected 
 at NIC level 
 an attacker who can modify the options of an NIC to listen for all frames re-
gardless of the recipient‟s MAC address (use of sniffers) 
 at hub level 
 anyone who can plug their computer into a physically unsecured hub to lis-
ten to the network 
 at switch level 
 MAC flooding 
 table overflowing 
 ARP spoofing 
 at router level 
 routing tables that can be falsely updated by an attacker 
 IP spoofing 
 replay of IP datagram 
 misconfigured access control decisions at the router level 
After the infrastructure of private and public networks has been discussed and the 
threats of these networks identified, it is necessary to comprehend the differences be-
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tween insiders and outsiders in order to identify potential e-evidence. The potential e-
evidence is extracted from a sequence of an insider‟s activities.    
   
2.3 Computer-related attacks 
Computer attacks appear when a computer is compromised as a result of its vulnerabil-
ity. Attackers usually employ special methods or tools to find a system that may be vul-
nerable to an exploit because of the operating system, network configuration, or appli-
cations installed on the system to prevent an attack [34]. Additionally, Stallings [85] has 
classified security attacks into four main types, as follows: 
 interruption: directed at making a computer system become unavailable, for 
example through destruction of a piece of hardware 
 interception: levelled against the confidentiality of a computer system, such as 
when an unauthorised user gains access to a system by using wiretapping, for 
example, to capture data in a network 
 modification: made against the integrity of a computer system, when an unau-
thorised user tampers with the system, for example by altering a program so that 
it performs differently 
 fabrication: directed against authenticity, when an unauthorised user inserts 
counterfeit objects into the system, such as the addition of records to a file     
These attacks are divided into two types: active and passive [85]. Active attacks involve 
the direct theft of information, software and hardware, and sabotage and destruction, 
whereas passive attacks are in the nature of eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, the 
transmission of data. Nowadays, computer-related attacks are being designed increas-
ingly to obtain information silently without leaving any damage to be noticed by a user. 
The purpose of attacks of this kind is to escape detection so that they remain on host 
systems for long periods of time [104]. A malicious code hosted on websites is one of 
the main forms of advanced attack. Finjan Inc. analysed, from Internet traffic recorded 
in the UK in 2007, more than 10 million unique websites, and it found that [104]: 
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 advanced attack methods that employ code obfuscation through various ran-
domisation techniques are becoming more sophisticated, making them invisible 
to pattern-matching/signature-based methods used by antivirus software; 
 attackers are displaying a growing level of sophistication when embedding mali-
cious codes within legitimate content.  
Another form of advanced attack is identity theft. This method exploits organisations‟ 
inadequate computer security practices [104]. In 2005, personal and sensitive informa-
tion for 310,000 U.S. citizens was stolen in a security data breach that involved 59 in-
stances of unauthorised access to its corporate databases using stolen passwords [104].          
Furthermore, threats to an organisation‟s systems or networks are posed by attackers 
who are referred to as „threat agents‟. These attackers are persons or groups who, with 
malicious intent, deliberately use their capability to disable or damage an organisation‟s 
systems. There are two types of attacker: “insiders” and “outsiders”. Vidalis and Jones 
[99] maintain that insiders (employees) and outsiders (crackers) have the same hostile 
intention towards the system. They also state that outsiders are the more dangerous 
threat to a computer system, because they have the knowledge and motivation to per-
form active attacks and the capability to create the opportunities needed in order to 
carry out attacks. However, Magklaras and Furnell [49] believe that insiders represent 
the more dangerous threat to their own organisation, because they have authorised ac-
cess, privileges to perform tasks and physical access to a target. This section therefore 
continues by providing overviews of insiders and outsiders.                                     
2.3.1 Insider 
An insider is defined by Vidalis and Jones [99] as “a threat agent who is directly or in-
directly employed by an organisation, and has access to the system or sensitive infor-
mation not otherwise disclosed to him and to the general public”. Walton [101] notes 
that authorised access, enabling insiders to commit crimes or breach an organisation‟s 
policies, is also essential to enable them to perform their jobs. Moreover, insider attacks 
can be perpetrated by full-time and part-time employees alike, as well as by temporary 
employees, contractors and auditors.  
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Numerous attempts have been made to define an insider with malicious intent and to 
identify their distinguishing features. Schneier [77] recognises a malicious insider as 
being an employee who is an expert who designed the system against which he is now 
committing an attack. However, Schultz [78] defines an insider attack as the intentional 
misuse of a computer system by an individual who is authorised to access the organisa-
tion's computers and networks. It appears that the majority of definitions of insiders 
agree that their main distinguishing feature is their authorised access to an organisation's 
IT facilities, whereas there is debate about other features of insiders, such as their pos-
session of technical computer skills.  
According to Schneier [77], computer skills and knowledge of an organisation's IT fa-
cilities are the main features of insiders who commit crimes. In addition to skills, Rowl-
ingson [74] extends the features of insiders to include knowledge of, and privileged ac-
cess to, the resources under the control of an organisation. On the other hand, Schultz 
[78] and Randazzo et al. [68] report that technical skills are not always necessary to 
commit a crime. They claim that authorised access to an organisation's IT facilities and 
the intention to commit a crime are the main features of insiders. Furthermore, Ran-
dazzo et al. [68] support the view that computing skills are not always particularly im-
portant in this respect, by finding that 87 per cent of internal incidents in the banking 
sector used simple user commands and that technical skills were not required. More-
over, Rasmussen [69] states that many sophisticated password cracking tools have been 
created that can assist a technically unskilled person to increase their privileges and gain 
unauthorised access to a computer system.  
Therefore, the current researcher defines insiders as trusted individuals who have been 
hired by an organisation and gained authorised access to their organisation's IT re-
sources (facilities) in order to perform their particular job responsibilities/roles. How-
ever, their authorised access (insider access) can be deliberately abused to violate the 
policies of the organisation or commit computer crimes. These abuses could include in-
formation theft, modifying data, downloading pornographic images or sending harass-
ing emails. 
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2.3.1.1  Types of insider 
As mentioned previously, there is some debate about computer skills being the main 
feature that distinguishes insiders. This feature depends on the type of insider under 
consideration. Many types of insider are classified based only on their technical skills.  
The first categorisation of insiders was attempted by Anderson [5] and concentrated on 
technical skills only. This comprised masqueraders and legitimate and clandestine users. 
A masquerader is an insider, with or without full privileged access to an organisation‟s 
IT resources, who wishes to exploit another authorised user's ID and password. Threats 
to IT by legitimate users involve the misuse of authorised access to the system and its 
data [5]. An example arises when an insider uses his legitimate privilege to gain access 
to information he is not normally authorised to access in the course of his day-to-day 
activities.  A clandestine user is related to insiders by his ability to bypass audit and ac-
cess control mechanisms in a specific system [5]. Anderson‟s categorisation is debat-
able because it was based only on the difficulty of detecting insiders‟ activities through 
audit trail data.  
However, advanced categorisation techniques have been designed based on various fea-
tures of insiders, such as knowledge and intention. Magklaras and Furnell [49] have de-
veloped the categorisation of insiders into three levels with regard to their sophistication 
as end users (based on insiders‟ capabilities and knowledge). The first level is ad-
vanced; these insiders have high levels of skill and privileges such as that of a network 
administrator. The second level is ordinary; these insiders have an intermediate level of 
knowledge of certain applications, such as that of a database administrator. The third 
level is novice; these insiders know only a little about computer software and hardware.  
2.3.1.2 Insider attacks/abuse 
Insider attacks, such as stealing information, embezzlement, email harassment and sabo-
tage, are believed to be the main form of breaching and violating the IT policies of an 
organisation [60]. Nykodym et al. [62] assist organisations in understanding the types of 
insider who are likely to commit net abuse and/or cybercrime and the types of offence 
insiders may commit. These attacks can include espionage, theft, sabotage and personal 
abuse of the organisation‟s network. There is some debate here, because no distinction 
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is made between hardware theft and information theft. There are usually two forms of 
insider theft: information theft (e.g. stealing sensitive information) and hardware theft 
(e.g. theft of a laptop). This distinction is necessary for identifying the methodology of 
the attacks and establishing whether they have been carried out locally or remotely. Fur-
thermore, Stanton et al. [86; 87] propose six categories of insider behaviour based on 
two dimensions: intention and technical skill. The six categories are as follows: 
1. Intentional destruction: this requires both technical skill and a strong intention to 
harm the organisation's IT facilities. For instance, a user obtains an employer‟s 
protected files to steal a trade secret. 
2. Detrimental misuse: this requires no technical skill, but nonetheless includes in-
tention to harm through annoyance, harassment, rule breaking, etc.; for example, 
using a company email system for sending spam messages that market a private 
business. 
3. Dangerous tinkering: this requires only technical skill and no intention to harm 
the organisation's IT facilities. For instance, an employee configures a wireless 
gateway that allows wireless access to the organisation‟s network by outsiders in 
cars passing by or parked in the vicinity.    
4. Naïve mistakes: this requires neither technical skill nor intention to harm the or-
ganisation's IT facilities, e.g. choosing a weak password. 
5. Awareness: this requires both technical skill and a strong intention to do good by 
preserving and protecting the organisation‟s resources. For instance, an em-
ployee discovers a backdoor on his PC by using the task list to investigate un-
usual hard drive activity. 
6. Basic hygiene: this requires no technical skill and a clear intention to preserve 
and protect the organisation's IT facilities; for example, a skilled employee re-
sisting an attempt at social engineering by refusing to reveal his password to an 
impersonating user. 
It also appears that, at the present time, technical skill is not always necessary to 
commit insider crimes owing to the availability of complicated hacking software 
employed by unskilled insiders. Insider offences are also becoming increasingly 
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common because of the many features that allow the commission of such crimes. 
For example: 
 insiders are authorised to access their organisation's IT facilities such as files and 
printers; 
 they have physical access to a target; 
 they are privileged to perform specific tasks (jobs); 
 they have knowledge of where valuable resources are located[72]. 
The interesting point here is that many insider features are not limited to insiders, be-
cause the advancements of technology are rapidly changing the methods of outsider at-
tacks. For instance, an outsider can bring the insider to his machine by luring him to it 
and downloading malicious software in order to gain insider access.   
2.3.2 Outsiders 
Blyth and Kovacich [11-:10] define an outsider as someone “who gains unauthorised 
access to or breaks into computer-based information systems.” This definition of an 
outsider is debatable, because it is believed that the main feature of outsiders is that they 
have no prior knowledge of the target. Walton [101] makes this claim. In fact, all out-
siders have only a limited chance of carrying out their attacks against an organisation's 
IT facilities. They can gain access only by exploiting gaps or weaknesses in corporate 
protection systems [101]. Furthermore, advanced methods used by outside attackers fo-
cus on gaining unauthorised access rather than breaking into the organisation‟s network, 
this being in order to prevent the attacker‟s activities from being detected. A successful 
outsider attack requires at least three conditions [44]: 
1. proper motivation 
2. adequate technological skills 
3. right opportunity 
It appears that the changing methods of outsider attack have influenced the definition of 
an outsider significantly. Therefore, outsiders can be defined as users who gain unau-
thorised access (insider access) to an organisation's IT facilities, by having the ability to 
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bypass security mechanisms (no detection by a security mechanism) and with no prior 
knowledge of the facilities to be attacked. 
2.3.2.1 Types of outsiders 
There are three types of outsider [44]: 
 curiosity seekers: motivation for attacks is to have fun or to show off;   
 skilled hackers: outsiders targeting an organisation‟s IT for a specific reason. 
The attacks lead to data theft or corruption. 
 elite attackers: outsiders who gain insider access and commit a crime, leaving no 
trace.  
An outsider strives to gain insider access in order to use it to destroy data, deny service 
to authorised users and cause problems for the organisation [34].  
2.4 The Issue of insider and outsider attacks 
Since most security mechanisms focus on preventing outsider attacks from taking place, 
the only way of attacking an organisation's IT facilities would be through insider access 
[34]. Park and Giordano [64] state that “Many security technologies have been invented 
to prevent threats from outsiders, but they have limited use in countering insiders' ab-
normal behaviour.” 
Because of the advancement of security mechanisms and defences for organisations, the 
old attack techniques, such as emails infected with malicious viruses and worms, are no 
longer effective. Ackerman [1] reported that, in the past, the main computer threats 
came from e-mails infected with worms and viruses. Nowadays, outsiders employ web-
sites to carry codes designed to obtain information from an insider‟s computer [1]. 
Many codes are designed to download themselves automatically as soon as an insider 
accesses a Web page. Furthermore, other sites prompt the insider to accept what appears 
to be legal software but is in fact a malicious program [1].  For instance, insiders who 
browsed the MySpace and YouTube websites in 2005 and who had not patched their 
computers (i.e. their PCs were infected), found that, if they clicked on an advertisement 
or banner, that action silently installed Spyware on their computers to log keystrokes 
and capture usernames and passwords [1; 104]. The CRS Report for Congress found 
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that analysts at Google had reviewed a large number of web pages for the presence of 
malicious software, and identified 4.5 million web pages that were suspicious in this 
regard. More than a million were found to launch downloads of malicious software, col-
lect sensitive data, and then email that data to a temporary email account.  
Advanced methods of outsider attack focus on gaining insider access without leaving 
tracks. These methods lead to the involvement of insiders and may leave limited 
amounts of information (evidence) to distinguish between insiders and outsiders, this 
evidence being extremely hard to find. This is because the outsider aims to bring insid-
ers to the outside of the organisation‟s security defences, or the outsider may initiate 
attacks that go behind the organisation‟s defences (inside the organisation) as follows:    
1. Local information theft is a form of confidentiality attack (passive attack) but 
this kind of attack is hard to detect. Physical access to an organisation and use of 
suitable software or hardware is required to gain sensitive data, such as pass-
words, when the data travels in clear text across trusted networks. Therefore, 
outsiders can gain insider access by exploiting the following weaknesses [45]: 
 Weak password: sometimes a password configuration policy is lacking 
as part of an organisation‟s systems, resulting in an organisation select-
ing a weak password protocol or an insider being able to select a weak 
password (easy to guess) such as his wife‟s name;    
 Weak access control to secret data: poor access controls can create 
good opportunities for outsiders to gain privileged access to a target (file) 
and then delete, modify or read a file.   
2. Remote information theft is launched by using malicious software such as a 
Trojan. This software is usually designed to steal sensitive data. It allows an out-
sider to control an insider's computer when the software is installed on that com-
puter.  
An interesting experiment took place in June 2006, when Stasiukonis was em-
ployed by a credit union to penetrate their network and confirm the threat of a 
social engineering attack. Twenty USB devices were placed in designated areas 
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frequently visited by the employees, such as smoking areas. The interesting con-
tent in each one of these USBs was a specially written Trojan program, planted 
in image files, which would email any employee‟s sensitive information, such as 
logins and passwords, to Stasiukonis. After three days, fifteen of the USB drives 
had been found by the company‟s employees, who tried to find out the contents 
of the USB devices by plugging them into their organisation‟s computers. Sub-
sequently, the employees‟ user names and passwords were sent out to Sta-
siukonis. The actions of the employees, who were innocent users under no sus-
picion of any potential fraud, proves how easily social engineers can gain insider 
access [20]. 
3. Spoofing occurs over the Internet because organisations do not have control 
over the ISP, the public routers or the public domain name service (DNS) serv-
ers [76]. Outsider attacks can redirect a DNS server to lead an employee‟s com-
puter to a false destination.      
4. The theft of hardware such as laptops or disks may also present a good oppor-
tunity for outsiders to gain remote access to an insider's computer, once the or-
ganisation‟s devices are loaded with confidential information. The BBC reported 
that a memory stick with user names and passwords for a key government com-
puter system had been lost and later found in a pub car park [10]. This proves 
that opportunities for an outsider to gain insider access can occur anywhere.   
The main problem arises when an outsider has gained insider access or an insider 
denies carrying out an attack. This kind of attack needs special treatment, because it 
involves different parties (an insider and an outsider). The next section describes 
how corporate security investigators deal with different advanced methods of attack.             
2.4.1  Advanced methods of attack (outsiders gaining insider access) 
Once the attacker has gained insider access without detection and has employed an in-
sider's computer to commit a crime against an organisation's IT facilities, they usually 
redirect the computer crime investigation to a different crime. Indeed, nowadays this 
type of attack is directly linked to money laundering, fraud, the accessing or distribution 
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of pornography, espionage or harassment [37]. A significant case of this type of attack 
is illustrated by Dataclinic [21]. A university professor was sacked after being accused 
of downloading pornographic images. The university‟s IT security found that 150 por-
nographic images had been downloaded by the professor. The professor‟s PC was ex-
amined by two computer forensic firms (third party). The first firm produced a report 
that supported the university‟s allegations. However, the second firm found that the pro-
fessor was innocent and the incident had been committed by an outsider in order to in-
criminate him [21]. The university paid the professor £90,000 for unfair dismissal [21].  
Furthermore, it is vital to know when an outsider might also be directly linked to terror-
ist groups, especially in countries that have been the victims of physical terrorist activi-
ties such as Saudi Arabia, India, the United Kingdom and the United States. A recent 
case of such an attack involving terrorism occurred in India in 2008 and was reported by 
the Guardian newspaper. Access belonging to an American user who worked as an ex-
pert in India was used by an outsider who was a member of a terrorist group in India. 
After the compromised computer was used to broadcast a large number of terrorist 
emails, these emails were tracked, leading to the American expert. Subsequently, an ex-
tensive computer forensic investigation was conducted which found that access to the 
American‟s computer had been gained by an outsider [100].            
Such an attack is complicated. The reason for this complication is that no effort is put 
into identifying the features that can distinguish between insider and outsider activities.  
2.4.2 Current methods of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks 
The revolution of the Internet and communication technology, and the extension of pri-
vate networks, has led to constant changes in the methods of attack. In the past, outsid-
ers found difficulties in identifying potential targets because of slow connection to the 
Internet and a different IP address being generated every time. However, with high 
speed, always-on Internet connections for the outsider, ISPs have created a new playing 
field for the outsiders, who just need time to be able to identify their potential targets. 
The ability of attackers to hide their identity can also create a difficult challenge for 
corporate security investigators. 
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Casey [12:9] stated that “Criminals are using technology to facilitate their offences and 
avoid apprehension, creating new challenges for attorneys, judges, law enforcement 
agents, forensic examiners, and corporate security professionals”. Gaining insider ac-
cess is an advanced method of attacking the organisation‟s facilities in order to prevent 
the abnormal behaviour of an outside attack from being detected and to hide the identity 
of the outsiders. As a result of sophisticated attacks, new challenges are arising for in-
vestigators in terms of distinguishing between insider and outsider activities. Owing to 
the rapid development of attack methods, making the distinction between insider and 
outsider attacks has become extremely difficult. As mentioned previously, the develop-
ment of new attack methods influences insider features and those features are not only 
limited to insiders. Furthermore, the current methods of distinguishing between insider 
and outsider attacks are insufficient. These methods are described next.       
2.4.2.1 Location from which  attacks are initiated 
One of the main aspects (or features) of distinction between insider and outsider attacks 
is the location of where the attack was initiated. Melara and Sarriegui [50] and Graves 
[34] claim that the difference between insider and outsider attacks is based on whether 
they were initiated from inside or outside the organisation. However, this statement is 
debatable because, as discussed previously, the revolution of the Internet and communi-
cation technology, and the extension of private networks, allow insiders to commit 
crimes against their own organisation from the outside, whereas the improvement of 
wireless networks and the advancement of hacking tools such as keystroke devices al-
low an outsider to commit a crime against an organisation from the inside. For instance, 
an organisation configures a wireless gateway that allows wireless access to the organi-
sation‟s network by outsiders passing by the organisation's premises.  
Therefore, the outsider will be classified as an insider based on the location. However, 
from a computer forensics perspective, this is insufficient evidence and cannot support 
the assertion that it is possible to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks based 
solely on the location of the attack‟s initiation.   
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2.4.2.2 Attacks within an organisation’s control 
Another way to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks is demonstrated by 
Walton [101]. He believes that insider attacks are within the organisation's control, 
whereas outsider attacks are not [101]. However, this distinction is inappropriate be-
cause when insider access is gained by an outsider, this attack is still within an organisa-
tion‟s control and he/she is classified as an insider.  However, from the perspective of a 
corporate security investigation, the outsider‟s computer is not subject to forensic col-
lection. Furthermore, the insider‟s personal computer is also not subject to forensic col-
lection when the attacks are initiated from outside the organisation. Since the main aim 
of this research is to develop the process of computer incident analysis, gaining access 
to the log of interest is the first step in collecting appropriate evidence. Therefore, the 
insider's computer may be subject to collection, analysis and examination, whereas an 
outsider‟s computer is not.   
2.4.2.3 Access 
Authorised access is another aspect of distinguishing between insider and outsider at-
tacks, as demonstrated by the majority of computer security experts [68; 74; 78]. They 
report that the most important difference between these attacks is that insiders have 
authorised access to an organisation's IT facilities whereas outsiders do not have such 
access. However, having authorised access is not always the best way of distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks, because insider access can be gained illicitly. As 
mentioned previously, as a result of the development of the Internet and communication 
technology, remote access to private networks is extended to be accessible to a com-
pany‟s employees from anywhere and at any time using, for example, a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN). However, when insider access is gained by outsiders, this access is 
shared between the insider and the outsider. As a result of having insider access, outsid-
ers can easily access the organisation's IT resources without breaking into their private 
network. Therefore, security defences such as a firewall recognise an outsider as an in-
sider. Consequently, the task of distinguishing between an insider and an outsider be-
comes extremely hard. Table 8 illustrates the main ways of distinguishing between in-
sider and outsider attacks.  
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Therefore, an issue arises as to how to distinguish between insider and outsider activi-
ties when an insider denies carrying out an attack. 
 
Table 8: Main methods of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks 
 
Current methods of distinction between 
insider and outsider attacks 
Disadvantages Example 
Location of attack initiation Classifies an out-
sider as an insider  
Wireless networks and keystroke 
devices allow an outsider to 
commit a crime against an or-
ganisation from the inside. 
Attack is within the organisation's control Classifies an out-
sider as an insider 
When insider access is gained 
remotely by an outsider, it is 
within the organisation‟s control.  
Authorised access Classifies an out-
sider as an insider 
When an outsider gains insider 
access, with the capability to by-
pass the security mechanism, the 
outsider has authorised access.  
 
 
Since this research focuses on identifying items that facilitate computer incident inves-
tigation for distinction between insider and outsider attacks, the next section of the lit-
erature review introduces state-of-the-art computer forensics and investigation, in par-
ticular, corporate computer investigation. It ends with a description of the shortcomings 
of current models of computer forensic investigation.   
 
2.5 Computer forensics 
Computer forensics is a new discipline based on both computer security technology and 
forensic science [59]. As mentioned previously in the section on a LAN‟s security con-
trol, computer security technologies are the tools and techniques that are responsible for 
preserving, detecting and gathering electronic evidence (e-evidence). On the other hand, 
forensic science is the application of science to the law. It involves the search for, and 
examination of, physical traces. The main principles of forensic science are as follows 
[59]: 
 frozen crime scene in order to protect the integrity of the evidence 
 chain of evidence 
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 record of all steps taken to reach the conclusion arrived at, in order to allow an 
independent party to review these steps.          
Computer forensics concentrates on the investigation of computer-related crime and in-
cidents of computer abuse [102]. Furthermore, the purpose of computer forensics is to 
discover, acquire, identify, analyze and preserve electronic evidence (e-evidence). 
Newman [59] recognizes e-evidence as information or data of some investigative value 
that is usually stored on, or transmitted by, a computer system such as emails, files, im-
ages and IP addresses. This e-evidence is as demonstrated below [59]: 
 data are raw facts that can be processed by computing devices into relevant 
pieces of information such as a credit card statement; 
 software is recognized as instructional coding that manipulates the hardware in a 
computer system such as Java; 
 hardware is described as the physical equipment and attached devices used in a 
computer system, such as computers and printers.  
However, the nature of e-evidence is fragile because the evidence is subject to altera-
tion, damage or destruction under improper handling or examination [2]. For that rea-
son, there are many conditions that apply to e-evidence before it can be rendered ac-
ceptable in court. 
 
2.5.1 The principles of computer forensics 
The principles are as follows [2]: 
 no action taken by those undertaking computer forensic activities should change 
data held on a computer or other media, which may subsequently need to be re-
lied upon in court 
 an audit trail or other record of all processes applied to e-evidence should be 
created and preserved. A third party should be able to examine those processes 
and achieve the same result 
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2.5.2 The process of investigation into a relevant computer crime/incident 
There are four main forensic procedures that should be followed in order to conduct the 
investigation, as indicated below [2]: 
1. The collection process is responsible for the search, recognition, collection and 
documentation of computer based e-evidence. This phase involves both real-
time and stored information which can be lost if the investigator does not take 
precautions at the scene.   
2. the examination process is responsible for making the evidence visible and ex-
plaining its origin and significance. It should accomplish several things. It 
should document the content and the state of the evidence. This documentation 
allows investigators to discover what the evidence consists of. It includes the 
search for hidden information. Furthermore, physical computer evidence can be 
represented by physical items such as central processing units (CPU), chips, 
boards, media, monitors, printers, digital cameras and USBs. E-evidence, while 
stored on these physical items, is latent and exists only in an abstract electronic 
form. The result that is reported from an examination is the recovery of this la-
tent information. Computer forensics requires adherence to certain methods to 
ensure the integrity of the data and information contained within those physical 
items.      
3. The analysis process is a technical review that is within the area of expertise of 
the forensic professional. The analysis of evidence involves identifying the most 
appropriate software tools to be used. It might include a forensic toolkit, a file 
viewer for deleted and extant files, software for reading network logs, and hex 
editors. 
4. The report outlines the examination process and the pertinent data recovered, 
and completes the examination.   
2.5.3 The analysis of computer investigations 
This section illustrates the different types of computer analysis, because this research 
aims to employ many types of analysis such as “timeline analysis” and “relational 
analysis” to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. The analysis is the process 
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of observing the data and determining its relevance and significance to the specific case. 
There are several types of analysis, as shown below [43]: 
2.5.3.1  Timeframe (timeline of activities) analysis  
The timeframe or timestamp is the date/time stored or communicated by an electronic 
medium. Computer systems store timestamps in many different ways and according to 
different rules [103]. Timestamps are usually stored whenever a file is created, modified 
or accessed. Furthermore, most computer systems have logging functions that log ac-
tivities on the computer with timestamps. The importance of timeframes or timestamps 
in digital forensics lies in establishing the correct sequence of events and associating a 
particular user to a time period. It is also a fundamental method of activity reconstruc-
tion during a case investigation [44; 103].   
2.5.3.2 Data-hiding analysis 
This analysis is used to search for data that may be hidden on the hard disk in order to 
hide the crime and the evidence. Files can be hidden in many ways on a computer sys-
tem, such as hiding in plain view. This method of hiding allows the criminal user to 
give a file a name that makes it appear to be something it is not and something that an 
investigator would not be interested in.   
2.5.3.3 Application and file analysis 
This analysis is used to identify the kind of programs that the suspect is using, recogniz-
ing common file types used for specific purposes relevant to the investigation, and asso-
ciating the files that have been located on the drive with particular software. A number 
of files can be associated with specific applications to identify the programs that are 
normally used. For instance, investigators could link files in a Temporary Internet Files 
directory to those used with Internet Explorer, whereas other files could be associated 
with email programs.       
2.5.3.4 Functional analysis  
This analysis is used to determine the capabilities of computers and users, and the 
proper working of the system during relevant time periods, and to understand an of-
fender‟s motivation and intent [12].     
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2.5.3.5 Relational analysis 
This analysis is used to identify relationships between suspects, victims and the crime 
scene. Relational analysis is useful in creating nodes that represent places those in-
volved have been to, and email and IP addresses used by them, and to determine if there 
are connections between these nodes [12; 43].   
2.5.3.6 Ownership and possession  
This analysis is used to identify who has created, modified or accessed files on a com-
puter in order to associate the existence of a file with the actions of users. For instance, 
when a user denies the creation of a specific file, this analysis is employed to identify 
who created that file and the last time it was accessed. This analysis is usually used in 
conjunction with timeframe analysis to observe when a particular person used the com-
puter and had access to a particular file.      
 
2.5.4 Types of computer investigation model 
Ciardhuain [17] believes that the available models are general models of cybercrime 
investigation that concentrate only on part of the investigative process (dealing with 
gathering, analysing and presenting the evidence). These models are usually designed to 
assist public and corporate forensic investigations. Therefore, it appears that there are 
two types of computer forensic model: specific and general. 
2.5.4.1 Specific models  
These focus on improving just one computer forensic process by producing appropriate 
procedures or techniques in order to assist the investigation in its handling of e-
evidence.   
- The Good Practice Guide for Computer-based Electronic Evidence [2] provides 
guidance for public and corporate investigators with regard to criminal investi-
gations involving computers and electronic devices. It is designed only to collect 
physical and electronic evidence at the crime scene, and to illustrate how to deal 
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with the computer(s) at the crime scene when they are switched off or on. It is 
useful for collecting volatile evidence at a crime scene.  
However, the Practice Guide does not focus on the analysis process, and does 
not provide the investigation with suitable tools for data collection, for example, 
the tools that can be used to image a suspect‟s hard drive.   
- The Technical Working Group for Electronic Crime Scene Investigation [6] is 
also wholly designed as a procedure for improving the collection process. This 
procedure deals with the recognition, collection, preservation, transportation and 
storage of e-evidence. It provides the investigation with the location of evidence 
for specific crimes.  
However, it has the same shortcomings as the Good Practice Guide for Com-
puter-based Electronic Evidence. Furthermore, there are no instructions on how 
to collect volatile data.     
- The Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) [63] has proposed a model 
for computer forensic analysis, but it has not yet been completed. The main ad-
vantage of DFRW is that it is one of the first large associations for this purpose 
that is led by academia rather than law enforcement [63]. It focuses the direction 
of the scientific community towards the challenges of digital forensics [63]. 
However, the DFRW model is just a basis for future work [70]. 
-  The International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists (IACIS) 
[92] has focused on the process of computer forensic examination by developing 
a guide for forensic examinations. This guide provides useful information about 
the examination of the OS and file systems, such as FAT and the location of the 
most important evidence. However, proper examination tools are not provided. 
IACIS‟s guide focuses on passive examination of the target or suspect com-
puters only.         
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2.5.4.2 Generic models 
These are concerned with appropriate procedures including guidance on how to conduct 
all the processes of computer forensic investigation (reporting a crime and collecting, 
examining, analysing, reporting on and presenting the evidence).  
- Casey [12] has proposed a very general framework for dealing with computer 
crime on network layers and standalone systems. It describes how to collect, ex-
amine and analyse data. This model is designed to ensure appropriate evidence 
handling and reduce the chance of mistakes being created by other potential pit-
falls;   
- Ciardhuain [17] has proposed an extended model for cybercrime investigation 
by addressing certain activities such as presenting the information flow in an in-
vestigation and capturing its full scope, rather than merely processing the evi-
dence. This model assists the development of modern investigative tools. Al-
though this model is generic, it concentrates on the management perspective. In-
vestigative tools for conducting investigations are not provided.     
- Haggerty and Taylor [37] have provided a framework for the management of 
computer forensic facilities and activities within a corporate setting. This 
framework demonstrates how to conduct computer forensic investigations 
within an organisation by means of procedures including coverage of how to se-
cure evidence, how to preserve the integrity of the evidence and how to produce 
an audit trail for all the forensic steps that have been taken in order to reach the 
final conclusion. However, the framework provides guidance on managing fo-
rensic investigation tasks rather than being a comprehensive guideline for foren-
sic computer examination. 
- Mitropoulos et al. [58] have also proposed a management framework with a 
structured methodology that includes practices for handling security incidents. 
Their management framework discusses how to identify the source of an attack 
by using both passive incident response procedures (such as examining the sys-
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tem log) and active incident response procedures (such as examining the com-
puter domain and the network).          
- Windows [52] provides useful guidance for conducting computer investigations 
for Windows platforms. This guideline identifies the location of evidence and 
suitable tools for recovering data. However, it is not suitable for distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks. 
Table 9 explains the process of computer forensics for both general and specific models 
 
Table 9: Process of computer investigation for general and specific models 
 
  Process of Computer Forensics  











Casey [12] X X X X  
Ciardhuain [17] X X X X  
Haggerty and Taylor‟s framework [37] X X X X  
Windows [52] X X X X  
Model proposed by Nelson et al. [60] X X X X  
















Technical Working Group for Electronic 
Crime Scene Investigation [6] 
 
X     
ACPO[2] X     
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2.5.5 Corporate security investigations 
A corporate computer investigation is defined by Wang et al. [102] as an investigation 
that can be conducted by an organisation, without the involvement of law enforcement 
agencies, in order to deal with violations of the organisation‟s policies or for purposes 
of civil litigation. The investigation should be able to deal with insiders so as to prove 
that a crime has been committed and, if so, to identify the insider. It is often the case 
that an electronic crime has been committed and the guilty party (the insider) needs to 
be identified.  
A corporate computer investigation is usually required to reveal e-evidence, from net-
works or computers, that may be destined for use in court. Nowadays, organisations are 
increasingly making use of computer forensics and investigation in areas such as fraud, 
accessing and distribution of pornography, and harassment cases [37].  An organisa-
tion's computers, servers and laptops are increasingly becoming targets of crime, as well 
as being potential tools for committing crimes, or a repository of information used or 
generated in the commission of a crime [37].  
However, the lack of forensic readiness is a serious challenge that faces corporate com-
puter investigators when dealing with e-crime [42; 37; 81]. For instance, research into 
computer security in the private sector in Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that the detec-
tion and identification of the source of attacks is limited. However, the proportion of 
crime detection without identifying the source of an attack is high [3]. Kent and Gha-
valas [42] believe that organisations are usually slow in recognising the importance and 
implications of computer-based evidence.  
Based on the above discussion, it appears that organisations still find difficulty in deal-
ing with traditional crimes, such as breaking into the system. Therefore, they have yet to 
consider advanced methods of attack by outsiders. There is still no investigation model 
in existence that can distinguish between insider and outsider attacks in an organisation. 
Thus, when addressing the lack of forensic readiness within organisations, it becomes 
clear that little effort has been made to improve forensic capability within organisations.  
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2.5.5.1  The issue for corporate security investigation of distinguishing be-
tween insider and outsider attacks 
Based on the above discussion, it can be said that outsiders exploit the weakest link in 
an organisation‟s computer security chain, namely that of authorised users/insiders, to 
gain unauthorised access to an organisation‟s system. It appears that the methods of at-
tack have become extremely sophisticated in recent years, since outsiders are able to 
take their insiders (victims) outside the organisation‟s network security (beyond the or-
ganisation‟s control). Such an attack assists the outsider in gaining insider access while 
hiding their abnormal behaviour and their identity. Figure 4 illustrates the problem of 
insider and outsider attacks. An outsider used insider access to access an organisation‟s 
computer. Then an abusive email has been sent to a worker. The co-worker reported this 
incident to an IT security department. After that, an insider‟s computer was collected 
and analysed. The evidence supported that the email had been sent by an insider, 
whereas the insider refuted this allegation. Finally, the wrong decision was made based 
on the incorrect evidence.  
      
1. On the other hand, it appears that the above model of computer investigation is 
usually designed to deal with traditional old-fashioned computer attacks, such as 
breaking into networks or computer systems. The single largest gap in the cur-
rent models is that they do not focus on the distinction between insider and out-
sider attacks. These models focus on incorporating the requirements of legal sys-
tems into IT systems in order to conduct proper computer forensic investiga-
tions. Casey [12] has stated that every investigation is unique and can bring 
about unforeseeable challenges. Therefore, because these models do not focus 
on the distinction between insider and outsider attacks, they do not provide in-
vestigators with the proper requirements for distinguishing between those types 
of attack, as follows:  
 what type of data is to be collected? 
  which tools should be used to collect the data: 
  which procedures should be followed to analyse the data?     
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Furthermore, another critical gap in the current models is that little effort has been put 
into the process of computer analysis [103]. From examining cases of outsider and in-
sider attack, it is clear that there is no computer forensic analysis tool for dealing with 
the distinction between insider and outsider attacks. This is because, as in the case of the 
university professor mentioned above, two totally opposing conclusions can be reached. 
Unfortunately, these issues mislead investigators who are performing ad hoc investiga-
tions with the aim of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks, because no 
specific analysis model for that distinction exists to guide the investigation towards col-
lecting proper evidence. The consequence of this is an increased chance of mistakes be-
ing made in identifying the right suspects, which could lead to the mishandling of evi-
dence and putting the organisation into a financially disadvantageous situation and 
negative publicity. 
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Step 1: An outsider logged into 
network resources 
Step 2 : The outsider 
accessed to the mail server 
send an abusive email
Step 3: A victim received an 
abusive email from the insider
Step 4: The victim reported an 
abusive email to the ddepartment 
concerned  
Step 7: The insider refutes the 
allegation of sending the email    
Step 5: An insider’s computer was 
seized
Step 8: Make a decision that was 
insider attack based on the 
evidence 
Step 6: The available evidence was 
examined
ISSUE 3: Absence of legitimate 
activity log for  insider’s activities  
ISSUE 4: Improper use of analysis 
methodology and incorrect data 
analysis  
Effect 1: Incorrect decision made  
Effect 2: Compensation & damage 
reputation  
ISSUE 1: Authentication problem;
 An outsider can gain the insider 
access and an insider can claim his 
password was obtained by the 
outsider   
Authentication 
Server
ISSUE 2: Incapable of log systems 
Outsider
 
Figure 4: Issue of Insider and Outsider Attacks 
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Based on the literature review, it can be concluded that the difficulties in distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks, when an insider denies carrying out an attack, fall 
into five main categories as follows: 
1- Intensive research on a distinction between insider and outsider attacks 
has not yet been conducted. 
2- Advanced technology, if possessed by a skilled attacker, significantly 
influences the methods used for gaining insider access without detec-
tion. As a result of insider access being gained by someone with the 
ability to bypass the security mechanisms of an organisation, by ex-
ploiting the weaknesses of various components of the Internet, the 
crime scene can extend beyond the control of the organisation. Fur-
thermore, outsiders can exploit weaknesses in the organisation‟s net-
work to gain insider access without detection. Therefore, the task of 
distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks becomes extremely 
difficult when an insider denies carrying out an attack. 
3- Incorrect types (or aspects) of evidence can be used to identify the dif-
ferences between insider and outsider attacks. This is because these as-
pects are suitable for dealing with traditional attacks such as when out-
siders penetrate an organisation‟s network by overriding firewalls. As 
previously discussed, these aspects include the location of attack initia-
tion, attacks within an organisation‟s control, and authorised access. 
Therefore, these aspects are not suitable for distinguishing between 
types of attack. 
4- Lack of physical evidence collection because suspect computers are 
not under an organisation‟s control, such as when the computer be-
longs to an outsider or an insider‟s personal computer is being used at 
home. Therefore, a limited amount of logical data is available for fo-
rensic collection. 
5- No conclusive model of computer forensic analysis exists that includes 
the distinction between insider and outsider attacks. In general, there is 
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limited research on computer forensic analysis models, such as the first 
model of computer forensic analysis which was designed by Palmer 
[63]. However, models for distinguishing between insider and outsider 
attacks are non-existent. This issue prevents a corporate computer in-
vestigator from conducting an investigation with the aim of distin-
guishing between insider and outsider attacks. There has been a lack of 
effort in identifying the types of data to be collected and the location of 
the data, determining the tools to be used to collect and analyse it, and 
also in determining the methodology that should be employed to con-
duct an investigation.    
Furthermore, this chapter has also defined insiders as trusted individuals who have been 
hired by an organisation and gained authorised access to their organisation's IT re-
sources (facilities) in order to perform their particular job responsibilities/role. On the 
other hand, outsiders are defined as users who gain insider access (unauthorised) to an 
organisation's IT facilities through their ability to bypass security mechanisms and with 
no prior knowledge of the insider‟s job responsibilities. 
Following the literature review, which illustrated the difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween insider and outsider attacks, the next chapter will discuss classifications of com-
puter and network attacks in detail. Then, it will present the assumptions of the thesis 
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 to discuss suspicious activities (computer incidents/attacks) 
 to discuss user job activities and legitimate activities  
 to develop the thesis‟s assumptions 
 
 
After understanding the issues of involved in distinguishing between insider and 
outsider attacks, this chapter discusses the categorisation of attacks. It extends the 
classification of computer and network attacks devised by Hansman and Hunt to include 
a number of other types of attack [38]. It also develops the assumptions made by the 
thesis, which enhance the collection and analysis process of computer investigations, in 
order to improve the process of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. 
3.1 Job responsibilities/roles   
This section aims to identify the job responsibilities/role of an employee and determine 
what constitutes legitimate activity. Comprehension of the insider‟s job responsibilities 
is essential in order to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. Job responsibili-
ties comprise a list of the tasks and roles of each position [51]. They define an em-
ployee‟s job title because they detail the tasks that an employee is expected to undertake 
in return for his/her salary. They also include information about the applications and 
equipment used by an employee and their relationships with other positions within the 
organisation [51]. Therefore, job responsibilities are important when making a distinc-
tion between insider and outsider attacks, for a number of reasons: 
 Identification of insider’s job responsibilities/tasks:  corporate security inves-
tigators should identify and collect insider‟s job responsibilities from an organi-
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sation‟s human resource management. This is because the analysis process of 
distinction between insider and outsider attacks requires this information     
 No prior knowledge of the insider’s job responsibility: most outsiders who 
gain insider access have no prior knowledge of the insider‟s job responsibility. 
They usually focus on hiding their identity when computer attacks are carried 
out;   
 Identification of legitimate activities: job responsibilities help to identify 
whether the activities performed at the time of the incident are related to the in-
sider‟s job responsibilities or not; 
 Identification of relationships: job responsibilities help to identify the relation-
ships between the activities that were performed at the time of attack and an at-
tacker. If these activities match with a job responsibility, the attack is classified 
as an insider attack  
3.2 Legitimate user activities  
After identifying an employee‟s job responsibilities, it is necessary to understand what 
constitutes a legitimate employee/user activity. Every organisation allows its employees 
to utilise its IT resources (facilities), such as remote login, file transfer, email or Internet 
access, in order that they can perform their job responsibilities/roles. These activities are 
deemed to be legitimate because an organisation specifies which employees are granted 
access to IT facilities and which operations, such as create, read and modify, can be per-
formed on the software and hardware to which such access is granted [27]. These activi-
ties include the following: 
 Install and upgrade: employees who have administrator privilege can install 
software such as Operating Systems (OS) or applications. They can also update 
software or applications; 
 Access to specific application servers: permission has been granted for specific 
employees to access the following application servers in order to create and 
modify data, download or upload files: 
o Database Application Server  
o File Application Server  
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o FTP Server 
 Browse the Internet: many employees require access to the Internet to perform 
their jobs; for example, researchers need the Internet when finding conference 
and journal papers;  
 Files and folders: employees usually create, modify and store files and folders 
on their desktops. These files or folders are related to their job responsibilities.    
 Access to network servers: employees can use their organisation‟s network 
server, such as its email service for sending and receiving emails. These emails 
are usually business emails. Employees can also use their organisation‟s printer 
to print files and folders. 
These legitimate activities are a main source of distinction between insider and outsider 
attacks, because these activities would be uniquely undertaken by employees. The col-
lection and examination of details of these activities would help to reveal the insider‟s 
job responsibilities.       
Figure 5 shows an example of an organisation‟s structure, the job responsibilities/roles 
of sample employees, and their legitimate activities. This Figure divides the organisa-
tion‟s resources between subjects and objects. A subject would be an employee who has 
been assigned by the organisation to perform a list of specific tasks that include access-
ing passive objects via specific operations. The objects comprise IT resources and facili-
ties, such as application servers, email servers and file servers. 
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Figure 5: An organisation's structure 
 
 
It appears that there is a difference between a user‟s job responsibilities/activities and 
legitimate activities. A user‟s job responsibilities include a set of tasks and activities 
that are needed to produce certain results, such as writing a memo, writing spreadsheets, 
updating a database, or sending and receiving business emails. However, a legitimate 
activity allows an employee to access an organisation‟s resources, such as a database 
server, in order to perform their job activities. For example, once insider access to an 
organisation‟s email system has been gained by an outsider, a security mechanism 
would classify this activity as being legitimate but without verifying whether this activi-
ty is included among the user‟s job responsibilities or not. Therefore, the content of the 
email should be analysed. 
The researcher believes that if the activity includes organisational user‟s job responsibil-
ity it is called “legitimate activity” otherwise; it is called “suspicious activity”.   
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3.3 Suspicious activity/taxonomy of attacks 
This section aims to identify suspicious activities that have been performed by insiders 
to annoy co-employees or harm their organisation‟s systems. These activities can also 
be performed by outsiders using insider access to hide their identity. Any organisation‟s 
computer connected to the public network is under threat from malicious attacks, such 
as viruses and attacks from crackers. Therefore, a corporate security investigator needs 
to understand the nature of these attacks in order to be able to determine which types of 
suspicious activity can be expected to occur. 
The aim of a classification is to provide a useful means of describing attacks because, at 
present, attacks are often described differently by different organisations. Hansman and 
Hunt [38] have proposed a common classification that can be shared between 
organisations. The classification comprises viruses, worms, Trojans, buffer overflows, 
denial of service (DoS), network attacks, physical attacks, password attacks and 
information-gathering attacks. 
It appears that this classification of attacks does not include some important types of 
attack such as client-side attacks, impersonation, spoofing and email attacks. Graves 
[34] states that outsiders can use one of these methods to gain insider access and attack 
an organisation's IT resources. Therefore, this chapter extends the classification to cover 
these attacks. 
3.3.1 Client-side attacks 
The only way to attack an organisation's IT facilities is through gaining insider access 
[34]. However, outsiders currently use advanced techniques for committing a crime that 
allow them to gain insider access without detection and then carry out an attack.  
One of these techniques is client-side attacking that is designed to exploit a vulnerability 
remotely, via client applications such as an Internet browser. One encouragement for 
this type of attack is the fact that 35 per cent of organisations have no control over 
employees‟ use of instant messaging [7]. Further encouragement for the attacker comes 
from about 70 per cent of organisations having no control over Internet access by their 
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employees, whereas the remaining 30 per cent restrict Internet access to only some of 
their staff [7]. Therefore, it is quite possible that client-side attacking is one of the main 
threats facing an organisation‟s computer clients, because the majority of organisations 
implement client/server networks. The attack can occur via any client/server pair, for 
example email, FTP and instant messaging [75]. 
In 2007, the SANS Institute reported that client-side vulnerabilities are among the 
biggest threats facing computer users [35]. For example, an outsider can use websites 
that include codes that are designed to obtain information, such as passwords, from an 
insider‟s computer [1]. It is remarkable that many codes are often designed to download 
themselves automatically as soon as an insider accesses a web page. Furthermore, other 
sites prompt the insider to accept what appears to be legal software but is in fact a 
malicious program [1]. One example of this type of attack was in 2005 when insiders, 
who had not patched their computers, browsed the MySpace and YouTube websites. 
Their PCs were infected if they clicked on an advertisement or banner, which secretly 
installed Spyware on their computers to log keystrokes and capture user names and 
passwords [1; 104]. 
It is evident that outsiders employ websites to carry malicious software which aims to 
obtain usernames and passwords. As mentioned in the previous chapter, analysts at 
Google discovered that 4.5 million web pages that were suspicious in nature [104].  
Beer reported that more than a million were found to have launched downloads of 
malicious software, collected sensitive data, and then emailed that data to a temporary 
email account [7]. This is because organisations tend not to scan outgoing emails for 
confidential data. This is true, for example, of 84 per cent of organisations in the UK 
[6]. 
3.3.2 Malicious software 
Malicious software or malware is a piece of software that is implemented for fraudulent 
reasons with the intention of causing damage on personal or corporate computers. It in-
cludes computer viruses, worms and Trojan horses [39].  
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These are computer programs that are usually capable of causing harm to a file system 
or another program [11]. Insiders and outsiders use emails to distribute harmful content 
to the organisation‟s network. They can bypass firewalls by tunnelling through the 
email, if the email content has not been analysed. Viruses often deliver destructive 
payloads that can devastate data and bring down entire mail systems. Email is also 
employed to install Trojans (see below) in order to obtain an organisation‟s confidential 
information or gain control of their computers [11]. 
Viruses have become widespread in the past few years and are becoming more com-
plex. Various types of virus are developed daily and involve different methods of in-
formation gathering. 
3.3.2.2 Trojan Horses 
These comprise hidden instructions which, when executed, allow an outsider to control 
an insider's system by opening a communication channel between them. The insider's 
system can then be used as a tool to commit another crime in order to hide the identifi-
cation of the outsider. A Trojan horse can even send passwords and personal details to 
the outsider, and it is also one of the main ways of installing a malicious program, such 
as a virus or a worm. 
3.3.2.3 Logic bombs 
These are aimed at planting damaging programs in a computer system that execute 
when some specific condition is met. Magklaras and Furnell [48] reported that an 
employee of Lance Incorporated resigned from the company. Two months after his 
resignation, a file server suddenly lost valuable data and became inoperable. After a 
computer forensic investigation was conducted, it was found that the server was the 
subject of a logic bomb that the ex-employee had implanted on the server. This incident 
cost the company about $1 million [48].       
3.3.2.4 Time bombs 
These bombs are also programs implanted in a computer system, with the intention of 
being executed when a specific date or time is met, in order to damage a target. 
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3.3.2.5 Unauthorised user access 
After an outsider gains unauthorised access, they can obtain administrator rights by 
using software such as GetAdmin for Windows OS. This software is a powerful utility 
which can give a user administrator-level rights. It is often able to penetrate a computer 
server, and it then assigns administrative rights to an outsider. 
3.3.2.6 Key loggers  
Key loggers are used for recording data that an insider may enter. They can be in the 
form of hardware or software. The hardware is invisible to the user and is usually in-
stalled as an extension between the keyboard and the port. Only an executable file needs 
to be installed on the system for software key loggers to be kept completely hidden from 
the user.  
3.3.3 Spoofing 
This attack occurs when an outsider uses the identity of an organisation's resources, e.g. 
a network computer, in order to gain unauthorised access. There are several common 
types of spoofing, such as IP and machine [11]. 
3.3.3.1 Web-spoofing  
This is a way by which an organisation‟s users are led to believe that they are looking at 
an original website which, of course, they are not. This requires the outsider to be 
highly skilled in order to redirect the insiders to the outsider‟s website. When any iden-
tifying or sensitive information is entered by an insider, it will be stored and used for 
malicious purposes. 
Web pages can be precise copies of the original with all the content correctly linked to 
the original web page. The main difference is that there are minor changes which allow 
for insider information to be stored on the outsider‟s servers. 
3.3.3.2 DNS spoofing  
Spoofing is a form of impersonation of resources. A DNS can be redirected to point to a 
false resource [11]. For instance, an outsider creates a fake website for an insider‟s or-
ganisation (an impersonation of an organisation‟s website), and then redirects legitimate 
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(insider) requests for this website to the false site which the attacker has created. This 
type of attack can be carried out through one of the following methods [45; 76]: 
- spoofing DNS response: a man-in-the middle attack occurs when an 
outsider places himself between the DNS client and the legitimate 
DNS server. When a DNS request is initiated, the outsider immedi-
ately sends a false response (redirects the insider to an incorrect ma-
chine) before the legitimate DNS server can reply. 
- DNS server compromise: an outsider gains full control of the le-
gitimate DNS and then directly inputs incorrect data.  
- DNS cache poisoning: this occurs when an outsider sends incorrect 
information (false name information) to the DNS server and the 
server enters the incorrect information as legitimate data. Therefore, 
when an insider asks the DNS server to resolve a name that has been 
incorrectly entered in the DNS server, it directs the insider to the 
false destination. 
3.3.4 Impersonation 
This attack is designed to steal the identity of a legitimate user. This is designed to steal 
the identity of a legitimate user. An outsider can use the identity of an insider to gain 
unauthorised access to a system without detection. For example, an insider's email 
password can be obtained by an outsider who then uses the insider‟s email account to 
send an abusive email to someone else in order to hide the identity of the outsider. 
Outsiders can get the information they need to assume an insider‟s identity from a 
variety of sources, such as a stolen wallet, items thrown away, or from a credit card or 
bank statement [25]. 
3.3.5 Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
A Denial of Service attack prevents a legitimate user from accessing organisational 
network resources such as a mail server. This attack is characterised as an attempt to 
flood a network, to disrupt connections between two computers and thus prevent an 
Chapter 3                                                                                                  User Activities and Assumptions 





individual from accessing a service, or to disrupt service to a specific system or person. 
There are many types of DoS attack, as described next [45; 53; 54]. 
3.3.5.1 Buffer overflow 
The program writes more information into the buffer than can be contained in the space 
that has been allocated in the memory. An attacker can overwrite the data which 
controls the program execution path and hijack control of the program in order to 
execute the malicious code (the attacker's code) instead of the process code.   
3.3.5.2 Ping of death 
This is aimed at sending IP packets of a size greater than 55,535 bytes to the target 
computer [45]. This size is illegal, but applications that are capable of sending such 
packets can be built. Some programmed OSs could detect illegal IP packets, but fail to 
handle them. 
3.3.5.3 Smurf attacks 
These are aimed at exploiting IP broadcast addresses in order to create DoS. ICMP echo 
request packets are directed to IP broadcast addresses from remote locations so as to 
generate DoS attacks [16]. Three parties are involved in this attack: the attacker, the 
intermediary and the victim. The intermediary receives an ICMP echo request packet 
directed to the IP broadcast address of their network. When all machines on a network 
respond to this ICMP echo request, the result can be severe network congestion or 
outages. 
The attacker does not use the IP address of his own machine as the source address; 
instead, he creates forged packets that contain the spoofed source address of the 
attacker's intended victim [16].  
3.3.5.4 TCP SYN attacks 
An attacker can send a number of connection requests very rapidly and then fail to 
respond to the replies. This leaves the first packet in the buffer so that other, legitimate, 
connection requests cannot be accommodated. The packet in the buffer is dropped after 
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a short period of time without a reply. The effect of many such bogus connection 
requests is to make it difficult for legitimate requests for a session to be established. 
3.3.5.5 Teardrop 
This attack is aimed at exploiting the way by which the IP requires a packet that is too 
large for the next router to handle to be divided into fragments. The attacker's IP puts a 
confusing offset value in the second or a later fragment. Sometimes the system can 
crash if the receiving OS does not have a plan to handle this situation.   
3.3.6 Physical attacks 
These are designed to damage the physical components of an organisation‟s network or 
computer. It is well known that, given physical access to a computer, an attacker can 
compromise it by rebooting from a CD or swapping the hard drives. 
3.3.7 Password attacks 
Passwords are what users know and use to enable access to files, computers or 
programs. They are the main method used to authenticate users. However, they present 
a well-known problem in computer security, because the users‟ chosen passwords are 
naturally insecure. Password attacks are designed to obtain a password by cracking 
encrypted passwords, using dictionary and brute force attacks, and by decoding and 
scrambling passwords. 
3.3.8 Social engineering 
This is a method of manipulating individual insiders when the outsider has a certain tar-
get in mind that is usually fraudulent [32]. Computers are not necessary for a social en-
gineer, as communications skills appear to be more useful than having a technical back-
ground. Outsiders might try to harm a business or gain access to a company‟s private 
information by using social engineering techniques in order to achieve their purpose. 
The aim is to persuade an insider to disclose willingly any information the outsider 
needs to know. Attacks can be conducted in the following ways, either by influencing 
the insider psychologically or by gaining physical access [32]:  
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3.3.8.1 Impersonation  
The outsider pretends, either in person or over the phone, to be a trustworthy person, 
such as an IT helpdesk operator or an insider, and then tricks a person, usually a mem-
ber of the personnel department, to reveal the information they require. This might be a 
username or password, or other sensitive information that is of value to the outsider.  
3.3.8.2 Reverse social engineering  
Here, the attacker presents himself as an authorised person who can help an insider to 
address a problem. The problem will have been caused by the outsider, usually by dis-
rupting the network‟s traffic. Therefore, the insider will contact the outsider, thinking 
that he can sort out the problem [28]. The outsider then either creates a relationship of 
trust with the insider or carries out a direct attack [33].  
3.3.9 Information-gathering attacks 
These are designed to monitor data travelling over a network. They are aimed at stealing 
personal credentials and critical information for use in a further attack. An attacker with 
physical access to network devices such as a hub or a router is able to sniff the traffic. 
3.3.10 Theft of an organisation's devices and information 
The next technique used by outsiders to gain insider access is local information theft. 
This is a form of confidentiality attack; however, it is hard to detect. Physical access to 
an organisation and use of suitable software or hardware are required to obtain sensitive 
data that travels in clear text across trusted networks. Outsiders therefore seek to gain 
insider access by exploiting the weakness of password encryption mechanisms [88]. An 
organisation‟s password policy is sometimes inadequate, such that an organisation can 
select a vulnerable password encryption protocol or allow an insider to create a weak 
password, such as their spouse‟s name [88]. 
3.3.10.1 Theft of information for financial gain 
An insider or an outsider steals confidential or proprietary information such as customer 
information, source code or other sensitive data from the organisation for financial gain 
[57]. 
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3.3.10.2 Theft of information for business gain 
Insider theft of intellectual property (IP) for business advantage is a crime whereby 
insiders intentionally misuse an authorised level of access to networks or data in order 
to steal confidential information from the organisation [84]. They then use it to get 
another job, help a new employer or promote their own private business [56]. 
3.3.10.3 Theft of an organisation's device 
Another technique of outsider attack is the theft of laptops or disks. In 2008, 78 per cent 
of organisations in the UK that had computers stolen had not encrypted their hard disks 
[7]. In 2006, 7 per cent of organisations in the UK had computers stolen. The theft of 
organisations‟ devices has increased sharply, reaching its highest level in 2008 [7]. A 
further encouragement for carrying out attacks is that 54 per cent of organisations in the 
UK allow their employees to access their systems remotely [7]. Because an 
organisation‟s devices are loaded with confidential information, this presents a good 
opportunity for outsiders to gain remote access to an insider's computer. An example of 
gaining insider access by an outsider is cited by the BBC [10]; a memory stick with user 
names and passwords for a key government computer system was lost and later found in 
a public car park.   
Storage devices belonging to an organization, such as hard disks and USB keys, can 
pose a problem because they hold sensitive insider information. This information can be 
extracted from either stolen or sold storage devices on which sensitive information, such 
as personal information and e-mail messages, is held. A study conducted by the 
University of Glamorgan [9] showed that out of 105 hard drives, 57 per cent contained 
sensitive personal information. 
3.3.11 Computer and Internet abuse 
This is aimed at wasting time with email messages and websites that have nothing to do 
with employees‟ jobs [8]. This type of attack not only wastes employees‟ time but 
potentially creates legal liabilities for the organisation. 
The BBC [8] reported that a company which makes about £700,000 profit on turnover 
of £10-12m could be losing 15 per cent of its profit because of net and email abuse. 
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Computer Economics state that online shopping, stock trading, car buying, looking for a 
new house and visiting pornographic sites have become daily practices for about 25 per 
cent of the workers in the United States companies that have access to the Internet in 
their offices. A survey conducted by Young and Case [107] found that 83 per cent of 
companies were concerned with inappropriate employee usage of the Internet and the 
resulting legal liabilities and negative publicity. It also found that 70 per cent of 
employee Internet abuse resulted in lost productivity and slow network response [107].    
3.3.12 Email attacks 
Employees can use emails to send racist, sexist or other offensive material that can 
make an organisation vulnerable from a legal point of view [29]. UK firm Holden 
Meehan Independent Financial Advisors had to pay a former employee £10,000 for 
failing to protect her from email harassment in 2003 [29]. Chevron had to pay $2.2 
million to four employees after they had allegedly received sexually harassing emails. 
Under UK law, employers are responsible for emails written by employees in the course 
of their employment. Norwich Union Insurance was asked to pay £450,000 in an out-of-
court settlement as a result of emailed comments relating to their competition [29]. 
3.3.12.1 Spam 
Zhuang [108] has defined spam liberally to include traditional advertising email 
messages as well as phishing email messages, email messages containing viruses, and 
other unwanted email messages. Unwanted or harmful messages have become a 
particular problem for electronic mail, because it has recently been estimated that 80 per 
cent of all email traffic is spam [80]. Furthermore, this form of attack is aimed at 
sending emails to a large number of users. It can be made worse if a large number of 
recipients reply to those emails. 
Xie [106] believes that laundering email spam through open proxies or compromised 
PCs is a commonly used trick to hide real spam sources and reduce the cost of 
spamming in the underground email spam industry. He also states that spammers have 
been plaguing the Internet by exploiting a large number of spam proxies. 
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3.3.12.2 Email bombing 
This form of attack sends email messages repeatedly to a particular address at a victim‟s 
site. Usually, these messages will be large and constructed from meaningless data in 
order to consume network resources [15]. Most email bombs have the primary objective 
of flooding the email server so that it becomes unavailable. These email attacks may 
also be used to forge the identity of the attacker, degrade the availability of 
communication systems, or undermine the integrity of organisations.     
3.3.12.3 Phishing 
This form of attack is an attempt to ask for personal information from unsuspecting 
users by using social engineering techniques [98]. These emails aim to entice users to 
click on a link that will take the user to a fraudulent web site that appears to be 
legitimate. Furthermore, these web sites may contain malicious code. Phishing is the use 
of email messages that look as though they are from a trusted destination such as a bank 
[57]. For example, an attacker may send an email, seemingly from a reputable credit 
card company that requests account information. When the victim responds with the 
requested information, the attacker can use it to gain access to the victim‟s account.    
Fildes [26] has reported that a large number of accounts on the web-based email system 
Hotmail have been compromised in a phishing attack. Greenwood [36] reports that in 
2004, phishing has cost British banks more than a million pounds, and the bill could rise 
as the attacks become more sophisticated. 
3.3.12.4 Harassment 
Harassment can be construed as messages that threaten or intimidate the recipient [65]. 
Forgery and harassment by email usually go hand-in-hand [65]. Senders of harassing 
emails usually aim to hide their identity. The harassment often stems from some 
breakdown in a personal relationship between the parties, such as a romantic 
relationship having recently ended, a debt owed, etc., and there is no basis for legal 
action in what amounts to a personal dispute [65]. 
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3.3.12.5 Email spoofing 
This aims to trick the user into making a damaging statement or releasing sensitive 
information [14]. 
A recipient receives an email that appears to have come from a particular source 
whereas it was actually sent from another source. It is easy to spoof email because 
SMTP lacks authentication. If a mail server is configured to allow connections to the 
SMTP port (25), an attacker can connect to the SMTP port of a site and issue commands 
that will send emails that appear to have come from the address of the individual's 
choice.    
Emails have two addresses. The first address is the envelope address that is applied to 
deliver email to the correct destination (receiver), but email users do not see this address 
detail when the email is received. Email servers use this address to deliver email to the 
destination‟s email account. The second address is the header of the email message. 
This address, which includes To: and From:, is seen by email users. The critical point 
here is that the second address is not required to be correct for the message to be 
delivered to the recipient. As a result, this address can be forged.       
Therefore, any user can implement their MUA software to send emails bearing any 
name, email address and reply-to address. The thesis experiment will use this type of 
attack to send an abusive email to a victim.     
Table 10 illustrates various types of insider and outsider attack, the aim of these attacks 
and their consequences. Currently, impersonation and harassment by email usually go 
hand-in-hand.  An outsider steals and uses the identity of an insider to send harassing 
emails to another party. The advantage of stealing the identity of the insider is to hide 
the outsider‟s identity. On the other hand, an insider who carries out an attack can 
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Table 10: Illustration of insider and outsider attacks 
 
 Types of attack Aim Consequences  
1 Malicious software 
Gain insider‟s credential 
Steal information or destroy re-
sources 
2 Client side Gain access to an organisation's 
system 
3 Spoofing Use identity of an organisation's 
resources 
4 Password attack Unauthorised access to an organisa-
tion's system 
5 Information gathering Use in a further attack 
6 Theft of devices and 
information 
Gain access to an organisation's 
system 
7 Impersonation Hide an identity of outsiders Use identity of insiders to gain 
access to the system 
8 DoS Prevent a legitimate user from 
accessing an orgnisation's net-
work 
Disrupt connection between com-
puters 
9 Physical attack Damage Physical components 
of organisation's network 
Unavailability of an organisation's 
network devices 
10 Internet abuse Revenge Potentially creating legal liability 
for an organization 11 Email attack Bother and annoy a victim 
 
We have proved that incidents/crimes can be committed by insiders or outsiders. Insid-
ers can commit crimes/attacks by abusing their legitimate access for reasons of financial 
or political revenge. They can then deny any allegation of committing an attack. On the 
other hand, insider access can be obtained by outsiders who seek to commit a crime and 
hide their identity.  Outsiders can use one of the attack methods described above to ob-
tain insider access and then attack the system. As a result, insiders can be guilty or in-
nocent. An organisation‟s computers and networks are able to record these suspicious 
activities, because both insiders or outsiders use methods such installing malicious 
software or browsing illegal websites. Therefore, this research has designed a model to 
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Figure 6: Type of information 
 
 
Figure 6 shows this type of information. Firstly, it is necessary to understand how a 
user‟s job tasks relate to their responsibilities. Secondly, we need to identify the legiti-
mate activities that allow a user to access an organisation‟s IT facilities and the limits of 
what they are permitted to do in order to discover which legitimate activities conform to 
their responsibilities. Thirdly, in terms of suspicious activity, we should understand if a 
computer‟s security could easily have been compromised. 
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3.4 Location of user activities  
This researcher believes that any corporate security investigator should know the 
location of the above activities in order to collect and analyse information about them. 
This analysis leads to ascertaining whether the attack was committed by an insider or an 
outsider. There are many potential sources of evidence available within an 
organisation‟s networks. Many of these are existing records and logs. The research also 
requires an understanding of precisely how to turn this information about activities into 
evidence. These sources of evidence can be divided, based on activity functions, into 
three groups: legitimate activity logs, security logs and personal (insider‟s) storage. 
These groups are illustrated below:   
3.4.1 Legitimate activity logs 
These logs record an insider‟s legitimate computer activity. The corporate security 
investigator can find recent and past activity including recently accessed files and 
passwords. These logs can also assist the investigator in identifying emails that have 
been received and sent, websites that have been browsed and files that have been 
created and modified. They will assist in the reconstruction of the insider‟s job activities 
(responsibilities) so as to identify any abnormalities in behaviour.  These activities are 
usually located in the following logs: 
 email activity 
 web activity 
 file access/ database activity 
 application activity 
 remote access activity 
3.4.2 Security logs 
These logs are usually configured to maintain records of suspicious computer events 
[82]. These suspicious events include logs of failed accesses, and the detection and 
destruction of viruses and Trojans, as well as detection of forms of hacking. Security 
logs can identify an insider‟s abnormal activity, and they are strong evidence when 
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tracking activity on a computer system [82]. These suspicious activities can be found in 
the following logs: 
 access control 
 anti-virus and spy 
 intrusion detection 
 firewall 
3.4.3 Personal devices 
These devices are another source of distinction between insider and outsider attacks, 
because they contain an insider‟s activities. These personal devices, such as an insider‟s 
computer, laptops or USB flash memory, should be collected in order to reveal an 
insider's legitimate and suspicious activities. For instance, an insider can save an 
organisation‟s secret files to his USB flash memory. 
       
3.5 Assumptions 
There is no conclusive model of computer analysis investigation that covers the 
distinction between insider and outsider attacks, which leaves scope for a variety of 
opinions on the matter. The present work has made a number of assumptions in this 
regard, in conformity with its key goal of improving the analysis and collection 
processes of computer investigation. To address this issue, it is necessary to log 
information or data that has some investigative value before any incident can take place.  
One of the assumptions just mentioned is that all legitimate and suspicious user 
activities have been recorded by the organisation‟s IT system, before the incident took 
place. Another is that none of the organisation‟s operating systems have been altered for 
any reason, while a third is that an organisation‟s users would have to be agreeable to 
the security policy, which would include constant monitoring of their activities. 
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3.5.1 Conditions attached to assumptions 
In order for the assumptions underlying this thesis to be borne out in practice, the 
following conditions should be present:    
3.5.1.1 The organisation’s business processes are based totally on its IT sys-
tem 
Organisations should rely on computer systems to perform tasks and improve their 
businesses because of the ability of those systems to process, transmit, store and retrieve 
data. Daily jobs should be performed electronically, which will generate a history of all 
users‟ activities. 
3.5.1.2 Client/server environment  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, most organisations implement client/server environments, 
and control their network resources through security policies based on such 
environments. These environments enable the maintenance of log files for each of the 
organisation‟s resources, so that all user activities on every network can be monitored 
and recorded.      
3.5.1.3 No prior knowledge of employees’ job responsibilities 
Outsiders do not usually understand these responsibilities, because their aim in 
obtaining insider access is to bypass the security mechanisms implemented by the 
organisation. Moreover, outsiders do not perform employees‟ tasks, which are only 
performed by the organisation‟s own users (i.e. its employees). 
3.5.1.4 Log system capability 
Log files are created by networked computers or information systems that contain 
information on transactions, connections and other activities. Timestamping plays a 
significant role in identifying the times at which user activities, such gaining access to a 
system and creating files, were conducted [43]. These timestamps need to be accurate. 
An organisation‟s IT Security Department or system administrators should protect log 
files from misuse or alteration. These files should be kept locally on a server or 
remotely by using a centralised log server. A centralised log server prevents an attacker 
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from altering the logs. Organisations should identify what is logged. This research 
suggests that logs should not only be set to record suspicious activities but they should 
also record legitimate activities, because they should be able to prove whether an attack 
has been committed by an insider or an outsider. The basic requirements of what such 
logs should cover are as follows: 
 timestamp of an activity (see the analysis process) 
 IP address of the source and destination 
 MAC address of the source and destination 
 port number of the source and destination 
 data (content of a message) 
 successful and failed logins 
 changes of computer settings, and policies 
  installation or execution of software 
3.5.2 Information and technology requirements 
In order to apply the thesis‟s hypothesis and assumptions, the following minimum 
information and technology requirements should be implemented, but not be limited to 
them:     
3.5.2.1 Recording of activities 
Legitimate user activity is an essential aspect for distinguishing between insider and 
outsider attacks. An organisation‟s IT system should not only record suspicious security 
events but should also be extended to include a record of legitimate user activities. The 
job-related activities of users should also be identified. 
3.5.2.2 Retention policy 
This policy relates to retention periods for records that are created and maintained by an 
organisation‟s IT department. Retention periods vary between organisations, but they 
are usually between six months and one year. This policy is useful when gathering 
evidence; for example, when an insider removes an email from a list of deleted items or 
when an insider deletes an entire mailbox. 
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Most firewall policies are configured to drop an unauthorised connection without 
recording it [34]. They should not only drop such a connection but should also record it, 
because this would help to identify if an outsider has tried to gain access to an 
organisation‟s system or not. The firewall policy should also be configured to record an 
authorised connection in order to examine legitimate activities by an organisation‟s 
users. Therefore, this research proposes that the firewall log should include the 
following information: 
 date and time of packets 
 TCP information including source and destination port numbers 
 IP information including source and destination IP  
 MAC information includes source and destination addresses 
 packet state such as drop or accept 
3.5.2.4 Virtual Private Network (VPN) server 
The research proposes that this policy should be configured to record information in 
local logging files for remote access VPN connections. This log would assist in tracking 
remote access usage and authentication attempts. This remote access policy should be to 
record both accepted and rejected connections.    
3.5.2.5 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
An IDS policy should be configured to achieve the following goals:  
 verifying threats, whether from inside or outside the organisation 
 recording all statistic of employees‟ day-to-day work activities, such as 
accessing various services and servers 
 identifying any malicious network behaviour or anything done that is contrary to 
the organisation‟s policies 
 detecting any successful intrusions  
 identifying attack patterns and trends in order to allow a corporate security 
investigation to observe the most frequent points of attack 
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 detecting any modification of files or suspicious activity (on critical 
workstations and servers) 
3.5.2.6 Network traffic monitoring 
Network traffic should be monitored to achieve the following goals:   
 detecting a connection between an inside computer and an outside computer 
 detecting the content of conversation between these two machines 
 detecting sensitive information, such as username, passwords and any other in-
formation passing between these machines 
3.5.2.7 Workstations 
The  security event policy should be configured to achieve the following aims:  
 recording successful logins to identify which are legitimate 
 recording failed logins to identify access attempts 
 recording events that relate to the use of resources, such as creating, opening or 
deleting files 
Having access to a workstation is useful for collecting details, such as file attributes, of 
a user‟s job activities; for example, accessing timestamps and finding out what 
operations have been performed.  
3.5.2.8 Network servers 
Each network server, such as the web server and exchange server, should be configured 
to record the following information:  
 client IP addresses 
 name of the user 
 date and time of access 
 operations performed on the resources 
 any attempted and successful attacks 
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3.5.2.9 Imaging tools 
As this thesis focuses on the distinction between insiders and outsiders, a static image is 
employed. This image is made in respect of a detained computer. There are many types 
of static image, as follows [60]: 
 a disk-to-image file makes a bit-by-bit copy of the insider‟s disk drive. This 
method allows more than one copy of the insider‟s computer to be made and 
allows most computer forensic tools to read this file. However, this method is 
not suitable for a large disk drive because collecting evidence from a large 
computer can take many hours or several days. 
 a logical image records only specific files that are of interest to an incident. This 
method is useful for collecting only specific records from a large server. It is 
also useful for email investigations that only need to collect .pst files.   
 a sparse image is similar to a logical image but it collects deleted data. This 
method is useful for examining specific data.    
The purpose of this process is to protect the integrity of the insider‟s computer. 
Therefore, a corporate security investigator should understand that using imaging tools 
that run in Windows alters the evidence on a disk drive. To address this issue, a write-
blocker is required to ensure that any writing to the hard disk being imaged is blocked.   
3.5.2.10 Analysis tools 
These are used for analysing data, retrieving deleted and partially overwritten files from 
the insider‟s computer, retrieving hidden files and performing email analysis tasks such 
as:  
 FTK Tools: 
FTK can analyse data from different sources such as image files from different ven-
dors [60].  It has password cracking tools as follows: 
o Password Recovery Toolkit is able to recover passwords from many ap-
plications such as Microsoft Word. 
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o Distributed Network Attack (DNA) is able to recover password-
protected files by using the power of machines across the network or 
across the world to decrypt passwords.    
 Email Examiner: an email examination tool. This is used for recovering active 
and deleted mail messages from deleted items. An example of this type of tool is 
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The aim of this chapter has been to identify the data that should be collected and 
analysed in order to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. It has found the 
main aspects of distinction between insider and outsider attacks to be the user‟s 
(insider‟s) job responsibilities, and the user‟s legitimate and suspicious activities. It also 
found that there is a difference between a user‟s job responsibilities/activities and 
legitimate activities. A user‟s job responsibilities comprise a set of tasks and activities 
that are needed to produce certain desired results. An outsider has no prior knowledge 
of the insider‟s job responsibilities. However, through their legitimate activities, an 
employee (insider) is allowed to access an organisation‟s resources, such as a database 
server, in order to perform their job functions. The researcher found that if the activity 
includes user‟s job activity is called “legitimate activity”. This is because an 
organization‟s resources are used for business purposes.    
Furthermore, several suspicious activities have been discussed, using Hansman and 
Hunt's classification. However, this classification has been extended to include other 
important activities or attacks such as client-side attacks, impersonation, spoofing and 
email attacks. Many attacks, such as client-side attacks, malicious software, physical 
key loggers and social engineering, allow outsiders to gain an insider‟s credential 
details. These methods assist outsiders in accessing an organisation‟s resources without 
detection, enabling them to hide their identity and then commit a crime. This suspicious 
activity should be understood by corporate security investigators when looking into the 
malicious tools that are used to gain insider access. Impersonation and harassment 
attacks via email are selected in the thesis experiments as methods of computer attack 
(see chapter 5). This chapter has discussed the location of legitimate and suspicious 
activities within the client/server environment. 
Also, the assumption has been made that all user activities before the attack incident 
took place will have been recorded by an organisation‟s IT system. This assumption is 
formulated according to four main conditions. The first condition is that an 
organisation‟s business processes are based totally on an IT system. The second 
condition is that a client/server environment has been implemented. The third condition 
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is that outsiders have no prior knowledge of an insider‟s job responsibilities. The final 
condition is the presence of adequate log file systems. In addition, this chapter 
recommends that certain policies are implemented and appropriate technology should 
be used to collect and examine evidence of user activity.  
The next chapter will create a Digital Analysis Model for Distinguishing between 
Insider and Outsider Attacks (DAMDIOA) in order to improve the process of 
distinguishing between these attacks. It will also discuss the drawbacks of DAMDIOA. 
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4 Digital Analysis Model for distinguishing between Insider and 
Outsider Attacks (DAMDIOA) 
Objectives: 
 
 to discuss the shortcomings of the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 
(DFRWS) Method  
 to provide a digital model for distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the principle of computer forensics and investigation is to 
discover, obtain, identify, analyse and preserve e-evidence. It was also mentioned in 
that chapter that there is no model or framework by which to distinguish between 
insider and outsider attacks. Chapter 3 discussed the basic requirements for such a 
distinction, the main one being  identification of the type of information to be recorded. 
Others are the use of a client/server environment and the capability to maintain log files 
and to employ technology. 
In this chapter the design of a process for obtaining, examining and analysing activities 
to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks will be described, and a Digital 
Analysis Model for Distinction between Insider and Outsider Attacks (DAMDIOA) 
model that improves on the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) methods 
created.  
4.1 Limitations of DFRWS 
As mentioned, DFRWS methods are general ones used to conduct computer forensic 
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In addition, DFRWS methods provide a good foundation for computer forensic analysis, 
because it was the first approach to be led by academia rather than law enforcement [64; 
70]. It provides researchers with many methods of computer forensic analysis. 
However, its methods are unable to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. 
They do not include a method of relational analysis. Furthermore, the DFRWS approach 
is usually a general model that does not consider how to conduct an investigation into 
insider and outsider attacks. It does not develop a data collection process, for example, 
that determines what data should be collected and why, how it should be analysed and 
what tools should be used to perform these processes., These shortcomings do not 
therefore provide sufficient information on the suspect, and ultimately impact upon the 
decision process. 
4.2 DAMDIOA 
This section addresses this issue of the distinction between insider and outsider attacks 
by improving DFRWS‟s methods. It proposes DAMDIOA, which has been created to 
help corporate security investigators carry out investigations into digital crime by 
distinguishing between these two types of attack by focusing on improving the process 
of data collection and analysis. It uses a combination of two types of analysis: “timeline 
activity” analysis and “relational” analysis. These methods reconstruct an insider‟s 
activity from the various outputs of an organisation‟s security and personal devices in 
order to identify normal and abnormal activities, such as activities before and after a 
particular incident. The analysis subsequently identifies a relationship between these 
activities and the insider's job responsibilities. This model brings about a decision on 
whether the attack has been committed by an insider or an outsider. It therefore achieves 
the following aims: 
 it reduces the risk of wrongly identifying suspects 
 it avoids financial loss for the organisation 
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 it protects an organisation‟s reputation  
 it provides corporate security investigations with a structured investigation 
process for distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks 
Because any investigation that seeks to distinguish between the two types of attack 
starts with a large amount of data (job responsibilities, legitimate and suspicious activi-
ties), using deduction to extract the relevant evidence, DAMDIOA is represented by an 
inverted triangle. The evidence revealed usually exposes the differences between insider 
and outsider activities. This model is therefore used to distinguish between insider and 
outsider attacks after an insider denies allegation of breaching security. Figure 7 demon-




Figure 7: DAMDIOA Model 
 
 
DAMDIOA consists of many main processes. 
4.2.1  Collection/identification process 
This process is concerned with searching and collecting all user (i.e. insider) activities 
in order to provide an analysis process with sufficient information to make a distinction. 
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useful for investigating malicious insider activities that occur during an attack. It uses 
stored information located in many sources. Certain information such as the time and 
type of incident would be useful before the investigation proper begins, in order to save 
the investigators time and effort.    
4.2.1.1 Review of Network Diagram   
It is essential for corporate security investigators to review the diagram of an 
organisation‟s IT infrastructure before conducting a digital investigation to distinguish 
between insider and outsider attacks. This diagram of an IT infrastructure leads to an 
understanding of the structure of an organisational network, as well as identifying the 
locations of both legitimate and suspicious activities. It facilitates the identification and 
collection of general and technical details such as:  
 determining which security devices are being used  
 which computers were involved in the incident 
 which computers contain investigative information 
For example, Figure 8 illustrates general and technical information for organisational IT 
networks, which consist of three parts: external, DMZ and internal networks. In this 
example two firewalls are set up, both of which have two interfaces. The interfaces of 
the first firewall connect the external and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) networks 
respectively, while those of the second connect the DMZ network and an internal 
network respectively. The diagram also implies that there is a chance of retrieving 
valuable information from the internal firewall log, as well as showing that there are not 
many application servers; for example, this company has no file server and no web 
server. Therefore, these activities have been retrieved from: 
 the mail server (emails) 
 the insider's computer (files/folders) 
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Figure 8: Diagram of IT infrastructure 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Collection of job role/responsibilities for an insider 
Following the review of the diagram of an organisation‟s IT infrastructure, the insider‟s 
job responsibilities should be reviewed. The main purpose of this is to understand the 
insider's job activity. This review assists in mapping the relationship between any 
computer activities such as emails and the insider‟s job activity. For example, reviewing 
the insider‟s responsibilities will help identify their business emails, and any files and 
folders that have been created and modified for them. This job responsibility 
information should be collected from the Human Resources Department or from an 
insider‟s supervisor.   
4.2.1.3 Collection of legitimate and suspicious activities 
Collection of devices, such as an insider‟s computer that may have been involved in a 
security incident or that may contain legitimate activities, is a critical step because it 
may involve the collection of real-time information that might otherwise be lost, as well 
as stored information. Because the investigation is designed to distinguish between 
insider and outsider attacks, it is necessary to identify precisely which computers have 
been involved in a crime, and which computers‟ networks or systems contain legitimate 
data and which contain suspicious data that would be subject to investigation for the 
purpose of identifying a suspect. 
Collection also creates an opportunity for a corporate security investigation to collect 
large amounts of volatile data from an insider‟s computer. Volatile data is valuable 
investigative data that is available for only a certain period of time; it includes network 
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connections, running processes and memory dumps, and can help identify any 
connection between an insider‟s and an outsider‟s computers, as well as identifying any 
business activities performed by an insider.  
This step is also responsible for identifying which organisational resources an insider is 
allowed to access, so that the logs specific to them can be obtained, as well as being 
responsible for protecting the integrity of the original data by securing and forensically 
imaging, fully or partially, the organisation‟s or insider‟s devices such as hard disks, 
laptops and USB memory sticks, which are usually involved in a crime and contain data 
of use to an investigation. 
4.2.1.4 Collection of information regarding previous security incidents 
The purpose of collecting information about technical history, such as a previous 
security incident, is to establish whether the insider's computer was subject to 
penetration by an outsider. It should consider how a network administrator or a help 
desk dealt with the security incident. For example, it should collect the following 
information: 
 whether any incident report has been received from the insider or security logs 
(an IDS) 
 if it has, whether the security log for the insider's computer has been checked 
and any failed logins noticed. 
 whether the anti-virus has been run to check the computer‟s applications, or 
whether the password has been changed?.  
This information can be collected from a network administrator or a help desk. Figure 3 
shows the information sources from which data may be collected that may help 
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                                                 Figure 9: Information sources of data collection 
 
Data collection is therefore responsible for retrieving the following information: 
 the date and time of an incident 
 the type of incident 
 the source of legitimate and suspicious activities as follows: 
i. devices that contain information of potential use to an investigation. These 
are: 
 programs that have been used as tools to commit digital crime by 
allowing outsiders to gain insider access to the latter‟s computers, which 
have specific vulnerabilities 
 information stored on the hard disk that may contain users‟ job 
responsibilities 
ii. information as evidence on the log file that allows the revealing of the time 
of activities as follows: 
 when the insider accessed the Internet or Intranet 
 when they accessed their online banking and shopping accounts 
 when they created and modified a file 
 when they sent, forwarded and received an email 
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 when they accessed an application server or a database server 
 when they downloaded or uploaded data 
 when they made a call from their business landline or business mobile       
iii. identification of the insider‟s job responsibility   
 
Figure 10 shows the process of data collection in order to distinguish between insider 
and outsider attacks.  
  
 
Figure 10: Data collection process 
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4.2.2 Examination process  
This aims to examine all the user activities collected in order to retrieve all insider 
activities from log files and from the insider's computer during the period of an attack. 
The process begins by checking the logs of interest – those that log the insider's 
activities.  
The process is also intended to search for and recover the insider‟s protected data and 
deleted files. Insiders may use passwords to protect their files and folders on their local 
hard disks. These files and folders should be examined to establish whether or not these 
files and folders are part of their job responsibilities. The passwords are stored on the 
Security Account Manager (in Windows) or password or shadow file (in Linux). They 
can be recovered by using any available password cracking software such as 
AccessData or John Ripper. Figure 11 shows the examination process used to 
distinguish between insider and outsider attacks.  
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Figure 11: Examination process 
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4.2.3 Analysis process  
This step is extremely important, because it is where evidence may be discovered that 
assists in distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. It is responsible for 
reconstructing employee activities by reviewing and analysing information such as 
email activities, file activities and system logs. It also links insider or outsider attacks 
with particular malicious events such as downloading and executing a Trojan horse or 
sending an abusive email, these being distinct from normal activities such as creating 
reports. Analysis could also be used to determine whether an insider‟s computer that 
was involved in a crime was vulnerable to penetration. It may even be able to discover 
new evidence, which requires identifying and capturing more data from different 
devices such as firewall logs or IDS logs. “Timeline” and “relational” analysis” are used 
to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. 
4.2.3.1 Timeline analysis 
“Timeline” or “timestamp” is a date or time stored or communicated by an electronic 
medium. Computer systems store timestamps in many ways as determined by various 
rules [103]. Timestamps are usually stored whenever a file is created, modified or 
accessed. Furthermore, the majority of computer systems have logging functions that 
use timestamps to log activities. Timelines are important in digital forensics in 
establishing the correct sequence of events and associating a particular user with a 
particular time [43; 44]. It is also a fundamental method of activity reconstruction 
during case investigations [103]. Timeline analysis may therefore help identify patterns 
and anomalies, and may lead to other sources of evidence [12]. It shows what activities 
had been performed before and after the occurrence of an incident. The researcher 
employs timeline analysis to identify this time period.  
 Identification of attack period/session 
Identification of the attack period is significant if a distinction between insider and 
outsider attacks is to be made so that relevant user activities can be discovered and time 
spent collecting data can be reduced. The attack period is the time interval from the time 
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of login before the attack to the time logout after it. To identify this period, the 
following information should be determined:  
 date and time of the attack 
 login and logout activities for the attack period 
The following hypothetical example demonstrates the use of timeline analysis. At 0910 
a background file on a file server was accessed and then modified. At 1046 an email 
was sent to a Background Investigation Agent. At 1050 an abusive email was sent, and 
an email was subsequently received from the Background Investigation Agent. In 
addition, a Weekly Security Incident Report was created on an insider computer at 
1158.  
The report should identify the date and time of the incident. The incident took place on 
the 3
rd
 of March 2010 at 1050; the report should collect user activity for that date, and 
should then classify these activities as a series of sessions based on the time of login and 
logout. After that, it should identify the session in which the attack took place in order 
to analyse these user activities. Figure 11 shows that there are 3 sessions of user 
activities, each of which starts with the user‟s computer (i.e. client) login and ends with 
its logout. This figure shows that the attack, called the “attack session”, took place in 
Session 1. Figure 12 presents these activities by using timeline analysis to identify and 
obtain relevant user activities during the attack period. 
 
 
Figure 12: Timeline analysis revealing attack session 
 
03/03/2010 07:00 03/03/2010 17:00

































Chapter 4                                                                                                                                                 DAMDIOA 





Identification of the attack session helps the collection and analysis of particular user 
activities, resulting in reduced effort and time spent on such analysis.  
 Attack session analysis 
After the attack session has been identified, the user activities carried out during it are 
analysed in order to provide relational analysis with data regarding particular user 
activities. Figure 13 shows that many activities were performed during the time of the 
incident, including the sending of two emails and the accessing of two files. These 




Figure 13: Review attack period activity 
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distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. Figure 14 shows these gaps between 
sessions.  
 
Figure 14: Examine gap between sessions 
 
 
For example, at 1205 the insider logged onto a file server, created a monthly statistical 
security incident report and modified a statistical background report, logging out at 
1305. Figure 15 shows that analysis of the gap before the incident took place (i.e. 
Session 3, between 1210 and 1310) reveals some user activities to have been performed 
on a file server. 
 
Figure 15: Analysis of the gap between login activities 
 
 
However, timeline analysis alone is insufficient to distinguish between insider and 
outsider attacks, because it usually identifies patterns and anomalies only. Because it 
highlights activities before and after the time of an incident, it can point the way to other 
sources of evidence. It does not, however, analyse the relationship between these 
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anomalies and the insider‟s ordinary activities. Relational analysis, whereby 
relationships between a suspect's activities and an insider's job responsibilities are 
identified. is also required in order to address this issue. Timeline analysis is useful to 
identify the following: 
 attack period 
 activities during the attack period 
 the time that these activities took place 
4.2.3.2 Relational analysis 
This creates nodes representing insiders‟ day-to-day activities as well as their alleged 
malicious ones in order to determine if there are connections between them [12].  
Relational analysis is used to identify the following: 
 Activities carried out before and after the time of an incident, in order to identify 
possible matches between them and the insider's job responsibilities. As 
mentioned previously, insiders are classed as such largely by virtue of the 
authorised access that allows them to perform their legitimate tasks. Relational 
analysis should identify whether these activities are indeed legitimate. The 
occurrence of an insider attack may be indicated by an instance of malicious 
activity in a series of legitimate ones, because an outsider often has no prior 
knowledge of an insider‟s job responsibilities. The aforementioned timeline 
analysis shows an anomaly – a malicious event occurring as part of a series of 
legitimate ones carried out by the insider. Figure 16 shows that there were user 
activities and that their content was examined, after which they were compared 
with insider job responsibilities. If there is a link between these activities and the 
job responsibilities, it is a sign of an insider attack. 
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Figure 16: Relational analysis examination of the activities relation 
 
 
 A relationship between an insider and a victim, an example being an abusive e-
mail. The relational analysis will review previous emails for a certain period in 
order to establish a pattern of behaviour in determining if the malicious 
occurrence is an obvious anomaly. This examination is beyond the scope of this 
research, however. 
 A relationship between suspicious events and an exploitation of a system‟s 
vulnerability. As already mentioned, one method of outsider attack involves the 
exploitation of a client-side application. An example of what this could lead to if 
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a system is not properly maintained it codes automatically downloading 
themselves as soon as an insider accesses a Web page. 
Relational analysis is useful means of establishing a link between malicious events and 
an outsider‟s activities. For instance, when an outsider installs a Data-Sending Trojan 
on an insider‟s computer, this Trojan provides an outsider with passwords and other 
confidential data. Insiders‟ keystrokes can also be sent to the outsider, via email or by 
connecting to the outsider‟s website, by means of key-loggers installed by Data-Sending 
Trojans. Relational analysis will therefore be used to analyse the relationship between 
these activities and an outsider. It will also analyse how an outsider gained insider 
access by determining whether the insider‟s computer was vulnerable. Figure 17 shows 
the analysis process. 
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Figure 17: Analysis process 
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facilitate the distinction between insider and outsider attacks. Insider job activities are 
represented by “-1”, whereas suspicious activities (i.e. those not part of an insider's job 
responsibilities) are represented by “1”. An attack is represented by “0”.  
4.2.5 Decision  
After representing each activity i with a numerical value ai, the decision process is the 
final step to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. This thesis proposes two 
types of decision process as follows:    
4.2.5.1 Fixed decision  
This type of decision is based on a predetermined logical condition, which is why it is 
simple to implement. The average of the activity types is calculated by using this 
equation: average of activities A =  ai (total of activities that were being performed)/ N 
(total number of activities). If A < 0, the attack is likely to be insider, while if A > 0, it 
is likely to be outsider. If A=0, it is likely unknown attack.  
According to the aforementioned example of relational analysis, a type of user activity 
presented in table 11. 
 
 










A= -5/6= -0.83 
A < 0; it is likely an insider attack.   
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4.2.5.2 Customisable/tailored  decisions 
In this section, a new approach is proposed which uses a threshold of suspicious activi-
ties to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. The flexible equation is as fol-
lows: 
lN : number of legitimate activity 
sN : number of suspicious activity 
aN : number of attack 







Th: Threshold  
Decision:  
If R > Th is outsider 
If R < Th is insider 
If R = Th is unknown attack 
This decision is based on the proportion of suspicious activities. An organisation can 
customise its threshold of tolerance for such activities based on its level of concern for 
the type of attack involved. Each organisation develops its security policies on the basis 
of risk analysis. It collects data on the threats that its type of business may face and at-
tempts to rate each hazard in terms of the cost to it of each incident [82]. This type of 
decision will help the organization focus on the incident because the threshold it has 
already determined allows it to adjust its response to the level of suspicious activity in-
volved.  
According to the aforementioned example of relational analysis, it was found that the 
number of legitimate activities lN = 5, the number of suspicious activities sN = 0 and 
the number of attack aN = 1. 
  
lN : 5                       
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sN : 0 




R  =0  the proportion of suspicious activities =0 
 
For example, if the insider work for a bank which is vulnerable to fraud, both from in-
siders and outsiders. A bank can customise th= 0.2. Therefore, if r > th, it is most likely 
to be an outsider attack. Otherwise it is more likely an insider attack. The attack in this 
example is therefore most likely to be an insider one. Chapter 6 will discuss the differ-
ences between the levels of threshold and the differences between fixed and customisa-
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The main aim of this chapter was to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
DFRWS methods and to present DAMDIOA. Chapter 4 discussed the former‟s 
advantages and disadvantages. Advantages include the fact that it is the first approach to 
have been led by academia, and that DFRWS methods provide researchers with many 
means of computer forensic analysis. On the other hand, relational analysis is not 
considered, and the model, being a general one, does not take into account how to 
conduct an investigation into insider and outsider attacks, nor does it identify which 
data should be collected.  
The process by which DAMDIOA distinguishes between insider and outsider attacks 
was discussed. These processes are: 
 Collection, in which the interest logs and computers involved in the crime or 
which hold investigative information are gathered 
 Examination, in which these activities are reviewed and deleted, hidden and 
protected data are retrieved 
 Analysis, in which the relationship between these activities and the insider‟s job 
responsibilities is ascertained  
 Presentation, in which the analysed data is presented 
 Decision, in which the culprit is identified 
The following chapter will test and evaluate this framework. A virtual network and 
computers will be implemented, and email attacks will be carried out on them. The 
model will be used to collect, examine, analyse and present these activities, after which 
a decision will be made regarding whether these attacks were carried out by insiders or 
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1 Linux-Ubuntu Operating system
2 Netkit Free software to create virtual network for Test company that contains 8 machines
3 EXIM4-mail MTA program to send emails between MUA
4 PINE-mail MUA program to read and write emails
5 BIND DNS to translate IP address to names
6 MX collect incoming mails for a domain (test.com)
7 Tcpdump Collect and log all TCP/IP packets
8 Wireshark Analyse all collected TCP/IP packets
9 Iptables-firewall Implement security policy
 
5 Experiments  
Objectives: 
 
 to test the hypothesis 
 to conduct experiments discuss the results 
 to evaluate the results of experiments by using fixed and customisable decision  
 
This chapter aims at testing the hypothesis, by conducting a number of email attack 
experiments which will either support or refute the hypothesis. It also evaluates the 
results of this model. 
5.1 Hypothesis 
This research proposes that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to distinguish 
between insider and outsider attacks when conducting computer incident investigations. 
5.2 Experiment components 
This section discusses the network infrastructure, software and tools used in the 
experiment. This experiment is designed to build a virtual network in order to carry out 
an email attack; the thesis hypothesis will then be tested. Table 12 summarizes the 
components of the experiment‟s infrastructure. 
                                     Table 12: Components of the Experiment’s infrastructure 
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5.2.1 Experiment design 
This chapter designs eight experiments, which cover all the possibilities of computer 
attack investigations. These possibilities include authorised access, stolen insider 
password, password guessing, blank password, exploiting the weakness of SMTP 
authentication, initiation attacks from inside and outside an organisation and attacks 
within an organisation‟s control. An experiment was designed to conduct a digital 
investigation into distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. 
The scenario is that a victim has received an abusive email apparently from an insider. 
The insider refutes the allegation of sending the email, and claims that his credentials 
(user name and password) were illegally obtained by an outsider.   
5.2.1.1 Type of attack 
This experiment involves an abusive email attack, which is common attacks because an 
employee can send an abusive email or send an organisation‟s file out an organisation. 
This attack does not always need skill to be carried out. Forgery and harassment by 
email usually go hand-in-hand [66].  
5.2.1.2 Reason for the investigation 
The reason for carrying out this investigation is to establish whether this attack has been 
committed by an insider or an outsider.    
 Insider: incidents or attacks committed by authorised users. An insider is 
assigned many job responsibilities to perform. 
 Outsider: incidents or attacks committed by unauthorised users who gain 
insider's passwords. 
5.2.1.3 Investigation methods 
 Timeline analysis of legitimate activities 
 Relation analysis 
5.2.1.4 Collecting data 
 Full-content monitoring is used to collect TCP/IP headers and a datagram by 
using tcpdump to sniff all legitimate and suspicious activities over the network. 
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The purpose of conducting full-content monitoring is to analyse the TCP/IP 
headers (ICMP and SMTP) and datagram. A TCP/IP header will identify a 
source and the destination IP addresses, plus the destination port numbers and 
time and date of the packet. The analysing datagram will retrieve and identify 
insider job activities. 
5.2.1.5 Analysing data 
 Wireshark is used to analyse the legitimate and suspicious activities identified 
by tcpdump;  
 “Ls”: this command is used to review the insider's files and folders; 
 “Ls –l”: this command is used to review the creation of the insider's files and 
folders and review the time of their creation or modification; 
 “Ls-a”: this command is used to list hidden files; 
5.2.2 Established parameters of the experiment 
Many parameters were used, as follows: 
 Methods of Access (MA); 
 Insider activities (IA); 
 Time (T); 
 Security Policy (SP). 
These parameters are important, because both a timeline of activities and relational 
analysis (see Literature Review) were employed to distinguish between insider and 
outsider attacks. 
5.2.2.1 Methods of access (MA) 
There are many types of access to a network's resources (such as mail servers), 
including as follows: 
 Password Guessing (PG): an outsider tries to find words used as insider 
passwords by guessing. Failed logins will be found in the security event log;   
 Social Engineering (SE): an outsider tries to find the insider‟s password without 
guessing; for example, by finding a password written on a small slip of paper 
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placed close to an insider's computer. No failed login can be found; 
 Authorised access (AC): access to an insider‟s account.          
5.2.2.2 Insider Activities 
An insider can be responsible for many activities, for example: 
   gathering car accident reports; 
   gathering injured employee reports; 
   reducing the number of car accidents; 
   producing a morning report that includes the number of car accidents and 
injured employees. 
 Emails 
Emails are one of the main ways by which an insider conducts an organisation's job 
activities. They are the main source for collecting information about an insider's 
activities and can help to distinguish between insider and outsider activities. This 
experiment divides emails as follows:    
 Business Email (BE): the insider uses an organisation's email system to send 
and receive emails as one of his job activities. Therefore, if emails relate to one 
of the insider‟s job activities, they are called Business Emails (BE); 
 Non Business Email (NBE): an organisation's email system is used to send and 
receive personal emails. If emails do not contain material relevant to the insider's 
job activities, they are called Non-Business Emails (NBE). 
 Insider Data Stored 
The insider uses an organisation's computer to create, modify, read and store 
files/folders. The insider's computer is another source from which information about 
their activities can be collected; it can also be used to help to distinguish between 
insider and outsider activities. If these files/folders are relevant to job activities, they are 
called Business Files/Folders (BF). 
If these files/folders are not relevant to job activities, they are called Non-Business 
Files/Folders (NBF).        
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5.2.2.3 Timestamp (T) 
The time parameter is used to establish the correct sequence of events before and after 
an incident. It comprises the time of access and an activity timeline.    
 All activities (methods of insider access, email activities and PC activities) 
during attack sessions     
5.2.2.4 Security Policy 
The security policy is designed and implemented to log both the legitimate activities 
and suspicious activities of an insider in order to analyse these activities and then create 
a match between these activities and the insider's job responsibilities. 
 Legitimate activities: legitimate user activities are logged in order to determine 
all the activities undertaken before and after the incident; 
 Failed logins: all failed logins aimed at accessing the insider‟s email inbox are 
logged in order to discover any intruder activities. 
5.2.3 Network Infrastructure 
The experiment comprises setting up a virtual network. A virtual network comprises 
three elements of an organisation's network, as follows: 
 an external network 
 a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) 
 an internal network. 
Figure 18 illustrates the network structure for the experiments. Further information about the 
technical infrastructure is presented in Appendix A4.  
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Figure 18: Network infrastructure for Experiments 
 
 
5.2.3.1 Virtual Network Components 
 Five clients are set up in the internal network at the same domain, as follows: 
          1- victim (Alice) is configured with IP 146.227.128.3; 
          2- insider (Bob) is configured with IP 146.227.128.4; 
          3- manager (Tim) is configured with IP 146.227.128.5; 
          4- group-leader is configured with IP 146.227.128.6; 
          5- co-worker (Sarah) is configured with IP 146.227.128.7. 
 
 One server is set up in the DMZ to provide different services, as follows: 
          1- Mail Exchange (MX) (see the next section) 
              2- Name Services (NS) 
        3-Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) 
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 Two routers are set up between the external and internal networks as follows: 
         1- Firewall (fw-1) 
         2- Firewall (fw-2) 
Fw-1 has two interfaces: the first interface connects to an external network and the 
second interface connects to a DMZ network. Fw-2 also has two interfaces: the first 
interface connects to the DMZ network and the second interface connects to an 
internal network. 
Further information about setting up the network and how to it works is presented in 
Appendix A5.  
5.2.3.2 Iptables Policy 
Iptables is a command line program that is used to configure the Linux Ipv4 packet 
filtering rule set. It is used to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IP packet filter 
rules in the Linux kernel. Further information about iptables is presented in Appendix 
A1.  
The firewall policy is configured as follows: 
 This policy records any traffic that comes to port 25 that is also from the source 
IP address 146.227.128.4 to the destination IP address 146.227.192.2.  
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 25 -s 146.227.128.4 
-d 146.227.192.2 -j LOG --log-prefix ***mailattack***-
-log 
 
 This policy records any traffic that comes to port 110 that is also from the source 
IP address 146.227.128.4 to the destination IP address 146.227.192.2.  
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 110 -s 
146.227.128.4 -d 146.227.192.2 -j LOG --log-prefix 
***mailattack***--log 
 
 This policy records any traffic that comes to port 143 that is also from the source 
IP address 146.227.128.4 to the destination IP address 146.227.192.2. 
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 143 -s 
146.227.128.4 -d 146.227.192.2 -j LOG --log-prefix 
***mailattack***--log 
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 This policy allows the specific subnet to connect to the mail server, port number 
25 (IP address 146.227.192.2). 
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 25 --source 
146.227.128.0/26 --destination 146.227.192.2 -j ACCEPT 
 
 This policy allows the specific subnet to connect to the mail server, IP address 
146.227.192.2 and port number 110. 
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 110 --source 
146.227.128.0/26 --destination 146.227.192.2 -j ACCEPT 
 
 This policy allows the specific subnet to connect to the mail server, port number 
143 (IP address 146.227.192.2). 
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 143 --source 
146.227.128.0/26 --destination 146.227.192.2 -j ACCEPT 
 
5.2.4 Software 
5.2.4.1 Operating System (OS) 
Linux-Ubuntu 9.04 Desktop is distributed as free and open source software [93]. It 
comprises multiple software packages typically distributed as free software or under an 
open source licence. Further information about Ubuntu‟s requirements is presented in 
Appendix A2. 
5.2.4.2 Netkit 
This software was conceived as an environment for setting up and performing 
networking experiments at low cost [61]. Netkit allows the creation of many virtual 
network components that can be interconnected in order to develop a network on a 
single personal computer or a laptop. Further information about Netkit‟s requirements is 
presented in Appendix A3.  
5.2.4.3 Pine 
Program for Internet News & Email (Pine) is a common mail user agent [96]. It allows a 
user to read, send and manage emails. It also allows connections to mail servers and 
manages incoming/outgoing email [96]. Users must be authenticated on the incoming 
mail server to get their incoming emails. Post Office Protocol (POP3) port 110 is used 
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to read emails from a local client and Interactive Mail Access Protocol (IMAP) port 143 
is used to view emails from the email server. 
5.2.4.4 Exim4 
A Mail Transfer Agent (MTA) is a server acting as an outgoing mail dispatcher [94]. It 
does the job of transferring messages from one host to another. After the mail reaches 
its destination hosts, the agent delivers it into user mailboxes or to the processes that 
manage user mailboxes. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) port 25 is used to 
transfer outgoing mail.  It was originally designed for passing messages between MTAs, 
but that was later subverted for the purpose of submitting new messages to an MTA, 
which is quite a different kind of operation [94]. 
5.2.4.5 BIND 
Berkeley Internet Name Domain is a hierarchical naming system for computers and 
services connected to a LAN or Internet. It is responsible for translating hostnames into 
IP addresses [95].      
5.2.4.6 Message Exchange (MX) 
This is a server that collects incoming emails for a specific domain (test.com). Each 
domain which allows users must have at least one mail exchanger [95]. MX records are 
part of the DNS information for a domain [95]. 
When a foreign mail server wants to send a message to an address at test.com, the 
foreign server will first attempt to deliver the message to mail.test.com.    
5.2.4.7 Investigation Tools   
 Tcpdump 
This is a network packet analyser tool that allows an investigator to intercept and 
display TCP/IP being transmitted or received over a LAN [92]. It allows the logging of 
the content of email packets. Tcpdump runs under the command-line. It prints out the 
headers of packets on a network interface. It can also be run with the -w flag, which 
causes it to save the packet data to a file for later analysis [92].      
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This software is one of the best network protocol analysers [105]. The current 
experiment uses Wireshark to conduct analysis of insider network activities (sending 
and receiving of emails). Wireshark also has display filters and is able to read and 
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5.3 Conduct of Experiments 
The experiment in fact comprises a series of experiments, conducted in order to test the 
hypothesis by looking for evidence which shows that it is possible to distinguish 
between insider and outsider attacks. This section presents only the analysis and 
decision processes of each experiment (see Appendix B for further information about 
the experiment as a whole).   
5.3.1 Experiment (Ex) 1  
A victim reported that she received an abusive email from her co-worker, which is his 
email address insider@test.com. The IT security interviewed an “alleged” suspect and 
he denies this allegation.     
5.3.1.1 Timeline analysis  
The OS usually records the time of the very last action that was performed in terms of 
user activities, such as file and folder activity. This information is a valuable source of 
evidence which can assist in distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. 
Moreover, the system stores file timestamps to keep a record of the file creation time, 
the last time the file was accessed and the last time the file was modified. Therefore, 
user activity timeline analysis helps in identifying the file creation time, as well as the 
last time the file was modified on the insider‟s computer and the emails that were sent 
and received. In the experiment, when the timeline analysis had identified all the 
insider's activities (email activity and file activity), it helped to identify the sequence of 
all the activities. It found that the abusive email had been sent when the insider was 
carrying out activities consistent with his job responsibilities. After the insider had 
logged out from the mail server, he created several files and stored them on his 
computer. 
Figure 20 shows that the period during which the attack took place was from 10:30 p.m. 
to 12:03 p.m. It also shows that some activities were performed before and during the 
period of the attack, including emails being received and sent.  
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5/27/2009 10:30 PM 5/28/2009 12:30 AM
11:00 PM 12:00 PM
10:31 PM - 11:01 PM
UA1
11:05 PM - 11:24 PM
UA2
11:45 PM - 12:02 AM
UA5








Received an email 11:00:16 PM
Sent an abusive email
10:31:45 PM
Email login 




































Figure 20: Timeline analysis for Experiment 1 
 
The timeline analysis of logs and an insider‟s computer showed that several activities 
were performed by the insider, as presented in the table 13 below:   
 
                                               Table 13: User activity for Experiment 1 
Session Attack Activity 
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The timeline analysis revealed the following facts: 
 one login 
 12 emails had been sent and received   
 one abusive email 
 four files were being accessed  
5.3.1.2 Relational analysis 
Relational analysis is used to analyse an insider's activities to identify matches between 
these activities and the insider‟s job responsibilities. When relational analysis was used 
to analyse the above activities, it revealed the following facts: 
 10 emails were BE 
 two emails were NBE 
 an abusive email was sent among the business activities 
 four BF were being accessed and updated 
 
Figure 21 shows that most of the email activities matched the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. It also shows that the file activities matched the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. 
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From: Manger To: Insider Time: 11:06:15 PM
Date: 27-05-2009 Message:089
Hi Bob there is a meeting with AVG Company in order to 
discuss how to reduce the car incident for employees. So, 
I would like to join this meeting. Could you tell me if you 
are free, please? Thnaks 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee















Security Incident Monthly Report
From: Sarah To: Insider Time: 10:58:46
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:086
















From: Insider To: Victim Time:10:36:13
Date:27-05-2009 Message No.:084
Hi Alice I hope you are ok. Are you still in Cardiff? Did 
you meet Abdulrazaq? See you later
Best reagrds
From: Insider To: Victim Time: 10:47:46
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:085
Hi Alice I would like to remind you to email me the 
report of car incident for yesterday in order to prepare 
the morning report. Thanks best regards
From: Victim To: Insider Time: 10:59:55
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:087
Hi Bob I met Abdulrazaq last night...















To: Insider Time: 11:08:41 PM
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:090
Could you send me a copy of monthly security incidents 
for the previous two months (March and April), please? 
Thanks in advance. Best regards, Tim
From: Insider To: Manager Time: 11:24:38 PM
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:090
Hi Mr. Tony I am pleased to attend this meeting on Friday. 







From: manager To: Insider Time: 11:25:15 PM
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:091
The meeting will take place at noon.
From: Insider To: Manager Time: 11:25:53 PM
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:092
Thanks sir
From: Victim To: Insider Time: 11:26:19 PM
Date: 27-05-2009 Message No.:093
There are two car incidents as follows: name of drivers: 
Ahmed, reporters: Khalid, type of car: Toyota, and 









































                      Figure 21: Relational analysis for Experiment 1 
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Figure 22 shows the communications that took place between the insider and other 
computer users in the organisation. It shows that these emails were business emails. 
 
                                                                  Figure 22: Insider’s business emails 
  
5.3.1.3 Decision 
An activity is expressed as a number in order to distinguish between insider and 
outsider attacks.  
Legitimate activities = -1 
Abusive email = 0 
Suspicious activities = 1 
 An average of activities is used to identify the type of attack as follows: 
 A =  ai / N   
Where n is the number of activities. 
 If total A < 0, it is likely an insider attack 
 If total A > 0, it is likely an outsider attack 
 If A=0, it is likely unknown attack   
A= -13/18= -0.72 
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Table 14 shows the activities timeline and type of activities performed by the insider. 
These activities are expressed as a number in order to help identify any attack by type, 
and whether the attack was carried out by an insider or an outsider. 
                                                           Table 14: Experiment 1 result 



















Average  -0.72 
 
Table 14 shows that the result is less than zero. Therefore, the attack was more likely an 
insider attack because a< 0. 
 
Further details about this experiment are presented in Appendix B1. Ex1. 
 
5.3.2 Experiment (Ex) 2 
A victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The email 
was received on September 8, 2009 at 22:29:24. 136008000. 
The preliminary investigation showed that this email was sent by the insider but the 
insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email. Therefore, the first step was 
to collect evidence of legitimate and suspicious activity by the insider from the logs and 
from the insider‟s computer. These activities were then examined in order to provide the 
analysis process with information about the insider's activities. 
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5.3.2.1 Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis presents all user activities before and during the period of the 
attack. Figure 23 shows that the period of the attack was from 09:57 p.m. to 11:05 p.m. 
It also shows that some activities, including the sending and receiving of emails, were 
performed before and during the period of the attack. Email login was then granted very 
shortly afterwards and the abusive email was sent.  
 
9/8/2009 9:50 PM 9/8/2009 11:05 PM
22:00
10:20 PM - 11:05 PM
UA4





































Figure 23: Timeline analysis for Experiment 2 
 
 
The timeline analysis of the logs and the insider‟s computer showed that several 
activities were performed by the insider, as presented in Table 15 below:   
 
                                                          Table 15: User activity for Experiment 2  
User Activity 
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The timeline analysis revealed the following facts: 
 three logins 
 five emails were sent and received   
 two files were being accessed  
5.3.2.2 Relational Analysis 
The relational analysis presents the relationships between user activities and insider‟s 
job responsibilities. Figure 24 shows that the email activities matched the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. It also shows that the file activities matched the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. 
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UA4-2: Sent an 
abusive email
UA4-1: Sent an email 
UA4-3: Sent an email
From: Manger To: Insider Time: 10:12:45
Date: 08-09-2009 Message No.: 121
I would like you to update me with latest car incident 
report soon. thanks
From: Insider To: Victim Time: 10:29:24
Date: 08-09-2009 Message No.: 124
*******Abusive email********
************************** 
From: Insider To: Group-leader Time: 11:02:59
Date:03-03-10 Message No.: 125
This email includes the update list of car incidents
From: Insider To: Group-leader Time: 10:24:40
Date: 08-09-2009 Message No.: 123
I would like to call for a meeting in order to discuss many 
issues such as how can reduce the number of incidents 
..Thanks  regards, Bob
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee


































Monthly car incident file
From: Insider To: Manger Time: 10:14:14
Date: 08-09-2009 Message No.: 122















Figure 24: Relational analysis for Experiment 2 
 
The analysis process found the following facts:  
 These activities were legitimate: 
o there is a match between the email activities and the insider's job 
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o there is a match between the file activities and the insider's job activities; 
o the insider was successful in accessing the mail server. Therefore, the 
method of access was authorised accessed; 
 An abusive email was sent to the victim, alongside the insider's legitimate job 
activities. 
5.3.2.3 Decision   
Table 16 shows the activities timeline and type of activities performed by the insider. 
These activities are expressed as a number in order to help identify the type of any 
attack, and whether the attack was carried out by an insider or an outsider. 
A= -9/10= -0.9 (it is more likely to be an  insider attack). 
 
                                                                          Table 16: Experiment 2 results 













For further details about the conduct of Experiment 2, see Appendix B1, Ex2.  
 
 
5.3.3 Experiment (Ex) 3  
The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on December 3, 2009 at 20:42:43.527593000. 
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The preliminary investigation showed that this email was sent from the insider‟s 
computer but the insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email because he 
was out of his office at the time. Therefore, the first step was to collect information 
about both legitimate and suspicious activity by the insider from the logs and the 
insider‟s computer. These activities were then examined in order to provide the analysis 
process with details of the insider's activities.  
5.3.3.1 Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis shows all user activities during the period of the attack. Figure 25 
shows that the period of the attack was from 8:35 p.m. to 8:48 p.m. This analysis 
reveals that some suspicious activities, including one failed login, were performed 
during the period of the attack. There were several suspicious activities, including 
attempting of sending emails logins and an abusive email.  
12/3/2009 8:30 PM 12/3/2009 9:30 PM
21:00





Attempt of sending external email
8:38:26 PM




















Attempt of sending external email
 
Figure 25: Timeline analysis for Experiment 3 
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The timeline analysis of logs and an insider‟s computer shows that several activities 
were performed by the insider, as presented in the table 17 below:   
 
                                                  Table 17: User activity for Experiment 3 
Attack Session Activity 







This analysis revealed the following results: 
 there were four times of failed attempts to send emails to external parties 
 several command-lines were used to collect technical information about the 
organisation‟s network in order to:  
o identify the default gateway for the insider‟s computer and interface to 
the network 
o collect information about IP and MAC addresses for the gateway 
computer and any computer communicating with the insider's computer 
(route, ifconfig-a and ifconfig-an) 
o identify the IP and MAC addresses for the insider‟s computer (arp–an). 
Figure shows these commands 
 the abusive email occurred  
 one file had been deleted  
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                                            Figure 26: User activities for collecting information  
 
5.3.3.2 Relational Analysis 
The relational analysis shows that there was no relationship between user activity and 
the insider‟s job responsibilities during the period of the attack and before and after the 
attack, but one business file had been deleted after the attack.  Figure 27 shows the 
relational analysis for these activities. 
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From: Insider To: Victim
Time:
08:42:43 PM
Date: 03-12-2009 Message No.:210
*******Abusive email********
************************** 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee























Figure 27: Relational analysis for Experiment 3 
 
The relational analysis process found the following facts: 
 the only email activity was the abusive email 
 the deleted file was a business file 
 no insider job responsibilities were carried out during the attack session: 
o  Non business emails  were sent or received 
o None Business files were created or modified 
5.3.3.3 Decision   
Table 18 shows the activities timeline and type of activities performed by the outsider. 
These activities are expressed as a number in order to help identify the type of attack, 
and whether the attack was carried out by insider or an outsider. It appears that: 
 the attacker had no prior knowledge of the company‟s IT infrastructure and no 
prior knowledge of any insider‟s job responsibilities 
 these activities were illegitimate:  
o suspicious activities were found relating to the collection of technical 
information about the network 
o these activities were performed out of working hours; 
 an abusive email was sent to the victim when the outsider tried to email the 
recipients who were not known to the mail server  
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A = 5/10= 0.5 (it is more likely to be an outsider attack) 
 












Further details about this experiment are presented in Appendix B1, Ex3.  
 
5.3.4 Experiment (Ex) 4 
The victim reported that an abusive email was received from Tim@hotmail.com. The 
email was received on Monday, 30 November 2009 at 03:22:2.  Figure 28 shows that 
the content of the abusive email header included the date of the email, its source 
address, recipient address, subject of the email and the body of the message. 
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                                                            Figure 28:  Content of the abusive message  
 
Preliminary investigation shows that Tim's account is a personal account and Tim is not 
working for Test Company. Therefore, the first step was to review fw-1 (firewall) log. 
When reviewing the log, it appeared that there was no connection between the mail 
server and another computer. This lead us to examine the mail envelope header of the 
abusive message in order to identify the source IP address of the email envelope. The 
envelope header is usually hidden when an email is viewed, and the message header is 
usually visible. It contains information that is essential to email delivery. The envelope 
header of the abusive message showed that the source IP address was 146.227.128.4. 
When reviewing the header, it revealed two suspicious issues as follows: 
1- Date and time of email was unreliable because the envelop header showed that 
delivery date and time of email was Mon, 30 Nov 2009 03:22:27 whereas, the email 
header shows that the date and time of email was Mon, 28 Nov 2009 01:00:01. 
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2- The envelope header showed that source IP address was 146.227.128.4. This IP 
address belongs to the insider‟s computer. Therefore, this IP source belongs to Test 
Company.        
Figure 29 shows that the content of the full header of the abusive email includes 
envelope header and message header. This information contains return-path, envelope-
to, delivery-date, received from, date of email, the source address and the recipient 
address, subject of email and the body of this message. 
                                                            Figure 29: Full header of an abusive email 
 
5.3.4.1 Timeline Activities 
The timeline analysis shows all user activities before and during the period of attack. 
Figure 30 shows that the period of attack was from 01:52 a.m. to 03:20 a.m. It also 
shows because there are no emails received, and only one other sent, as it stands.  
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11/30/2009 1:30 AM 11/30/2009 3:30 AM
02:00 03:00



















Figure 30: Timeline analysis for Experiment 4 
 
The timeline analysis of logs and an insider‟s computer showed that several activities 
were performed by the insider, as presented in the Table 19 below:   
 
                                        Table 19: User activity for Experiment 4  
 Attack Session Activity 






This analysis revealed the following results: 
 one login 
 one email had been sent 
 an abusive email was sent 
 one file accessed 
 
5.3.4.2 Relational Analysis 
The relational analysis shows the relationships between the user activities that were 
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performed before and during the period of the attack and the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. Figure 31 shows that the email activities matched the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. It also shows that the file activities matched the insider‟s job 
responsibilities. 
 
UA2-2: Sent an 
abusive email
From: Insider To: Group-leader Time:03:12:07 AM
Date: 30-11-2009 Message No.:126
I would like to inform you that the number of car incidents is 
increased this month. Therefore, we would like to prepare 
awareness program for employees
From: Insider To: Victim Time: 03:13:02 AM
Date: 30-11-2009 Message No.: 127
*******Abusive email********
************************** 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee

























Figure 31: Relational analysis for Experiment 4 
 
 
The analysis process found the following facts: 
 these activities were legitimate: 
o  there is a match between email activities and the insider's job 
responsibilities 
o there is a match between file activities and the insider's job activities; 
o the insider accessed the email server by using the SMTP protocol 
 an abusive email was sent to the victim while the insider was performing his 
legitimate job activities; 
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5.3.4.3 Decision  
Table 20 shows the activities timeline and type of activities performed by the insider.  
A =- 3/4= -0.75 (it is more likely to be an insider attack).  
               







Further details about this experiment are presented in Appendix B1, Ex4.  
 
 
5.3.5 Experiment (Ex) 5 
The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on Monday, 30 November 2009 at 02:53:20. However, the insider 
denied the allegation of sending an abusive email, because he was out of his office 
when the email was sent. The insider claimed that his password had been stolen.   
The preliminary investigation showed that the insider‟s account belonged to Test Com-
pany and, because the insider worked for Test Company, the first step was to review the 
fw-2 (internal firewall) log. When reviewing the log, it appeared that there was no con-
nection between the mail server and the insider. This led us to examine the mail enve-
lope header of the abusive message in order to identify the source IP address of the 
email envelope. 
5.3.5.1 Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis shows all user activities before and during the period of the attack. 
Figure 32 shows that the period of the attack was from 02:24 a.m. to 02:43 a.m. I It also 
shows that two emails were sent.  
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Figure 32: Timeline analysis for Experiment 5 
 
 
The timeline analysis of logs and an insider‟s computer showed that several email 
activities were performed by the insider, as presented in the table 21 below:   
 
                                                               Table 21: User Activity for Experiment 5 
Attack Session Activity 






The timeline analysis revealed the following facts: 
 no login 
 two emails had been sent and received   
 one abusive email 
 
5.3.5.2 Relational Analysis  
The relational analysis shows the relationships between the user activities that were 
performed during the period of the attack and the insider‟s job responsibilities. Figure 
33 shows that the activities mentioned in the emails matched the insider‟s job 
11/30/2009 2:00 AM 11/30/2009 4:00 AM
03:00
2:24 AM - 2:43 AM
(S1) UA1
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UA1-3: Sent an 
abusive email
From: Insider To: Manger
Time:
02:33:58 AM
Date: 30-11-2009 Message No.:131
I would like to inform you that this afternoon I am going to Car 
Insurance Company for business meeting
From: Insider To: Victim
Time: 
02:43:47 AM
Date: 30-11-2009 Message No.: 132
*******Abusive email********
************************** 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee










From: Insider To: victim
Time:
02:24:25 AM
Date: 30-11-2009 Message No.: 130
I would like to provide me with the updated list of car incident 






Figure 33: Relational analysis for Experiment 5 
 
 
TCPdump logs revealed that the insider did not use his password to access to the orga-
nisation‟s network but he used SMTP commands to send emails, which were two busi-
ness emails and an abusive email. Analysis of abusive header email revealed that this 
message came from insder@test.com but from an external machine, the source IP ad-
dress was an external 1.1.0.1. Then the external firewall (fw-1) logs were being ex-
amined and showed that there were SMTP connections between the external machine 
and the email server.  
The analysis process found the following facts: 
 the insider used SMTP commands to send emails and the abusive email 
 these email activities were legitimate: 
o there is a match between the email activities and the insider's job 
responsibilities 
Chapter 5                                                                                                                             Experiments  





 an abusive email was sent to the victim when the insider was performing his job 
activities   
5.3.5.3 Decision                                                                                
Table 22 shows the activities timeline and type of activities undertaken by the insider. 
A = -2/3= -0.66, therefore, it is more likely to be an insider attack. 
 







Further details about this experiment are presented in Appendix B1, Ex5.  
 
5.3.6 Experiment (Ex) 6 
A victim reported that an abusive email was received from this source: 
insider@test.com. The email was received on September 6, 2009 at 20:33:14. 
634794000. 
A preliminary investigation showed that this email had been sent from the insider‟s 
account but the insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email. Therefore, the 
first step was to collect information about legitimate and suspicious activity on the part 
of the insider from the logs and from the insider‟s computer. These activities were then 
examined in order to provide the analysis process with information about the insider's 
activities. The examination process provided the following information. 
5.3.6.1  Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis shows all user activities during the period of the attack.  
Figure 34 revealed that the period of the attack was from 8:30 p.m. to 8:37 p.m. There 
were several suspicious activities, including two failed logins and an abusive email.  
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Figure 34: Timeline analysis for Experiment 6 
 
 
The timeline analysis of the logs and the insider‟s computer showed that several 
activities were performed by the user, as presented in the table 23 below:   
 
                                                       Table 23: User activity for Experiment6 
Attack Session Activity 






This analysis provided the following information: 
 the activities included two failures to gain authenticated access to the mail server 
 the method of access was password guessing to gain insider's access 
 the attacker used the insider's email account to send an abusive email to the 
victim 
9/6/2009 8:00:00 PM 9/6/2009 9:00:00 PM
9/6/2009 8:32:13 PM 9/6/2009 8:37:00 PM
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5.3.6.2 Relational Analysis  
The relational analysis shows that there is no relationship between user activity and 
insider‟s job responsibilities during the period of the attack and before and after the 
attack. Figure 35 shows the relational analysis for these activities 
 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee
Insider’s job responsibility 
User activities (UA)
UA2: Sent an abusive 
email
From: Insider To: victim Time:08:33:40 PM





Figure 35: Relational analysis for Experiment 6 
 
 
The relational analysis process found the following facts: 
 the only email activity was the abusive email; 
 no insider job responsibilities were carried out: 
o  No business email was sent or received; 
o No business file was created or modified. 
The relational analysis shows that there is no relationship between user activity and 
insider‟s job responsibilities during the period of the attack, and neither before nor after 
the attack.  
5.3.6.3 Decision  
Table 24 shows the timeline activities and type of these activities, which were 
performed by an outsider because the suspect had no prior knowledge of the insider's 
job responsibilities. These activities are represented by numbers in order to help identify 
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the type of attacks, as to whether the attack was carried out by an insider or an outsider. 
A= 1/4= 0.25 (it is more likely to be an outsider attack) 
 








Further details of this experiment are presented in Appendix B1, Ex6.  
 
5.3.7  Experiment (Ex) 7                                       
The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on December 3, 2009 at 09:49:01.273294000. 
The preliminary investigation showed that this email had been sent from the insider‟s 
account but the insider denied the allegation of sending the abusive email. Therefore, 
the first step was to collect information about legitimate and suspicious activities 
relating to the insider from the logs, and then to examine these activities in order to 
provide the analysis process with information about the insider's activities.  
5.3.7.1 Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis shows all user activities during the period of the attack. Figure 36 
shows that the period of attack was from 09:47 p.m. to 09:51 p.m. This analysis reveals 
that some suspicious activities, including one failed login, were performed during the 
period of the attack. Email login was then granted very shortly afterwards and the 
abusive email was sent.     
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                                                       Figure 36: Timeline Analysis for Experiment 7  
 
 
The timeline analysis of logs and an insider‟s computer showed that several email 




                                         Table 25: User activity for Experiment 7 
Attack Session Activity 






This analysis provided the following information: 
 one failed login  
 one authorised login 
 an abusive email was being sent 
 
5.3.7.2 Relational Analysis 
The relational analysis shows that no user activities were performed during the period of 
the attack, apart from the sending of the abusive email. Therefore, this attack should 
most probably be an outsider attack; however, this methodology finds it difficult to 
12/3/2009 9:00 PM 12/3/2009 11:00 PM
22:00
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identify for certain whether this attack has been committed by an insider or an outsider, 
because there is a lack of activities to examine. Figure 37 shows no matching between 
user activity and the insider‟s job responsibilities.  
 
From: Insider To: Victim
Time:
09:49:01 PM
Date: 03-12-2009 Message No.: 126
*******Abusive email********
************************** 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee








Figure 37: Relational analysis for Experiment 7 
 
 
The analysis process found the following facts: 
 one failed login 
 the only email activity was the abusive email 
 No business email was sent or received 
 No business file was created or modified 
5.3.7.3 Decision  
Table 26 shows the activities timeline and the type of activities that were being 
performed. These activities are expressed as a number in order to help identify the type 
of attack, and whether the attack had been carried out by an insider or an outsider. 
A =0/3=0 (it is more likely to be an unknown attack)  
 






Further details about this experiment are presented in Appendix B1, Ex7.  
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5.3.8 Experiment (Ex) 8  
The victim reported that an abusive email was received from this source: 
insider@test.com. The email was received on January 10, 2010 at 21:55:26. 
The preliminary investigation showed that this email had been sent from the insider‟s 
account but the insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email. Therefore, the 
first step was to collect information about both the legitimate and suspicious activities 
of the insider from the logs and the insider's computer. These activities were then 
examined in order to provide the analysis process with information about the insider's 
activities. 
5.3.8.1 Timeline Analysis 
The timeline analysis shows all user activities during the period of the attack. Figure 38 
shows that the period of the attack was from 09:38 p.m. to 09:55 p.m. This analysis 
revealed that some suspicious activities, including three failed computer login attempts, 
were performed during the period of the attack. Email login was then granted and the 
abusive email was sent. Also, the computer password had been changed before the 
attack took place.   
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1/10/2010 9:30 PM 1/10/2010 10:30 PM
22:00
9:38 PM - 9:55 PM
(S1) UA1
9:39 PM - 9:55 PM
Attack Session
1/10/2010 9:38 PM 1/10/2010 9:55 PM















Figure 38: Timeline analysis for Experiment 8 
 
 
The timeline analysis of logs and an insider‟s computer showed that several email 
activities were performed by the insider, as presented in the table 27 below:   
                                               
 
 
                                      Table 27: User activity for Experiment 8 
Attack Session Activity 







This analysis provided the following information: 
 the authenticated activities failed three times in accessing the insider‟s computer 
 the method of access was by using password guessing to gain access 
 the insider‟s access had been changed before the abusive email was sent 
 the attacker used the insider's email account to send an abusive email to the 
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5.3.8.2  Relational Analysis 
The relational analysis shows that no user activities were performed during the attack 
session, apart from the sending of an abusive email. Figure 39 shows that there was no 
match between user activity and insider‟s job responsibilities.  
 
From: Insider To: Victim Time: 09:55:26 PM
Date: 01-10-2010 Message No.:166
*******Abusive email********
************************** 
T3: Analysis of security 
incidents 
T4: Design of security 
awareness programs
T2: Write a security 
investigation report
T1: Conduction background 
investigation for employee








Figure 39: Relational analysis for Experiment8 
 
The relational analysis process found the following facts: 
 the abusive email was the only email activity performed during the attack 
session 
 no insider job responsibilities were carried out before or during the attack 
session: 
o  No business email was sent or received 
o No business file was created or modified 
5.3.8.3 Decision  
Table 28 shows the activities timeline and type of activities performed by the insider. 
These activities are expressed as a number in order to help identify the type of attack 
and whether the attack had been carried out by an insider or an outsider. 
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This section discusses the results of these experiments. DAMDIOA revealed that Exs.1, 
2, 4 and 5 had been committed by the insider. It uses legitimate activities as a method of 
distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. The researcher believes that legiti-
mate activities should not only depend on access but also on execution of the user‟s job 
responsibilities. This proposed method allows corporate security investigators to com-
pare activities carried out during the attack session with these responsibilities. In the 
present case, relational analysis was used to identify these relationships. DAMDIOA 
found that Exs.3, 6 and 8 were committed by the outsider because no job responsibili-
ties had been carried out. 
In Experiment 7, DAMDIOA failed to differentiate between an insider and an outsider 
attack; the attack was therefore classed as unknown. The reason for this is that the 
number of suspicious activities equalled the number of legitimate ones. It also found 
that there was not enough information to analyse. The conclusion is that this is 
apparently one of the main problems with this model. The researcher believes, however, 
that the problem is not with the model itself but with IT security policies. Chapter 7 will 
propose a corporate security model with recommendations in order to address this issue 
 
                                             Table 29: Results of Experiments     
 
Experiments  Type of attack DAMDIOA  
 Ex1  Insider  Insider 
Ex2 Insider Insider  
Ex3 Outsider Outsider 
Ex4 Insider Insider 
Ex5 Insider Insider  
Ex6 Outsider Outsider 
Ex7 Outsider  Unknown 
Ex8 Outsider Outsider 
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5.5 Tailored decisions  
This section discusses how the threshold can differentiate between insider and outsider 
attacks and what similarities and differences there are between tailored and predeter-
mined decision. It reports the results of these attack experiments based on the propor-
tion of suspicious activities (r). The threshold of suspicious activities has been adjusted 
to meet the requirement of different levels (from 0.1 to 1).  
Tailored decisions are able to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks with dif-
ferent false positive rates because those decisions are based on an adjustable threshold. 
The researcher tested all level of thresholds from 0.1 to 1, and found that: 
 Th = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1 failed four times to make such distinctions  
 Th = 0.2 and 0.3 made correct distinctions 
The table 30 shows the proportion of suspicious activity for each experiment, together 
with the different levels of threshold, illustrating how the types of incident depend on 
this level of threshold.         
                                          Table 30: Results of experiments based on portion of suspicious activities  
 
 
Likely types of 
incidents Customisable decision 
   Threshold=Th 
   Th=0.1 Th=0.2 Th=0.3 Th=0.4 Th=0.5 Th=0.6 Th=0.7 Th=0.8 Th=0.9 Th=1 
Exp no. Likely types R If R < Th it is more likely Insider ; if R > Th, it is more likely Outsider; if R = Th, it is more likely unknown attack   
Ex1 Insider 0.11 Outsider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex2 Insider 0 Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex3 Outsider 0.7 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Unknown Insider Insider Insider 
Ex4 Insider 0 Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex5 Insider 0 Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex6 Outsider 0.50 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Unknown  Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex7 Outsider 0.33 Outsider Outsider Outsider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex8 Outsider 0.66 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
 
 
                       
 
                          Correct decision                                         The highest level of wrong decision 
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5.5.1 Similarities and comparisons between fixed and the tailored decisions  
This section discusses the similarities and differences between the identification of the 
type of attack based on fixed and tailored decisions. The researcher selected the adjust-
able threshold Th=0.2 and 0.3 because their results were similar to fixed decision ones.   
The  outcomes were:  
 Both fixed and tailored decisions (Th =0.2 and 0.3) returned the same results 
 Tailored decisions are able to differentiate between these attacks, whereas fixed 
ones failed to identify the type of attack in Ex.7  
 Fixed decisions were unable to identify the type of attack in Ex.7 because the 
number of user suspicious activities is equal to the number of legitimate ones (0) 
 Tailored decisions (Th=0.2 and 0.3) are able to address the fixed decision issue 
by identifying the types of unclassified attack 
Table 31 illustrates these decisions and their distinction between these attacks. 
 
                         Table 31: Comparison between fixed and tailored decision 
 
  Fixed Tailored 
   Th=0.2 Th=0.3 
Ex1 Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex2 Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex3 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider 
Ex4 Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex5 Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex6 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider 
Ex7 Outsider Unknown Outsider Outsider 
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5.6 Summary   
This chapter aimed to test the hypothesis by running a number of insider and outsider 
attacks using DAMDIOA to distinguish between them. The experiments consisted of 
the following components: 
 Netkit to build a virtual client/server network 
 TCPdump to intercept TCP packets and record activities 
 Wireshark to analyse activities  
Password attacks and forged emails using SMTP were used as methods of attack. Both 
legitimate and suspicious activities were collected using TCPdump and command lines 
such as ls-l and ls-a. The resulting data were analysed and examined using timeline 
analysis to identify the attack session and relational analysis to identify the relationship 
between the activities performed in the attack session and the user‟s job responsibilities.  
The researcher found that, when DAMDIOA used predetermined decisions based on 
legitimate activities, it was able to differentiate the type of attack in seven of the eight 
experiments conducted. It was the tailored decisions with threshold levels Th=0.2 and 
0.3 that conferred the ability to make such distinctions.   
  





Chapter 6                                                                                                                            Test and Evaluation 





6 Test and Evaluation 
Objectives: 
 
 to discuss the results of the experiments 
 to evaluate DAMDIOA  
 to present case studies that have used DAMDIOA in real computer incidents 
 to discuss limitations of DAMDIOA  
 
This chapter analyses the experimental results and discusses similarities and contrasts 
between the current methods of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks 
(methods based on the three elements of authorised access, locations of attack initiation 
and attack within an organisation‟s control) and the proposed method of making such 
distinctions, based on the conduct of legitimate activities. It discusses similarities and 
contrasts between DAMDIOA and other models. DAMDIOA was used once each by 
two companies and proved able to distinguish between the two types of attack. The 
limitations of DAMDIOA will also be discussed.          
6.1 Discussion  
This section discusses the similarities and differences between methods by which in-
sider and outsider attacks are distinguished. It also compares DAMDIOA with the other 
models.       
6.1.1 Comparisons between current methods of distinguishing insider from out-
sider attacks 
The current methods of differentiation as outlined above will be compared with the pro-
posed one with regard to their respective efficiency. Table 32 illustrated these methods 
and their distinction between these attacks.  
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             Table 32: Results of experiments to determine the best factor for distinguishing the type of attack 
 
Experiment  Type of attack  
Methods of distinction between insider and outsider attacks 
Proposed method 

















 Ex.1  Insider  Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider  
Ex.2 Insider Insider Insider  Insider Insider Insider  
Ex.3 Outsider Outsider Outsider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex.4 Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider Insider 
Ex.5 Insider Insider Insider  Unknown Outsider Outsider  
Ex.6 Outsider Outsider Outsider Outsider Insider Insider 
Ex.7 Outsider  Outsider Unknown Insider Insider Insider 









6.1.1.1 Legitimate activities and location from which attacks are initiated     
The method of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks is based on the 
locations from which these attacks are initiated. If they are carried out from inside an 
organisation they are called “insiders”; otherwise they are known as “outsiders”. These 
experiments reveal that the locations from which attacks are launched (discussed in 
Chapter 2) can be misleading when attempting to make such a distinction. Experiments 
3, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate how an outsider can carry out an attack from inside an 
organisation using an insider's access and computer. Experiment 5 also demonstrates 
how an insider can carry out an attack from outside an organisation. The vulnerability 
of SMTP, namely its lack of authentication, was exploited to carry out this attack and 
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send an abusive email. However, in Experiments 1, 2 and 4 this method proved able to 
differentiate between these attacks.   
Of eight experiments attempting to determine the type of attack by ascertaining the 
location from which it was launched, only three successfully did so. The results of 
experiments 1, 2 and 4 show  that both legitimate activities and locations of initiation 
were able to identify the types of attack.    
The researcher therefore disagrees with the position of Melara and Sarriegui [50] and 
Graves [34], who believe that the differences between insider and outsider attacks are 
based on whether they are initiated from inside or outside the organisation. 
6.1.1.2 Legitimate activities and authorised access 
The main difference between insiders and outsiders is that the former have authorised 
access. The experiments conducted for this research have found that authorised access is 
not always a trustworthy aspect by which such distinctions can be made. Experiments 3 
and 7 demonstrate that outsiders were successfully authenticated on the system using 
the insider's password, which classifies them as insiders. Experiment 5 shows that 
authorised access cannot identify the type of attacks because no password was used to 
login into the system, that field not being a required one, or the password was so easily 
guessed as to be a mere formality. Vulnerability due to the lack of SMTP authentication 
was exploited to carry out this attack and send business emails. However, analysis 
based on legitimate activities was able to distinguish between these attacks.  
Experiments 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 found that both legitimate activities and authorised access 
were able to make such distinctions. Of the eight experiments using authorised access, 
three failed to discover whether the attack was launched by an insider or an outsider. 
The researcher‟s position is opposed to that of Rowlingson [74], Schultz [78] and 
Randazzo et al. [68], who hold authorised access to be one of the main aspects involved 
in such a distinction. The inadequacy of this approach is demonstrated by its 
classification of outsiders as insiders when they gain authorised access. Such access 
alone, while being useful, is not enough to distinguish between insider and outsider 
attacks. The crucial factor in this regard is establishing the relationship between 
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authorised access and the legitimate activity involved in the discharge of an 
organisational user‟s job responsibilities. Consideration of access is particularly useful 
in cases where different passwords are allocated for different functions, as when a user 
has one password for accessing a database server and a different one for accessing their 
computer.           
6.1.1.3 Legitimate activities and attacks within an organisation’s control 
These experiments prove that attacks from areas within an organisation‟s control 
(discussed in Chapter 2) do not always discriminate correctly between insider and 
outsider attacks. Outsider attack Experiments 3, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate how an outsider can 
carry out an attack from such areas, while Experiment 5 demonstrates the contrary: 
insiders can also carry out attacks from areas outside an organisation‟s control. 
Legitimate activities, however, are able correctly to make such distinctions, as 
Experiments 3, 5, 6 and 8 demonstrate. 
Of the eight experiments based on attack from within an organisation's control, five 
incorrectly identified the types of attack. For this reason the present researcher disagrees 
with Walton‟s [101] belief that the differences between insider and outsider attacks are 
based on attacks from within the organisation's control.  
The three aspects used by current methods prove unable to distinguish between insider 
and outsider attacks, resulting in an increased risk that corporate security investigators 
will misidentify suspects and that organisations will consequently be financially 
penalised.  
The present research did find, however, that legitimate activity in the form of insider job 
responsibilities can provide the basis for correctly distinguishing between such attacks. 
Of eight experiments using legitimate activities, seven correctly identified the source of 
the attack. The single failure was due to the dearth of activities to analyse, and the fact 
that the number of legitimate activities equalled the number of suspicious ones. 
DAMDIOA‟s ability to distinguish between these attacks could diminish the risk of 
misidentification of suspects. Figure 40 shows correct and false decisions for each 
method. 
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6.1.2 Comparison between the proposed model and existing models 
6.1.2.1 Collection data 
Most of the existing computer forensic models such as Haggery and Taylor's framework 
[37], DFRWS methods [63] and the model developed by Nelson et al. [60], do not 
determine what user activities are logged, and thereby fail to collect enough information 
with which to analyse the insider's activities. They focus only on recording suspicious 
user activities, which by itself is not enough to improve the process of distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks. This leads to an increased chance of mistakes 
being made in identifying suspects correctly, which could in turn result in mishandled 
evidence and organisations being put at financial risk. Some network forensic research, 
such as that of Rowlingson [73], indeed focuses on forensic readiness that maximises an 
organisation's ability to collect digital evidence, but this ability is not directed towards 
the necessary distinction revealed by the present research.  
DAMDIOA, on the other hand, identifies which user activities are logged, as well as 
determining which activities are necessary to carry out an investigation. DAMDIOA 
provides the corporate investigator with a procedure by which to collect enough 
information to proceed with the inquiry.    
6.1.2.2 Analysis data 
Most existing computer forensic models such as Haggerty and Taylor's framework [37], 
DFRWS methods [63] and the model developed by Nelson et al. [60] do not offer a 
methodology or techniques for analysing collection data, nor do they usually focus on 
analysing suspicious rather than legitimate user activities, although some research into 
computer security does study the detection and analysis of both, analyses that cover 
insider PC and network logs.    
On the other hand, DAMDIOA offers a means of focusing on analysing both legitimate 
and suspicious user activities by using a combination of two analysis methods, timeline 
and relational analysis. Timeline analysis enables the investigation to narrow its focus 
to a specific day, while relation analysis facilitates the discovery of any link between 
these activities and an insider's job responsibilities. This model also provides corporate 
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security investigations with an analysis procedure, as well as using the Wireshark tool 
as a network traffic analysis [105]. This research has found Wireshark to be a useful 
analysis tool that can help corporate computer investigators find specific pieces of 
information in the mass of evidence that has been collected, and then to use this as 
evidence to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks.        
6.1.2.3 Decision 
Most existing computer forensic models, such as Haggerty and Taylor's framework 
[37], IACIS [92], DFRWS methods [63] and the model developed by Nelson et al. [60] 
are not able to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. They conduct digital 
investigations based on ad hoc rather than structured methods. 
DAMDIOA, however, is designed as a structured model that is able to make such a 
distinction, which it does by the two proposed methods of fixed and customisable 
decisions. The former is based on a predetermined logical condition, whereas the other 
derives from thresholds of suspicious activities. This is useful, for example, when an 
organisation has employees perform specialised job responsibilities such as medication, 
mathematics and engineering. In such cases, if the proportion of suspicious activity is 
more than 80 per cent, the perpetrator is more likely to be an insider, because an 
outsider could not perform the insider‟s job responsibilities.           
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6.2 Case studies 
This section discusses that DAMDIOA was used in two different cases and it made 
differentiate between insider and outsider attacks.  
6.2.1 Case study 1   
6.2.1.1 Background 
This educational organisation located in Saudi Arabia has 1,000 employees and uses a 
client/server network environment. The two types of operating system for clients are 
MAC and Windows XP, while the server operating systems are Windows Exchange and 
Linux. This organisation relies on computer systems to perform, process, transmit, store 
and retrieve data. 
IT security is responsible for securing the organisation‟s network and seizing 
organisational devices that are being misused. The organisation‟s Corporate Security 
Service is responsible for conducting computer forensic investigations.  
6.2.1.2 Misuse of an organisation’s computer     
A report reached the Corporate Security Service that an organisation‟s PC on the second 
floor, Security Reception Desk at Building 1, was being misused. It was found that this 
PC, on at least one occasion, was consuming about 17 per cent of the organisational 
network's bandwidth. This PC was among the top ten system abusers in the whole 
organisation. This type of bandwidth use usually indicates the downloading of movies 
or software from the Internet.  
As a result of their investigation, this PC was seized by IT Security which, together with 
the Corporate Security Service, conducted a technical analysis of the system and found 
that this PC was in fact used to download movies and games from the Internet as well as 
accessing inappropriate websites. According to IT Security, the consequences of 
consuming that much bandwidth impacts on overall network performance. Accessing 
inappropriate web sites is (depending on the site) also against Saudi law. Another 
potential problem is that the PC could be infected with viruses as a result of visiting 
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these inappropriate sites, and therefore the organisation‟s network could be impacted as 
well.  
6.2.1.3 Initial findings   
As part of the investigation, IT security sent the suspect PC to Corporate Security 
Service for further analysis. That analysis included reviews of system applications and 
activities such as files, folders and web histories. It found that a number of movies and 
games were downloaded and pornography was accessed by using a piece of proxy 
software called Hotspot Shield. This software allows a user to bypass King Abdulaziz 
City Web filtering, which is controlled by the Saudi Government‟s Internet Services 
Unit. This analysis also determined that the majority of this activity took place between 
2300 and 0600.  
After analysing the PC system, the Corporate Security Service identified an insider, a 
security officer, who appeared to be assigned to the evening security shift on the second 
floor security desk in Building 1. The Corporate Security Service interviewed him and 
he denied the allegation, stating that he did not download any inappropriate software. It 
was also determined that the password for this system was commonly known: it was a 
default password, the easily guessed "123456", and the computer was located in an open 
area. The officer stated that, during the course of any given shift, he might leave the 
security desk post to patrol or to cover for someone else‟s break, thereby leaving the 
system unprotected. It was hard for Corporate Security Service to find evidence linking 
the insider with these illicit activities.     
6.2.1.4 DAMDIOA findings  
DAMDIOA was used to investigate this allegation. Analysis of the insider activities 
showed the Corporate Security Service that four business emails were sent from the 
insider‟s email account and two were received by it. One of the most important emails 
was one he received from the Human Resource Department containing his performance 
appraisal and asking him to read and sign it. The signed appraisal was saved on the 
document folder on the hard disk. The insider attached this appraisal and sent it to the 
Human Resource Department at 0150. At 0157, another important email was a security 
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status report he sent to his supervisor. Hotspot Shield was received by email and 
downloaded at 0200. The pornographic movie was accessed at 0230, and at 0300 he 
emailed a security incident report to the security control center. At 0330 he received a 
message from a security officer located in Building 15 asking him to cover a post in that 
building because he needed to take a break. At 0335 the insider emailed his supervisor 
informing him of this. 
The Corporate Security Service interviewed the insider again and presented him with 
these facts, whereupon he admitted in writing that he had indeed downloaded movies 
and on one occasion had accessed a pornographic website, because he had received an 
email including that website‟s link. He further stated that he had downloaded the 
inappropriate software “Hotspot Shield”.  
6.2.2 Case study 2 
6.2.2.1 Background  
One of the biggest private companies in Saudi Arabia has about 20,000 employees [4]. 
This organisation relies on computer systems to perform, process, transmit, store and 
retrieve data. The organisation uses a client/server operating system. Clients are organ-
isational users‟ computers that request data or services such as email and directory ser-
vices from organisational servers. 
Active Directory (AD) is a critical database of users, computers and network resources; 
it makes the latter accessible to users and applications [4]. The groups are stored in the 
AD and are monitored by Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM). MOM can monitor, 
manage and secure a wide range of resources including computers, applications, Web 
server farms and corporate servers [4].  
Two types of policy are implemented for Internet access in this organisation. The first is 
restricted access for one hour only for employees, while the second is unlimited access 
to the Internet for mangers and above.  
The company‟s IT security is responsible for securing IT resources and conducting 
computer forensic investigations. 
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6.2.2.2 A case of violation of the organisation’s IT policies  
An AD administrator reported to IT security that an employee – i.e. an insider – 
violated the organisation‟s IT policy by logging into its domain controller (DC) using a 
domain administrator account and illegally added his account and that of his co-worker 
to the manager‟s group, granting him unlimited Internet access.   
Figure 41 demonstrates the electronic evidence that the insider‟s account was moved to 
open the Internet policy.  
  
              Figure 41 Evidence of modification Internet Policy 
 
    
6.2.2.3 Initial findings  
As a part of their investigation, the insider‟s PC was seized by IT Security, which 
conducted a technical analysis of its system and found that it was in fact used to access 
the DC. The insider gained administrator access in order to modify the policy by 
moving his account and another one from restricted to unlimited access. MOM detected 
the insider‟s breach of the organisation‟s Internet policy and sent an email to the AD 
administrator. 
 The server:  
 Audit logs: the investigators found that the insider was successfully logged on 
to the administrator domain account in the AD at 1052; 
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 A message from MOM to confirm that the Internet policy had been changed 
by the insider at 1110 
 The insider’s computer: 
 Audit log: the investigator found that the insider had successfully accessed 
his computer at 0900.    
The investigator interviewed the insider, who denied the allegation by claiming that he 
was out of his cubicle for more than two hours. He also stated that he always logged in 
to his computer and left it without logging out  
6.2.2.4 DAMDIOA findings  
The following information was collected: 
 the insider‟s emails from the email servers 
 those resources‟ log files that had been accessed by the insider 
 the insider‟s job responsibilities 
The insider‟s job was a company IT trainer responsible for teaching the company‟s em-
ployees how to use Microsoft software packages such as Word, Excel, Access and 
PowerPoint. He was also authorised to access SAP, which allowed him to input 
trainee‟s names into a company database. 
 This investigation revealed the following:  
 one business email has been sent to co-workers 
Analysis of the insider‟s email showed that one email sent to a co-worker included a 
list of trainees nominated to attend a Microsoft PowerPoint course. The content of 
this email matched one of the insider‟s job responsibilities.    
 two personal emails have been sent to his friends 
Analysis of the insider‟s email also revealed that he sent a message to his brother 
who worked for the same company but at a different branch. Another personal 
email had been forward to his co-worker (might be suspicious if not allowed).    
 the SAP application had been accessed and a file modified  
Analysis of SAP‟s file log found that 0925 the insider successfully accessed a train-
ing database, and that at 1021 he had added the names of those trainees that had 
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passed the Microsoft Excel course and submitted the list to the company‟s Training 
Manger Department for approval.     
 AD had been accessed 
 
After the data, including emails, access to SAP and modified files, were collected, 
the insider was questioned. Upon being presented with these facts, he admitted that 
he changed the policy because he wanted to access the Saudi Stock Market. Table 
33 presents the time line of the insider‟s activities 
 
                        Table 33: Timeline of the insider’s activities  
 
Timeline Activities Type of activities 
9:12:28 Computer login -1 
9:25:00 Login SAP -1 
9:33:12 Forward personal email 1 
10:21:00 Modified a file -1 
10:52:03 Access to AD 1 
11:01:53 Send email to co-worker -1 
11:15:13 Change policy 0 
11:47:42 Modified a file -1 
12:03:14 Send personal email 1 
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6.3 Challenging the distinction between insider and outsider attacks 
It is not always possible to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks, because 
digital analysis usually depends upon output from protective security components [63]. 
The basic issues confronting corporate security in distinguishing between these attacks 
is therefore as follows: 
6.3.1 The model’s incapability of model to distinguish between co-workers 
DAMDIOA is an unsuitable model by which to distinguish between attacks by co-
workers. As previously mentioned, an outsider has no prior knowledge of an insider‟s 
job responsibilities. However, co-workers do have such information, because some jobs 
require more than one employee to perform. It is therefore very difficult for this model 
to determine which co-worker has carried out an attack.   
6.3.2 The model’s inability to model to distinguish between insider and outsider 
attacks 
In some cases, DAMDIOA cannot distinguish between these attacks. As previously 
mentioned, an outsider has no prior knowledge of an insider‟s job responsibilities. 
However, if outsiders do mange to become familiar with these,( for example by using a 
physical key-logging), it is very difficult for corporate security investigators to ascertain 
who has carried out an attack. Also, if the number of legitimate activities is equal to the 
number of suspicious ones, a predetermined decision cannot differentiate between them.     
6.3.3 Classification of activities 
The problem this model has is that legitimate and suspicious activities must be classi-
fied. For example, it classes personal activities as suspicious because legitimate ones 
only include employees‟ job responsibilities. These activities must therefore be properly 
classified.      
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6.3.4 Relative weighing of activities 
Legitimate activities are given the same significance. For example, both email login and 
read email are assigned values of -1. These values must be reconsidered in order to im-
prove this mode.     
6.3.5 Mis-configured security components 
Security components such as firewalls or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are 
hardware or software used to protect an organisation‟s system by filtering out unwanted 
network traffic and recording suspicious computer events. This record is essential if one 
is to comprehend the computer incident and the behaviour of the attacker. For example, 
if an IDS cannot correctly detect Trojans or any tools of hacking a loss of evidence of 
an attempt to steal an insider‟s access will result.  
6.3.6 Lack of implementation of full-content network monitoring 
The employment of trap and trace monitoring is one of the main problems in 
distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks, because it does not record a 
conversation‟s content, or payload. Trap and Trace monitoring only logs the transaction 
data summarising this network activity, consisting of IP address, port and username. 
This does not allow corporate security investigators to analyse the payload containing 
the substantive content of the packet. 
6.3.7 Lack of preservation of the log files 
Corporate security investigators sometimes face a problem if log files are not preserved 
correctly, because the integrity of log files is affected. Outsiders alter these logs upon 
gaining unauthorised access, thereby hiding the evidence of their crimes. In this case, it 
is very difficult to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. These log files 
should preserve in a separate server to protect the integrity of these files.  
6.3.8 Lack of recording of legitimate activities 
Many security professionals focus on recording suspicious security events, but this 
alone is not enough to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks because it does 
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not indicate if the insiders are performing their jobs when the incidents in which they 
are involved occur. Furthermore, this lack of recording affects the identification of the 
relationship between insider job responsibilities and the activities carried out before and 
after the incidents in question.    
6.3.9 Lack of retention policy 
Another issue facing corporate security investigators is the fact that that many 
organisations do not have retention policies. Only 50 per cent of U.S. organisations, for 
example, have formally embedded such policies [19] which are responsible for keeping 
security computer event and legitimate activity logs for certain periods of time. The lack 
of such a policy leads to the loss of evidence that can help distinguish between insider 
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6.4 Summary  
This chapter aimed to evaluate the results of the eight experiments by comparing cur-
rent methods of distinction between insider and outsider attacks (authorised access, lo-
cation of initiation attack and attack within an organisation‟s control) and the proposed 
one of legitimate activity. The researcher found that the criterion of authorised access 
failed three times to make these distinctions. This method of distinction is useless when 
there is a blank or shared password. He also discovered that both the location from 
which an attack was launched and attack within an organisation‟s control failed five 
times to differentiate between such attacks. There are no substantive differences be-
tween these methods. The single instance in which the proposed method failed to make 
these distinctions was because the number of legitimate activities equalled the number 
of suspicious ones. 
This chapter also discussed this model‟s use in the real world, in which it succeeded 
both times in making this distinction. The first case was when an insider in the form of 
an IT trainer violated the policy of his organisation by moving his account and that of a 
co-worker from restricted to unlimited Internet use. This model was able to name the 
insider who had committed this violation. In the second case another insider, a security 
officer, violated the organisation‟s policy by downloading a video pornographic. He 
denied this allegation until DAMDIOA was used to identify that particular violation 
with that employee. 
The researcher also discussed the disadvantages of this model, one of these being that 
when outsiders have prior knowledge of insiders‟ job responsibilities, this model cannot 
distinguish between them. Another is that it misclassifies some activities such as the 
sending and receipt of personal emails, classifying them as suspicious because legiti-
mate activities include employees‟ job responsibilities. The final disadvantage is that 
this model puts equal weight on all activities. 
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 to enhance security mechanism for the organisation‟s users 
 to improve the collection process of digital investigations 
 
This chapter provides a number of recommendations in terms of ways to enhance the 
process by which an organisation can authenticate its users and maintain audit logs of 
security events. This chapter also facilitates the process of distinguishing between 
insider and outsider attacks by proposing a physical and logical log management 
system. This log management system comprises a centralised database for all employee 
activities. These recommendations will lead to improvements in the process of 
distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks.      
7.1 Recommendations for enhancing an organisation’s resource authentication 
The researcher found that an organisation‟s user authentication is one of the main prob-
lems face a corporate security investigators when they dealing with distinction between 
insider and outsider attacks. This is because the insider access can be gained easily. 
Therefore, this section provides some recommendation to address this issue.  
7.1.1 User authentication 
Passwords are a universal form of authentication. However, password authentication is 
open to attack, as follows: 
 it is subject to guessing; organisation   
 the password may be written down and placed in a visible area 
 it is subject to eavesdropping 
 it is subject to social engineering 
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Based on the thesis experiments, , an outsider can exploit these vulnerabilities in order 
to obtain an insider's credentials. An organisation should enhance its IT security policy 
in order to prevent outsiders from obtaining insiders' credentials (passwords). In order 
to enhance the password policy, it should maintain and include the following: 
7.1.1.1 Implementation of two factor authentication 
Simple authentication schemes use a user-name and password to authenticate an 
organisation‟s user. This satisfies only a minimal security requirement because these 
passwords are often not difficult to guess. In two factor authentication, passwords still 
depend in part on something known by the user. However, in the most common 
implementation of two factor authentication, an organisation‟s users also use something 
they have, such as smart cards or something they are, such as biometrics, in order to 
enhance employee authentication.  The researcher believes that the use of two factor 
authentication can prevent outsiders from gaining insiders' credentials. 
7.1.1.2 Enable password complexity 
This policy involves the checking of passwords to ensure that they meet strong 
password requirements, such as:    
 not containing users‟ names or genuine names 
 containing characters, digits and non-alphabetic characters 
 not containing a dictionary word 
 
7.1.1.3 Define the minimum password length: 
Passwords should consist of at least a specific number of characters, usually more than 
fourteen characters. The main advantage of enforcing this policy is that it prevents an 
organisation‟s users from using blank passwords. It also forces users to create 
passwords that contain a certain number of characters. 
7.1.1.4 Login security 
This policy delays logins after incorrect attempts. Successful and failed logins are 
recorded. 
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The researcher suggests that employees should also protect their passwords from being 
obtained by outsiders. Employees should consider the following advice:    
 do not reveal a password in an email message 
 do not mention a password in front of others 
 do not hint at the format of a password 
 do not reveal a password to co-workers or to managers 
 do not create easily guessed passwords, such as one‟s wife's name or “2010” 
 do not choose a single password (Single Sign-On or SSO) for all applications, 
but choose a different password for each application (see the next section) 
7.1.2 Enabling of different passwords for different applications 
SSO allows an organisation's user to log in just once and navigate across many 
applications without the need to enter their credentials for each application. This makes 
it easy for the employee to login once and be able to access all the applications they 
want. SSO reduces the need for users to remember many logins and passwords. On the 
other hand, if outsiders obtain an insider's login then SSO makes it easy for access all 
the applications they want. Moreover, the key point here is that a single logon for the 
whole system will fail to capture individual activities; only separate logons for different 
applications will record activities in the detail necessary for forensic investigators. 
To address this issue, a different password policy should be implemented. This policy 
would require different passwords for different services. The reason for this is that 
doing so would minimise the risk of an outsider obtaining an insider's passwords. If an 
outsider obtains a password or cracks an insider's computer, the organisation will want 
to limit him/her from getting access to more applications. For example, an employee 
should have two different access passwords: one for accessing their computer and the 
other for accessing their email account. Should an outsider obtain the password for an 
insider's computer, he is not then able to access the insider's email account and misuse 
the email service, due to different passwords being required. 
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7.2  Recommendations for enhancing an organisation’s log files 
To distinguish between insider and outsider attacks, it should enhance an organisation‟s 
log files. The researcher makes many recommendations to enhance these files.  
7.2.1 Creating multiple event records 
A main advantage of enabling different passwords for different applications is that there 
will be multiple security event records. The audit record can be implemented for each 
application‟s login to record security event information such as: 
 successful and failed authentication attempts  
 file access  
The most important advantage of implementing monitoring/auditing for each login 
activity is that it generates security events for the activities of each login application. As 
a result of this action, the information collection process for distinguishing between 
insider and outsider attacks could be improved. It could also provide the analysis 
process with sufficient information. Therefore, employees should use different 
passwords for their various access needs. 
7.2.2 Enabling of communication records 
Communication records can provide corporate security with a list of dialled and 
received calls. This call list is another source of evidence that can help to support or 
refute any suggestion that the attack was committed either by an insider or an outsider. 
This log will help to identify whether the insider was in his office or not during the time 
of the initiation of an attack. It will also help to determine whether these calls were 
business-related or not. 
7.3 Implementation of physical access controls 
Organisations should enhance their security mechanisms by implementing physical 
access controls with two factor authentication, such as a smart card with that also 
requires a PIN. If the attack was initiated from inside the organisation, the physical 
access will be another source of evidence to support or deny a claim that the insider was 
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in his office during the time of the incident. The main advantage of physical access 
control is that it prevents an outsider from accessing an insider's office in person and 
implementing a physical keystroke logger on the insider's computer in order to obtain 
the insider's passwords. The physical access logs will provide a corporate security 
investigation with useful information, such as the last time the insider accessed his 
office and when he left his office, such as the last time the insider was using his office 
and when he left it. 
7.4 Physical access control logs 
 A physical access log file, such as a card reader or CCTV tape, determines when the 
insider accessed the specific location, such as an organisation's building, floor or 
department. This source of evidence can be essential to show whether the attack was 
initiated from inside the organisation or not. This evidence will help to confirm whether 
the insider entered the premises or not. 
Figure 42 shows the advantages of implementing recommendations that enhance the 
process of information collection and analysis for the purpose of distinguishing between 
insider and outsider attacks. 
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           Figure 42: Advantages of enhancing the collection process 
 
 
7.5 Insider and outsider activities log management 
Following the success of manual investigation methods for distinguishing between 
insider and outsider attacks, the researcher suggests that automated methods could be 
implemented to facilitate these processes. As we saw in the research, log files are 
important to the success of such an investigation. An organisation should maximise its 
ability to collect physical and digital evidence in order to log all employee events in a 
centralised server. Therefore, the researcher suggests the creation and management of 
logs that can collect both digital and physical evidence. 
C
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7.5.1 Log management 
The organisation should develop procedures for performing log management. Log 
management is aimed at creating and maintaining centralised physical and logical log 
files that record and store employees' activities, such as when an insider had access to a 
specific building, the last time he accessed his email account and when he left his 
office. Logs containing information relevant to security management are generated by 
many sources including: 
 firewalls 
 intrusion detection systems 




 physical card readers 
 others 
Moreover, this procedure should define minimal physical logging requirements in order 
to record and store sufficient detail for distinguishing between insider and outsider 
attacks, as follows: 
 first and last name 
 an organisation's employee ID 
 date and time in 
 destination 
 date and time out 
 description of activity 
 
7.5.2 Components of logs management 
These logs are designed to collect information for distinguishing between insider and 
outsider attacks. They consist of a number of components, as follows: 
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 log generation: as previously described, these logs are generated from many of 
the organisations‟ devices, such as servers, applications and firewalls. Each device 
generates its own log files     
 log transmission and storage: these logs should be transferred from the original 
servers or computers to a designated log server (a collector). They should be 
protected from breaches of their confidentiality and integrity. These logs are 
transferred to the server either in a real-time or near-real-time manner, or in 
infrequent batches based on a schedule or the amount of log data waiting to be 
transferred;  
 log analysis: in order to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks, two 
types of analysis will be employed: “timeline” and “relational” analysis. This 
analysis will provide the following advantages: 
 the log analysis is responsible for reconstructing activities, by reviewing 
and analysing the evidence, such as email activities, file activities and 
system logs  
 the log analysis provides a link between insider or outsider attacks and 
particular malicious events; 
 the log analysis could also be used to determine whether an insider‟s 
computer which has been involved in a crime was vulnerable to 
penetration  
 the log analysis shows what activities had been undertaken before and after 
the time of an incident;  
 the log analysis usually identifies patterns and anomalies 
 the log analysis identifies activities that were performed before and after 
the time of an incident in order to spot a possible relationship between 
these activities and the insider's job responsibilities (day-to-day 
organisational activities). As mentioned previously, one of the main 
characteristics of an insider is that they have authorised access to enable 
them to perform legitimate tasks; this analysis should identify whether 
these activities are indeed legitimate. If a malicious activity is found 
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among the legitimate activities, this may be an indication of an insider 
attack, because an outsider often has no prior knowledge of an insider‟s 
job responsibilities;  
 a relationship between an insider and a victim, e.g. in the case of abusive 
e-mails, can be identified; 
 a relationship between suspicious events and the exploitation of a system‟s 
vulnerability can be spotted;  
This physical and logical log management will lead to improvements in the analysis 
process for distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks, because it will analyse 
not only an insider‟s computer activities, but extend to physical activities. 
7.6 Interview insiders 
The researcher believes that the aim of interview employees/insiders is to obtain some 
relevant facts about their job responsibilities and other information as follows:  
 identify their secondary tasks  
 identify their interest websites 
 identify their coworkers and customers 
 identify the requirement to perform their tasks 
Another aim of this interview is to check the investigation findings with the information 
had been collected from the insider.        
7.7 Security incident report policy 
An organisation should create a security incident policy in order to report, as quickly as 
possible, all security incidents and events that may constitute a breach of security. The 
reporter (victim or IT security) should, as quickly as possible, write an email that 
presents the details. These incidents should be logged.  
The purpose of gathering information about a previous security incident is to understand 
whether the insider's computer was the subject of penetration. It should consider how a 
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network administrator or a helpdesk operator dealt with the security incident. For 
example, it should collect the following information: 
 has any an incident report been received from the insider or an IDS? If yes, 
 has a security log for the insider's computer been checked, and any failed logins 
noticed? 
 has an anti-virus program been run to check the applications on his computer? 
Or was his password changed?   
This information can be collected from a network administrator or a help desk. The 
researcher has created a basic sample of a Computer Incident Report (see the appendix).  
7.8 Defining of user’s job responsibilities 
Human resource management (HRM) is another critical source of collecting employee 
information, which includes user‟s job responsibilities. This information helps to 
improve the process of distinction between insider and outsider attacks.  However, the 
researcher believes that corporate security investigators may face an issue of defining a 
user‟s job responsibilities. To tackle this issue, the investigators should set up a regular 
meeting with HRM. An organisation‟s HRM should identify the following: 
 lists the main activities an employee has to carry out 
 role set which identify relation to other employees 
 to whom is the employee responsible  
 personal information from employee‟s file such as his/her personal email, his/ 
her bank details and other information 
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7.9 Summary  
This chapter has suggested a number of recommendations. These recommendations 
would improve the organisation‟s resources authentication such as enhancing password 
policy and enabling different passwords for different applications. They would also 
improve the audit log files for recording employee activities. Furthermore, the 
researcher suggests the creation and management of physical and logical logs in order 
to facilitate the process of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks. 
The researcher also suggests creating a security incident policy in order to report all 
security incidents and events that may constitute a security incident. Another suggestion 
is that user‟s job responsibilities should be identified by human resource management. 
These recommendations will improve the process of distinction between insider and 
outsider attacks. 
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This research has established both the importance and the possibility of distinguishing 
between insider and outsider attacks when conducting investigations into computer 
crime, in order to correctly identify suspects, to save organisations time and money, to 
avoid negative publicity for both the organisation and for the wrongly accused em-
ployee, and to forestall legal action. Recognising the impossibility of making this dis-
tinction purely on the basis of legitimate access (which outsiders may gain in an unau-
thorised fashion in order to launch criminal attacks on the organisation or its employees, 
or use to attack a third party), the researcher has clarified the current definitions of in-
siders and outsiders to reflect the importance of job responsibilities. He has then con-
structed a model, DAMDIOA, that builds on current ones in order to fulfil this function.  
The researcher identified the main issues facing corporate security investigators in-
volved in distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks as follows: 
 None of the current methods of making such distinctions (methods involving the 
location from which the attack was initiated, attacks within an organisation‟s 
control and authorised access) address the problem. 
 The lack of an organisation‟s resources authentication (for example, a single 
sign on or a weak password policy) allows outsiders easily to gain insider ac-
cess. 
 There is no conclusive model of computer forensic analysis of the distinction be-
tween insider and outsider attacks.  
The researcher then identified the types of information required to collect and analyse in 
order to distinguish between these attacks, namely insider job responsibilities, legiti-
mate and suspicious activities. The researcher also believed that legitimate activity 
should depend not only on access but also on execution of the user‟s job responsibili-
ties. For example, if an organisational user‟s activity includes their job responsibilities, 
it is more likely to be legitimate activity; otherwise that activity is more liable to be sus-
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picious. The researcher decided on legitimate activity incorporating job responsibilities 
as a basis for distinguishing between the types of attack because authorised access can 
easily be obtained by outsiders. 
A Digital Analysis Model for Distinction between Insider and Outsider Attacks (DAM-
DIOA) was therefore created by developing the DFRWS method to make it possible to 
make this distinction. DAMDIOA includes collection, examination, analysis, presenta-
tion and decision processes. Two analysis methods, timeline and relational analysis, 
were used to enable analysis of legitimate and suspicious activity. 
Timeline analysis was used to establish the correct sequence of events, associating par-
ticular users with specific time periods, and to show what activities had been carried out 
before and after the occurrence of incidents. It also helped to identify an attack session. 
Relational analysis was used to analyse activities performed before and after an inci-
dent, if it proved necessary to do so, as well as during an attack session in order to iden-
tify a possible relationship between these activities and the insider's job responsibilities.  
DAMDIOA also proposed two types of decision process: fixed decisionmaking, based 
on a predetermined logical condition, and decisions that can be tailored to the propor-
tion of suspicious activity. The main difference between these decisions is that an or-
ganisation can customise the threshold of tolerance for such activity based on its level 
of concern for the type of attack involved. Sometimes, tailored decisions based on these 
threshold levels can address the problem of an attack whose type is unknown.    
The success of this thesis has been measured according to the following criteria: 
1. Evaluation. This research conducted a network simulation in which a network 
experimental test involving eight experiments based on both fixed and tailored 
decisions was set up to carry out computer incidents. One of the eight experi-
ments, based on fixed decisions, failed to make that distinction because the 
number of suspicious activities equalled that of legitimate ones. Current methods 
of distinction between these attacks (authorised access, attacks within an organi-
sation‟s control and locations of initiation attack) and the proposed method (le-
gitimate activities) were compared.  
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Authorised access failed three times to distinguish between these attacks, in part 
because it was found not to be a suitable method of distinction between such at-
tacks if blank or weak passwords are used. Attacks within an organisation‟s con-
trol as well as locations from which attacks were initiated failed five times to 
make this distinction. The researcher‟s findings therefore differ from those of 
Melara and Sarriegui [50] and Graves [34], who believe that the differences be-
tween insider and outsider attacks are based on whether they are initiated from 
inside or outside the organisation. The present findings also differ from those of 
Rowlingson[74], Schultz [78] and Randazzo et al. [68] because of their position 
that one of the main aspects of the distinction is authorised access.   
2. Comparative analysis, which compares the proposed model with other com-
puter forensic models. The researcher finds that the main differences between 
DAMDIOA and others are as follows:  
 Purpose: DAMDIOA has been designed to deal with the distinction between in-
sider and outsider attacks, whereas other models such as DFRWS are general 
model that do not take the conduct of investigations into insider and outsider at-
tacks into account.  
 Collection: DAMDIOA has identified types of data to be collected, whereas 
other models do not, instead usually focusing on collecting evidence of suspi-
cious rather than legitimate user activities. 
 Analysis: DAMDIOA has employed both timeline and relational analysis to ex-
amine the user activities collected in the previous stage in order to identify the 
relationship between these activities and a user‟s job responsibilities. However, 
other models do not prescribe how to analyse collection data and what analysis 
methodology was used to analyse that data. For example, DFRWS was unable to 
distinguish between these attacks because of its omission of a method of rela-
tional analysis. 
 Decision: DAMDIOA‟s flexible decision process proposes two types of decision 
that allow an organisation to customise the level of threshold. No other models 
have this level of flexibility, relying instead on ad hoc methods. 
3. Case study: 
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Two companies used this model to identify whether incidents were carried out 
by their employees or by another party. The first case concerned an IT trainer 
who violated the organisation‟s IT policy by logging into the Domain Controller 
using a domain administrator account and illegally added his account and that of 
his co-worker to the manager‟s group, granting him unlimited Internet access. 
DAMDIOA was used to determine whether or not this incident was in fact 
committed by the IT trainer. It did indeed find a link between the activities 
carried out during the incident and the trainer‟s job responsibilities.     
In the second, a number of movies and games were downloaded and pornogra-
phy was accessed by using a piece of proxy software. It was alleged that the or-
ganisation‟s employee, who worked as a security officer, downloaded inappro-
priate software. It was determined that the password for this system was com-
monly known: it was a default password, easily guessed, and the computer was 
located in an open area.  However, DAMDIOA revealed that there were links 
between the activities carried out and the security officer‟s job responsibilities. 
The officer admitted in writing that he had indeed downloaded movies and on 
one occasion had accessed a pornographic website. 
The researcher also discussed the limitations of DAMDIOA. One of these is that this 
model misclassifies employees‟ personal activities such as personal emails as suspicious 
activities, because legitimate activities only include employees‟ job responsibilities. It 
also allocates the same weighting of -1 to activities such as read emails and database 
logins. Neither can DAMDIOA‟s fixed decisions able to distinguish between insider 
and outsider attacks when the number of legitimate activities equals the number of 
suspicious ones. Another limitation is DAMDIOA‟s inability to distinguish between 
such attacks when outsiders or co-workers have prior knowledge of insiders‟ job 
responsibilities. 
Difficulties facing DAMDIOA include misconfigured security components, lack of 
implementation of network monitoring, overwriting or deletion of log files, failure to 
record legitimate activities and lack of a retention policy.  
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The researcher made many recommendations to enhance both the authentication process 
of an organisation‟s users and the audit logs of security events. These recommendations 
would lead to improvements in the process by which insider and outsider attacks are 
distinguished. The researcher also suggests creating a physical and logical log manage-
ment system in order to facilitate the process by which this distinction is made       
 
8.1 Future Work 
8.1.1 Clustering of activities 
To improve the process of distinguishing between insider and outsider attacks, user ac-
tivities should be clustered into legitimate and suspicious activities. Two main issues 
must be tackled: 
I. What constitutes an “activity”? 
II. How activities be compared (for example, by similarity measures)?  
8.1.2 Identification of the most important information 
Based on the experimental results, it is not important to collect some legitimate activi-
ties such as reading emails or visiting public websites such as the BBC. However, some 
personal insider information such as access to personal email or bank accounts, is im-
portant in making this distinction. The researcher believes that studies should be con-
ducted to identify the most important information that should be collected in order to 
improve the quality of the process of distinguishing between the two types of attack. 
This research may help address the issue of unclassified attacks.      
8.1.3 Assigning relative weightings to legitimate and suspicious activities  
A significant task for future research is to establish the values of legitimate and 
suspicious activities in order to evaluate their relative importance. The researcher found 
that some legitimate user activities are of no great importance for distinguishing 
between the two types of attack. For example, insider access, including computer 
logins, can be obtained without detection, so such activities do not help to establish 
which types of attack have been carried out.  
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However, some legitimate user activities such as logins to specific application services 
(e.g. email, database, SSH and personal email logins) are  significant indicators of the 
type of attack, because they usually require different passwords. For this reason, 
assigning a relative weight to suspicious and legitimate activities may also improve the 
quality of this model, which does not prescribe this function. Table 36 shows the current 
weightings for legitimate activities.. 
 
                  Table 34: Relative weightings assigned to legitimate activities 
   
low weight  




   
 low weight 
high weight 
 
8.1.4 Develop DAMDIOA:  
Another task for future research is the development of DAMDIOA to work 
automatically as an investigation analysis tool that will lead to the collection of 
legitimate and suspicious employee activity in order to facilitate the distinction between 
insider and outsider attacks.  
8.1.5 Applicability to various types of incident 
The researcher believes that DAMDIOA can be applied to investigations into various 
types of offence, such as intellectual property (IP), information theft and the 
downloading of pornographic material. He suggests improving this model by using it to 
carry out real attacks in order to distinguish between insider and outsider attacks and 
evaluating the results.  
Timestamp Activities Type of activities 
Weig
ht  
9:10:00 Computer login -1 -1 
9:12:00 Database login -1 -3 
11:18:00  Email login -1 -3 
11:23:00  Database login -1 -3 
12:00:00  Install specific software -1 -2 
12:00:15  Computer login 1 1 
12:10:00 Modify file 0 0 
4:10:00  Forward email -1 -1 
5:10:00  Access bank account -1 -5 
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8.1.6 Users’ job responsibilities/roles 
Another area in which improvement is required concerns that of users‟ job 
responsibilities. These should be better defined, and their collection should be improved 
through the use of a standard method. In this regard it is necessary to establish precisely 
what information, such as personal email accounts and previous employers, is relevant, 
and should therefore be collected from employees‟ files  
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Appendix A: Build configuration of experiment 
A1. Iptables 
Each table comprises several built-in chains and may also contain user-defined chains. 
Furthermore, each chain is a list of rules which can match a set of packets. Each rule 
specifies what to do with a packet that matches. Table 35 illustrates filter packet chain 
types.   
                                                                   Table 35: Filter Packet Chain Types 





Forward Filters packets to servers accessible by another NIC 
on the firewall 
Input Filters packets destined to the firewall 
Output Filters packets originating from the firewall 
                                                                                   
 
Table 36 illustrates the policy of the Iptables chains [47].   
  
                                                             Table 36: Policy of IPtables Chains 
 
 
A2. Ubuntu Requirement: 
The minimum system requirements of Ubuntu Desktop are as illustrated in the below 
Table 37 [93]: 
                                                              Table 37: Minimum System Requirements of Ubuntu 
Target Description 
Accept  Iptables stops further processing 
 The packet is handed over to the end application or the OS for processing 
Drop  Iptables stops further processing 
 The packet is blocked 
Log  The packet information is sent to the syslog daemon for logging 
 Iptables continues processing with the next rule in the table 
 It is common to have two similar rules in sequence. The first rule will log the 
packet, the second rule will drop it 
Reject  Works like Drop target 
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 Minimum System Requirements Recommended minimum Requirements 
Processor 300 MHz 700 MHz 
Memory 256 MB 384 MB 
Hard drive 
(Capacity) 
4 GB 8 GB 
Graphic Card 640x480 1024x768 
 
A3. Netkit Requirements:  
It requires the following parts to work properly [61]: 
 Core; 
 Kernel of virtual machines; 
 File systems. 
The minimum system requirements of Netkit are illustrated in the below Table 38: 
                                     Table 38: Minimum System Requirements of Netkit 
 Minimum System Requirements 
Processor 600 MHz 




                                  
A4. Technical Configuration Description 
Technical configuration for the experiment is described as follows: 











# DMZ Machines hosting the exim4 MTA need more memory 
 Mail-server[0]="b" 
 Mail-server[mem]=32 
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A5. Setting the Network 
It sets up a network between 5 virtual machines. A network with 5 hosts connected to 
the same collision domain: 
1- Creating the 5 Vms as follows: 
 Create insider and a console window for insider 
 vstart insider –eth0=a 
 Configure network interface 
 ifconfig eth0 146.227.128.4 netmask 255.255.255.0 
 Test the network connection between machines to make sure machines can 
reach each other. 
 Ping 146.227.128.3. Figure 43 shows the experiment’s network 
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                                                      Figure 43: Using Ping for testing Experiment network connection 
 
The rest of VMs are configured the same way but the IP addresses for the following 
machines are different. Table 39 shows the IP addresses for the rest machines. 
 
                               Table 39: IP Address for Experiment's Client Machines 





                               
 
2- Creating fw-2 and configuring network interface as follows: 
 Ifconfig eth0 146.227.128.2 netmask 255.255.255.0 up 
 Ifconfig eth1 146.227.192.3 netmask 255.255.255.240 up 
 Route add -net 1.1.1.0 netmask 255.0.0.0 gw 146.227.192.1 dev eth1 
 Route add -net 146.227.128.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 gw 146.227.128.2 
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 Route add -net 146.227.192.0 netmask 255.255.255.240 gw 
146.227.192.3 dev eth1 
      IPtables Policy is configured 'forward chain' as follows: 
 Iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 25 -s 
146.227.128.4 -d 146.227.192.2 -j LOG --log-prefix 
***mailattack***--log 
 Iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 110 -s 
146.227.128.4 -d 146.227.192.2 -j LOG --log-prefix 
***mailattack***--log 
 Iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 143 -s 
146.227.128.4 -d 146.227.192.2 -j LOG --log-prefix 
***mailattack***--log 
 
3- Creating fw-1 and configuring network interface as follows: 
  Ifconfig eth0 1.1.0.2 netmask 255.0.0.0 up 
 Ifconfig eth1 146.227.192.1 netmask 255.255.0.0 up 
 Route add -net 146.227.128.0 netmask 255.255.0.0 gw 146.227.192.3 
dev eth1 
    IPtables Policy is configured forward chain as follows: 
 Iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --destination 
146.227.192.2 -i eth0 --dport 25 -j ACCEPT 
 Iptables -P INPUT DROP 
4- Creating Mail-server and configuring network interface as follows: 
  Ifconfig eth0 146.227.192.2 netmask 255.255.255.240 up 
 Route add default gw 146.227.192.3 
 Route add default gw 146.227.192.1 
Also   
  /etc/init.d/bind start 
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 /etc/init.d/exim4 start 
 /etc/init.d/inetd start 
      5- Configure MUA (pine) on PCs: 
 Start Pine on insider 
 Type password (insider) to login into incoming mail server 
 Select set-up (configure pine option) 
 Press C to move to a main menu 
1-Identifying the sender: 
 Personal-name =Bob 
2- Identify the name of the local domain: 
 User-domain     =Test.com 
3- Identify outgoing (SMTP) mail server: 
 Smtp-server    =Mail.test.com 
4- Identify the location of the incoming mailbox (server 
name; protocol; user=username folder name) 
 Inbox-path      ={imap.test.com/user=insider}inbox        
5- Tick (x) reply-always-users-reply-to 
6- Customized -header  = Reply-To: insider@test.com  
7- Exit set-up 
Figure 44 shows a configuration of MUA for the insider‟s machine. 
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                                                                  Figure 44: Configuration of MUA for insider’s client 
 
The rest of PCs are configured pine in the same way but instead of insider typing 
victim, manager, group-leader and co-worker. 
 6- Configuring email servers, sending and receiving emails: 
 
1-Configure MTA (exim4): 
 Create exim4.conf file: 
 Gedit /etc/exim4/exim4.conf 
 Identify domains for which mail is accepted as a final destination. type 
domain name: Main-Local-Domains = @:localhost:test.com 
 Identify subnet:Main_Relay_Nets = 164.227.0.0/24 
 Create inetd.conf 
 Determine email protocols 110 for pop3 or 143 for imap 
 Pop3 stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/tcpd  /usr/sbin/ipop3d 
 Imap stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/tcpd  /usr/sbin/imapd 
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where stream is socket type; nowait is only applicable to datagram sockets; root is 
name of the user who starts daemon; /usr/sbin/tcpd is daemon name and tcpd is 
providing logging and access control capabilities. 
Pop and imap server running on the mxs provide access to the mailboxes of the 
users. 
2- Create new five user accounts on the MX 
 An “insider” user account is defined on the mx password:insider    
 An “outsider” user account is defined on the mx password:outsider 
 A “manager” user account is defined on the mx password:manager 
 A “group-leader” user account is defined on the mx password:group-leader 
 A “co-worker” user account is defined on the mx password:co-worker 
 
Figure 45 shows that new five accounts were created in MX. 
 
                                                          Figure 45: Creation of new five accounts in MX 
 
3- Configure DNS: 
 Geidt /etc/bind/db.com.test 
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 Identify the following services in the same host: 
 Name service: @ dns.test.com 





  1-Configure NS: 
 Gedit (/etc/bind/) named.confin order to associate between zone and name 
server 
 Identify where to find information about the root name server: type hint; file 
“/etc/bind/db.root” 
 Identify the primary master for zone: type zone “test.com” 
 Identify the location where to find data about names in the zone: type file 
“/etc/bind/db.com.test” 
 
     2- Authoritative information: 
 Gedit db.com.test 
 Determine time to live in seconds (long a resource record should be cached) 
TTL 60000 
 Type @ in SOA mail.test.com  (2009031801; serial 
28; refresh 
14; retry 
3600000 ; expire 
negative cache ttl) 
o Where IN: record class (Internet) 
o SOA: record type (Start of Authority) 
o Mail.test.com: primary master server for the zone mail.test.com 
 
3- Configure slave/master server: 
 2009031801: serial number that includes year(yyyy), month(mm), day (dd) 
and number of change within that day (nn). 
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 28; refresh: (refresh interval) informs a slave how to check that data for zone 
is up to date. 
 14; retry:interval between subsequent attempts to contact the master. 
 3600000 ; expire: slave expire time: when the slave fails to contact the 
master for this amount of time, it considers the zone data old and stops 
giving replies about it. 
 Negative cachevttl: ttl for negative responses from authoritative name 
servers 
4- Association between name and IP addresses:      
 Identify the authoritative name server for the zone (test.com) is dns.test.com: 
               @ IN NS dns.test.org 
 Identify the mail exchanger for domain test.com   
              @ IN MX 5 mail.test.com. 
Where 5 is a preference value and mail.test.com is the mail exchanger for domain 
test.com. 
 Determine the number of pcs (6) in this zone: 
 Victim   IN A 146.227.128.3 
 Insider  IN A 146.227.128.4 
 Manager  IN A 146.227.128.5 
 Group-leader  IN A 146.227.128.6 
 Co-worker  IN A 146.227.128.7 
 IMAP  IN A 146.227.192.2 
 POP    IN A 146.227.192.2 
 Mail   IN A 146.227.192.2 
Note: imap.test.com, pop.test.com and mail.test.com are the same host. 
Figure 46 shows the configuration of experiment‟s server (NS). 
                                                                                                                                                                 Appendixes 





                      Figure 46: Configuration of Experiment’s server (NS)                       
 
 User Activities: 
1- Insider Activities: Many activities are conducted as follows: 
 Business emails are sent; 
 No business email is sent; 
 No business email is received; 
 Business emails are received; 
 Business files are stored in his pc; 
 An abusive email is sent.    
2- Victim Activities: Many activities are conducted as follows: 
 Business emails are sent; 
 Business emails are received; 
 An abusive email is received from the insider. 
3- Manager, co-worker and group-leader Activities: Many activities are 
conducted as follows: 
 Business emails are sent; 
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 Business emails are received. 
 
7- TCPdump: 
TCPdump is downloaded on the PC by using this command-line apt-get install 
tcpdump. Then TCPdump is used on fw-2 to sniff all packets that travels over the 
network. The command line to perform a full packet monitoring and log it is as 
follows [92]: 
 Tcpdump -n -i eth1 -s 1518 -w /hosthome/tiger/log27-
05-09.pacp & 
 -n: Do not convert addresses (such as host addresses, port numbers, etc) to 
names. Display the numerical address; 
 -i: Listen on the specific interface and capture the traffic of a particular 
interface eth1; 
 -s: Number of bytes captured per packet (default is 68) 
 -w: Write the raw packet to a file log27-05-09.pacp 
    
8- Launching the experiment: After configuring the components of this 
experiment, the next step is to run this experiment. The components of this 
experiment are automatically launching and comprises of the follows:   
 7 virtual machines are started; 
 All interfaces are configured; 
 Name server automatically configured and started; 
 MTA is automatically configured and started; 
 MUAs are automatically configured. 
 
9- Sending an emails: To send an email and record the activities of the insider, it 
should follow these steps:    
 Place on fw-2; 
 Start tcpdump; 
  Tcpdump -n -i eth1 -s 1518 -w /hosthome/tiger/log27-05-09.pacp & 
 Place on insider; 
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 Press Ctrl-X to send the message. 
 
10- Receiving an email: To receive an email, it should follow these steps:    
 Place on insider; 
 Start pine and check for incoming messages; 
 On the main menu select folder list; 
 Select inbox to check the incoming messages; 
 Select the message. 
     
    11- Investigation of an abusive email 
When a victim received an abusive email and the insider is refuting the allegation of 
sending the abusive email, the investigation is conducted to find out evidence that 
supports whether it was sent by the insider or the outsider. 
12- Abusive email 
On the 27
th
 of May 2009 at 11:49:24 pm, Alice (a victim user) received an abusive 
email and reported it to the computer forensic team. The header of the email indicated 
that the email was sent by Bob (an insider). When an investigation was conducted, the 
insider refuted the allegation of sending the abusive email. The insider claims that the 
password was gained by a hacker (an outsider) and he was not on his computer during 
the time of the incident. Therefore, computer forensic investigation should be carried 
out to prove/disapprove whether the insider sent the email or not. 
           13- The abusive email: the following details are the information of the abusive 
email:  
Date: 27 May 2009 23:00:55.338698000  (UTC) 
From:insider user <root@test.com> 
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Appendix B: The Process of Analysis the Attack Experiments  
B1.Ex1:  
 1.Collection process:  
Because of analysing the legitimate activity of the insider, it needs to review job 
description/ responsibility for the insider and the location of the legitimate activities. 
The main purpose of gathering information from various sources is to gain an 
understanding of the insider‟s responsibilities and the case. This experiment employs 
two types of information gathering: network diagram and job description/ responsibility 
for an insider.   
2.Review of Network Diagram:   
Before conducting a digital investigation for distinction between insider and outsider 
attacks, network diagram should be reviewed in order to understand the structure of an 
organisational network and identify the location of the activity (evidence). This diagram 
gives further technical details about security devices such as number of firewalls and 
identifies computers that were involved in this issue. 
Figure 47 shows that there are three parts of an organisational network: external, DMZ 
and internal networks. Two firewalls are set up. The first firewall has two interfaces. 
The first interface connects the external network and the second interface connects a 
DMZ network. The second firewall also has two interfaces. The first interface connects 
the DMZ network and the second interface connects an internal network. The diagram 
also showed that there is a chance to retrieve valuable information from the internal 
firewalls log.      
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                                                                             Figure 47: Review Experiment’s network 
 
This diagram shows that there is no file server and no web server for this company. 
Therefore, these activities retrieve from: 
 Mail server (emails); 
 The insider's computer (files/folders).   
 
Analysis email activities assist to identify the relationship between the emails and the 
insider's job (business) activities. Analysis files and folders help to identify the 
relationship between the insider's files/folders and the insider's job activities. 
Importantly, a review of job description and responsibility for the insider is needed to 
make a match of relationships between the insider and these activities to distinguish 
between insider and outsider attacks.   
Collecting packets: 
After conducting a full-packet monitoring, it logged 4340 packets. The next step is to 
extract these activities for the insider from these packets. Wireshark is used to retrieve 
and analyse these packets. Figure 48 showed that there are 4340 packets and different IP 
addresses and different protocols.   
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                                                                                Figure 48: Examine the insider’s activity 
   
However, it is not easy to analyse 4340 packets. An employment of Wireshark can 
reduce the number of the packets by customising filter. To reduce the number of 
packets, it should identify the insider's IP address and protocol. The experiment is 
interested in an insider's IP address 146.227.128.4 and email protocols, two protocols 
IMAP (port no. 143) and SMTP (port no. 25). A following command is used: 
 imap and ip.addr == 146.227.128.4 
The purpose of using this command is as follows: 
 Reducing the number of analysing packets from 4340 to 183; 
 Displaying only the insider email activities; 
 Displaying login and logout for the inbox email. 
Another command was used as follows: 
 smtp and ip.addr == 146.227.128.4 command 
The aim of this command is as follows: 
 Reducing a number of analysing packets from 4340 to 194; 
 Displaying only the insider's sending emails. 
Figure 49 shows that imap activity for the insider reduces the number of packets that 
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subject to examine.     
                                                                          Figure 49: IMAP insider’s activity  
 
Figure 50 shows that SMTP activity for the insider reduces the number of packets that 
subject to examine.     
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                 Appendixes 





                                                                              Figure 50: SMTP insider’s activity 
 
3.Examination Data: 
The goal of this analysis is to examine exchange mail messages that had been sent and 
received by the insider. After reducing the packets, the next step is to extract/examine 
the mail messages for the insider in order to analyse these emails. There is a list of 
legitimate activities generated by the insider as follows:   
Login no.1: This login was the first login activity of the insider for this night on the 27
th
 
of May 2009. The insider's computer (146.227.128.4) logged into a mail server 
(146.227.192.2) at 22:31:56. This login activity indicated that this is a legitimate access 
because there was no failed login. Therefore, the access method is classified as an AC. 
Figure 51 shows that when using Wireshark tool, the technical information connection 
between the insider computer and a mail server occurred. This information showed that 
a packet's header includes source and destination IP, source port number 53319 and 
destination port no 143 (IMAP). It also showed that body packet includes authentication 
login.      
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                                                               Figure 51: Examine insider’s authentication login 
 
 
Email no.1: The message had been sent from an insider (Bob) to a victim (Alice). It 
showed that the insider asked whether Alice was still in Cardiff or not and whether she 
met Abdulrazaq or not. The source IP address of the message was 146.227.128.4, the 
destination IP address was 146.227.192.2 and the destination port no. was 25 at 
22:36:13. The content type of the message was text/plain. 
At this stage is not easy to identify the type of a message whether it was a business 
email or a personal email because there is no relationship between Abdulrazaq and their 
organisation. Moreover, there is no match between insider's job responsibilities and the 
content of this message. Therefore, this email is classified as NBE.    
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Figure 52 showed that the header of a packet contained source and destination IP 
addresses and source port no 45010 and destination port no 25 (SMTP). It is also 




                                                                         Figure 52: Examine insider’s email activity   
 
Email no.2: The message had been sent from the insider to Alice showed that Bob sent 
a reminder email to Alice in order to ask her to email him a car incident report as soon 
as possible. The email was sent at 22:47:46 and the content type of the message was 
text/plain. The analysis of email content identified that one of the insider job activity is 
to follow up car incident reports for Test Company. It is also to prepare a security 
morning report. There are matches between the insider's job responsibilities and the 
content of this message. Therefore, this email is classified as a BE.    
Figure 53 shows that the content of this message included a business email because it 
contains one of the insider's job responsibilities.    
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                                                                   Figure 53: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Email no.3: The message had been sent from Sarah to the insider. It contained a car 
incident report. There is an exchange of business data between the insider and Sarah. 
This message indicated that another insider job activity is to collect car incident reports. 
There is a match between the insider's job responsibility and this email. Therefore, this 
email is classified as a BE. The email was received at 22:58:46 and the content type of 
the message was text/plain.  
Email no.4: This message is a reply email from the victim to the insider. This exchange 
message showed that there is no business data between the insider and the victim 
because it a contained personal message (informal relationship). However, this 
investigation is not going to analyse this relationship. There is no matching between the 
insider's job responsibilities and this email. Therefore, this email is classified as NBE. 
The email was received at 22:59:07 and the content type of the message was text/plain.  
 
Email no.5: The message had been sent from the insider to the victim. It contained an 
abusive email. This message was sent at 23:00:55 and the content type of the message 
was text/plain. Importantly, the message was sent among the insider's business activity. 
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There is also a personal message between the insider and the victim. Figure 54 shows 
the captured packet contents of an abusive email. Also, it showed that the source 
message IP is 146.227.128.4 (insider).    
 
                                                                Figure 54: Examine an abusive email 
 
Logout: when the abusive email was sent, the insider logged out at 23:01:03. This 
activity is the first logout activity for the insider. Figure 55 shows that the insider 
(146.227.128.4) was logged out from mail server (146.227.192.2). 
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                                                                             Figure 55: Examine insider’s logout activity 
 
Login no.2: After 4 minutes from the insider's logged out from the mail server, the 
insider logged into the server again at 23:05:49. The method of access is classified as an 
AC. Figure 56 shows that insider's authentication was successful.     
 
                                                             Figure 56: Examine insider’s authentication login  
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Email no.6: The message had been sent from the manager to the insider. This email 
indicated that the insider is not only responsible for collecting car accident reports but is 
also responsible for reducing the number of car incidents which leads to directly 
reducing the cost for the company. In addition, the analysis of this email showed that 
the manager asked the insider to attend a formal meeting with AVG Company. This 
meeting is aimed at discussing how to reduce car accidents for Test Company 
employees. The manager will expect a reply message from the insider. Therefore, series 
of messages will be exchanged between them. There is match between the insider's job 
responsibilities and this email's content. Therefore, this email is classified as a BE. The 
email was received at 23:06:15 and the content type of the message was text/plain. 
Figure 57 shows that the insider received a message from his manager. This message 
indicated there was a meeting with AVG Company. 
 
                                                                       Figure 57: Examine insider’s email activity  
 
 
Email no.7: The message had been sent from the group-leader to the insider. This email 
showed that the insider is responsible for creating a monthly report for car accidents and 
storing them. In addition, the analysis of this email showed that there is a business 
relation between the group-leader and the insider. There is a match between the insider's 
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job responsibilities and this email content. Therefore, this email is also classified as a 
BE. The requested email was received at 23:08:41 and the content type of the message 
was text/plain. 
Figure 58 shows that the message's content included a monthly security incident request 
from the group leader.         
                                                          Figure 58: Examine insider’s email activity  
 
Email no.8: The message had been sent from the insider to the manager. It contained 
the insider‟s reply to his manager's Email no.6. The insider informed his manager that 
he is going to attend the meeting. He also asked his manager when the meeting will take 
place. The insider will expect a reply message from the manager. A series of messages 
will be exchanged between them. Moreover, there is matching between the insider's job 
responsibilities and the email content. Therefore, this email is classified as a BE. The 
BE was sent at 23:24:27 and the content type of the message was text/plain.  Figure 59 
showed that the message content contained the insider replied to his manager's email.        
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                                                         Figure 59: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Logout: When the insider replied to his manager's email, he logged out at 23:24:38. 
Figure 60 shows that the insider was logged out from the mail server. 
                                                                           Figure 60: Examine insider’s logout activity 
 
 Login no3: After a few seconds, the insider logged into the mail server at 23:24:54 
PM. The method of access is recognised as an AC because the login was successful. 
Figure 61 shows that the insider was authenticated logging. 
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                                                                        Figure 61: Examine insider’s login activity 
 
 
Email no.9: The message had been sent from the manager to the insider. This is one of 
the series of exchange email between them. The manager replied to the insider by 
determining the time of meeting. There is a matching between the insider's job 
responsibilities and this email content. Therefore, the insider received the message and 
this message is recognised as a BE. The message was received at 23:25:15 and the 
content type of the message was text/plain. 
Figure 62 shows that the message was received by the insider. The message content 
confirmed the meeting time.          
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                                                                 Figure 62: Examine insider’s email activity 
  
Email no.10: The message had been sent from the insider to the manager. The insider 
replied to his manager's Email no.9 and he thanked his manager for his reply. This is the 
last part of the exchanged messages between parties regarding the meeting. There is 
match between the insider's job responsibilities and the content of this message. 
Therefore, this email is classified as a BE. The email was sent at 23:25:53 and the 
content type of the message was text/plain. 
Figure 63 shows that message contained the insider's reply to his manager's email.     
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                                                                       Figure 63: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Email no.11: The message was a replied email from the victim to the insider. This 
exchange message showed that the victim replied to the insider's reminder message by 
informing him that two car incidents had been reported. There is match between the 
insider's job responsibilities and the message content. Therefore, this email is classified 
as a BE. The email was received at 23:26:19 and the content type of the message was 
text/plain. 
Figure 64 shows that the insider received a car incident report from the victim.   
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                                                           Figure 64: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Logout: after the insider received the car incident report from the victim, he logged out 
from the mail server at 23:27:36.  
Login no.4: Eleven minutes after logging out, the insider logged into the mail server at 
23:38:08. Therefore, the method of access is classified as an AC because the login was 
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                                                      Figure 65: Examine insider’s authentication login activity 
 
 
Email no.12: The message had been sent from the group-leader to the insider. The 
group-leader informed the insider that two employees were injured. This email 
identified that the insider is also responsible for collecting injured employee reports. 
There is a match between the insider's job responsibilities and this message content. 
Therefore, this email is classified as a BE. This email was received at 23:39:03 and the 
content type of the message was text/plain. Figure 66 shows that the message was 
received by the insider contained an injury report.         
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                                                                 Figure 66: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Logout: When an injured employee report was received from the group-leader, the 
insider logged out from the mail server at 23:39:39 PM. Figure 67 shows that the insider 
logged out from the mail server. 
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                                                                 Figure 67: Examine insider’s logout activity 
 
Login no.5: Sixteen minutes after logging out, the insider logged into the mail server at 
23:55:45 PM. The access method is classified as an AC because the login was 
successful. Figure 68 shows that the insider was logging successfully. 
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                                                              Figure 68: Examine insider’s authentication activity 
 
Email no.13: The message had been sent from the insider to the manager. The insider 
sent a morning report for car accidents to his manager. The analysis of this message 
showed that the insider is also responsible for sending a morning report to the manager. 
It also showed that after the insider collects the car accident report and injured report, he 
makes a report. Then the insider sent this report to his manager. This message also 
contains a morning report attachment. There is a match between the insider's job 
responsibilities and the content of the message. Therefore, this email is recognised as a 
BE. 
Furthermore, the email was sent at 00:01:43 and the content type of the message was 
text/plain. Figure 69 shows that the insider sent a morning report to his manager and the 
message contained an attachment. 
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                                                                     Figure 69: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Logout:  After the insider sent a morning report to his manager, he logged out from the 
mail server at 00:02:03. This activity was the last logout activity from the mail server 
for the insider. Figure 70 shows that the insider logged out from the server.   
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                                                                          Figure 70: Examine insider’s logout activity 
 
As a result of the email activity analysis, it was that the insider sent and received a 
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                                               Figure 71: Examine insider’s computer analysis  
 
 4.File/Folder Timeline Activity Analysis: 
OS system usually records the time of the very last action that was performed on a 
file/folder. This information is a valuable source of evidence which can assist to 
distinguish between insider and outsider attacks. Moreover, the system stores file 
timestamps to keep record of the file creation time, the last time the file was accessed 
and the last time the file was modified. Therefore, file/folder timeline analysis identifies 
the file creation time and the last time the file was modified on the insider computer. 
When timeline analysis identifies all insider's activity (email activity and file activity), it 
helps to identify the sequences of all activities. It found that the abusive email was sent 
among the insider's job responsibilities. After the insider's logged out from the mail 
server, he created some files and stored them in his computer. Figure 71 shows the 
sequences of all activities email, file, login and logout activities that were generated by 
the insider.       
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The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on September 8, 2009 at 22:29:24 . 136008000. 
Preliminary investigation showed that this email was sent from the insider but the 
insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email. Therefore, the first step was 
to collect legitimate and suspicious activity of the insider from the logs and from the 
insider‟s computer. Then these activities were examined in order to provide analysis 
process with insider's activities. The examination process provided the following 
information:          
1. MA: 
 Email login: 
The login from the insider's computer was successfully authenticated on September 8, 
2009 at 21:59:55. 854317000. It indicated that the attacker was successful in accessing 
the mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 355   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: User INSIDER 
AUTHENTICATED. 
Figure 72 shows that the authenticated login information is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events. 
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                                                Figure 72: Authentication login activity 
   
 2.Email Activities: 
The logs showed that there were a number of emails that were sent and received by the 
insider as described below:   
Email No.1: 
TCPDump revealed that the first email asked for the updated car incident report and 
received it from Bob. In this experiment, one of the main job responsibilities for the 
insider is collecting car incident reports. Therefore, these activities are indeed legitimate 
because there is a relationship between this email and the insider's job responsibilities 
(day-to-day organisational activities). This email was received by the insider on 
September 8, 2009 at 22:12:45. 717668000. The following summary information is 
revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 60  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.4   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.2   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: BODY. 
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Figure 73 shows that the TCPDump information login is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email.   
 
                                                                    Figure 73: Examine insider’s email activity  
 
Email No.2: 
TCPDump revealed that the insider replied to the manager's email. This email was sent 
to the manager on September 8, 2009 at 22:14:14 . 064381000. The following summary 
information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 99  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 74 shows that the TCPDump information login is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email.    
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                                                            Figure 74: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Email No.3:  
TCPDump revealed that the insider sent an email to the group-leader. The email's 
content was calling for a business meeting and it was sent on September 8, 2009 at 
22:24:40. 136008000. As previously mentioned, one of the main job responsibilities for 
the insider is collecting and analysing car incident reports. Therefore, these activities are 
indeed legitimate because there is a relationship between this email and the insider's job 
responsibilities (day-to-day organisational activities). The following summary 
information is revealed from TCPDump log:   
Frame No. 187  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 75 shows that the TCPDump information email is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email.    
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                                                          Figure 75: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
Email No.4: 
TCPDump revealed that the insider sent an abusive email to the victim. This email was 
sent among insider job activities and it was sent on September 8, 2009 at 22:29:24 . 
136008000. The following summary information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 247  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 76 shows that the TCPDump information email is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email. 
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                                                           Figure 76: Examine abuse email  
 
Email No. 5: 
TCPDump revealed that the insider replied to the group-leader. This email contained an 
updated list of car incidents and it was sent on September 8, 2009 at 23:02:59 . 
758933000. This activity is also indeed legitimate because there is a relationship 
between the content of the email and the insider's job responsibilities (day-to-day 
organisational activities). The following summary information is revealed from 
TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 447  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 77 shows that the TCPDump information email is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email.     
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                                                                     Figure 77: Examine insider’s email activity 
 
3.Examination of an insider’s computer  
By using ls -l command, it shows that there were two files. These files are car-incident 
and monthly-car incident. Car-incident file was last accessed on September 08, 2009 at 
21:58. Monthly-car file was last accessed on September 08, 2009 at 22:17. These file 
activities are indeed legitimate because there is a relationship between these files and 
the insider's job responsibilities. Figure 78 shows the insider‟s computer activity. 
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The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on December 3, 2009 at 20:42:43.527593000. 
Preliminary investigation shows that this email was sent from the insider but the insider 
denied the allegation of sending an abusive email because he was out of his office. 
Therefore, the first step was to collect legitimate and suspicious activity for the insider 
from the logs and the insider‟s computer. Then these activities were examined in order 
to provide analysis process with insider's activities. The examination process provides 
the following information:     
1.MA: 
 Login activities: 
The login from the insider's computer was successfully authenticated on the 3
rd
 of 
December 2009 at 20:35:53.227755000. This login displays when an organisation's user 
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attempts to access the organisation's Mail server and the Mail server authentication 
system is able to recognize the user. It indicated that the attacker was success in 
accessing the mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 35   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: Response: 0000000 OK 
[CAPABILITY IMAP4REV1 LITERAL+ IDLE NAMESPACE MAILBOX-
REFERRALS BINARY UNSELECT SCAN SORT THREAD=REFERENCES 
THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT MULTIAPPEND] User INSIDER 
AUTHENTICATED. 
Figure 79 shows that the authenticated login information is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events.     
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1- TCPDump revealed that the first email was sent to abdulrazaq@kaust.com and 
contained safety awareness program for employees in order to reduce the number of car 
incidents. This email was sent by the insider on December 3, 2009 at 
20:38:27.840514000. The following summary information is revealed from TCPDump 
log: 
Frame No. 62  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT 
TO:<abdulrazaq@kaust.com>. 
Figure 80 shows the activity of attempting send an email outside the organisation.  
 
 
                      
                                                                            Figure 80: Examine email activity 
 
 
The mail server did not know how to reach kaust.com domain. The following summary 
information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 63  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.4   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.2   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 550 relay not permitted.   
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Figure 81 shows that the authenticated login information is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events. 
 
 
                                                         Figure 81 : Examine email activity 
 
 
2- TCPDump revealed that there was another attempt to send email to 
abdulrazaq@kaust.com. The insider attempted to send this email on December 3, 2009 
at 20:38:37.952632000. The following summary information is revealed from 
TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 96  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT 
TO:<abdulrazaq@kaust.com>.  
Figure 82 shows the email header address. 
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                                                                            Figure 82: Examine email activity 
 
 
The mail server did not know how to reach kaust.com domain. The following summary 
information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 97  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.4   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.2   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 550 relay not permitted. 
Email.2: 
TCPDump revealed that there was another attempt to send email to Ali@kaust.com. 
The insider attempted to send this email on December 3, 2009 at 20:39:04.543178000. 
The following summary information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 125  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT TO:<Ali@kaust.com>. 
Figure 83 shows that the authenticated login information is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events. It shows the attempt of sending a second email 
outside the organisation.   
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                                                    Figure 83: Examine email activity 
 
 
The mail server did not know how to reach kaust.com domain. The following summary 
information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 126  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 550 relay not permitted. 
Email.3:  
TCPDump revealed that there was one abusive email that was forwarded to the victim 
on the 3
rd
 of December 2009 at 20:42:43.527593000. The following summary 
information is revealed from TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 201  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMF   Deception: Malformed Packet. 
Figure 84 shows that the TCPDump information login is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email. 
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                                                          Figure 84: Examine abusive email 
 
3.Examination and analysis of the insider's PC 
After completing the examination of email activities, the next step is to examine the 
insider's computer. Firstly, the security corporate searched for any BF had been created 
or modified. This was done by using “ls –l” command; this command showed that there 
was NBF. Figure 85 shows that there was NBF in the insider's computer.     
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                                                 Figure 85: Examine insider’s computer activity 
 
Then the corporate security examined if there was any suspicious activities on this 
computer. This was done by using “history” command. This command revealed a 
number of suspicious commands as follows: ls, rm, route, arp-an and ifconfig. 
The last three commands (route, arp -an and ifconfig -a) are usually used to collect 
technical information about network infrastructure. Figure 86 shows that history list of 
commands that are used by the attacker to collect valuable information about the 
network.   
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Preliminary investigation shows that Tim's account is a personal account and Tim is not 
working for Test Company. Therefore, the first step was to review fw-1 (firewall) log. 
When reviewing the log, it appeared that there was no connection between the mail 
server and another computer. This lead us to examine the mail envelope header of the 
abusive message in order to identify the source IP address of the email envelope. The 
envelope header is usually hidden when an email is viewed, and the message header is 
usually visible. It contains information that is essential to email delivery. The envelope 
header of the abusive message showed that the source IP address was 146.227.128.4. 
When reviewing the header, it revealed two suspicious issues as follows: 
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1- Date and time of email was unreliable because the envelop header showed that 
delivery date and time of email was Mon, 30 Nov 2009 03:22:27 whereas, the email 
header shows that the date and time of email was Mon, 28 Nov 2009 01:00:01. 
2- The envelope header showed that source IP address was 146.227.128.4. This IP 
address belongs to the insider‟s computer. Therefore, this IP source belongs to Test 
company.        
This is useful information that leads corporate security investigation to examine the 
insider activities in order to collect further valuable information.   
Figure 87 shows that the content of the full header of the abusive email includes 
envelope header and message header. This information contains return-path, envelope-
to, delivery-date, received from, date of email, the source address and the recipient 
address, subject of email and the body of this message.     
                                                                Figure 87: Examine full abusive email header address  
 
Based on the collected information from the envelope header, the next step was to 
examine fw-2 (internal firewall) log. The firewall log shows that there was SMTP 
connection between the insider (IP address 146.227.128.4 and port # 44201) and the 
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mail server (IP address 146.227.192.2 and port # 25). This information indicated that 
this attack initiated from inside the company. Figure 88 shows the firewall activity logs. 
 
                                                   Figure 88: Firewall activity log 
 
The next step was to examine the insider‟s activities from the TCPdump log and it 
revealed the following activities:       
1. MA: 
 Login activities 
There was one login activity to the Mail server from the insider's computer. The login 
from the insider's computer was authenticated on November 30, 2009 at 03:09:18 
.338867000. The Mail server authentication system is able to recognize the insider. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 35  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: USER INSIDER THENTICATED. 
Figure 89 shows that the login information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and description of events.    
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                                                           Figure 89: Insider’s authentication login activity 
 
2.Email Activities: 
The logs showed that there were a number of emails that were sent and received by the 
insider as described below:   
Email No.1: 
TCPDump revealed that the first email was sent to the group-leader and contained 
safety awareness program for employees in order to reduce the number of car incidents. 
Another primary job responsibility for the insider is managing safety awareness. 
Therefore, this email is indeed legitimate because there is a relationship between this 
email and the insider's job responsibilities. This email was sent by the insider on 
November 30, 2009 at 03:12:15. 198370000. The following summary information is 
revealed from TCPDump log: 
1- Frame No. 73  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA Fragmented. 
2- Frame No. 75  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: IMF   Deception: Malformed Packet. 
Figure 90 shows this email,  
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                                                                       Figure 90: Examine email activity 
  
 
On November 30, 2009, the insider logged out from the mail server at 03:12:19. 
354163000. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 89  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: BYE mail-server IMAP4rev1 
server terminating connection. 
 
3- SMTP Connection between the Insider and the Mail Server: 
On Nov 30, 2009 03:13:02, TCPDump revealed some suspicious activities after the 
insider logged out from the mail-server. The insider attempted to set up a SMTP session 
with the mail server as described below: 
1- The insider used EHLO command to greet a target remotely. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 109  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: EHLO 
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2- EHLO command was invalid because the insider did not identify the source. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 111  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 501 Syntactically invalid EHLO 
argument(s) 
 
3- The insider again used EHLO command to greet a target remotely. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 138  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: EHLO Tim.hotmail.com 
 
4- The greet was accepted by the mail and was ready to establish SMTP connection 
with Tim. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 140  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250-mail-server Hello 
Tim.test.com [146.227.128.4] | 250-SIZE 52428800 | 250-PIPELINING | 250 HELP 
 
5- The insider sent an email by using Mail From command and the insider typed the 
source of email: Tim@hotmail.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 147  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: MAIL 
FROM:<tim@hotmail.com>. 
Figure 91 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the content of the packet. 
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                                                               Figure 91: Examine SMTP email activity 
 
  
6-  After the Mail server accepted the sender address as the following detail:   
Frame No. 148  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.4   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.2   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250 OK. 
The insider sent an email to victim by using RCPT TO command. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 152  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT TO:<victim@test.com> 
Figure 92 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the content of the packet. 
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                                                                  Figure 92: Examine SMTP email activity 
 
7- After the envelope was finished, the data of the email message just as it is followed. 
The data consists of the email's body as well as the header fields. The command to 
initiate the state that makes the mail server accept the message is DATA. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 155  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA 
 
8- The insider started with the header of the message by entering day, date and time of 
the email. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 160  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
Figure 93 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the content of the packet. It shows that the time and date of the email was modified. 
It also shows the first step of creating a fake email. 
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                                                Figure 93: Examine SMTP activity for the first step of creating a fake email 
 
The insider sent From: Tim@hotmail.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 164  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment. 
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                                           Figure 94: Examine SMTP activity for the second step of creating a fake email 
   
Figure 94 shows the email was sent from tim@hotmail.com. It shows the second step of 
creating a fake email. 
The insider typed Reply-To: tim@hotmail.com. The following information is revealed 
from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 170  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment. 
Figure 95 shows that the third step of creating a fake email. 
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                                        Figure 95: Examine SMTP activity for the third step of creating a fake email 
 
The insider sent To: victim@test.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 164  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
Figure 96 shows the fourth step of creating a fake email.  
                                              Figure 96: Examine SMTP activity for the fourth step of creating a fake email 
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The insider typed Subject: abuse email. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 176  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
Figure 97 shows the fifth step of crating a fake email. 
                                           Figure 97: Examine SMTP activity for the fifth step of creating a fake email 
 
The insider typed Message-ID Pine. LNX. 4.64.0604032208335.264@insider. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 178  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment. 
Figure 98 shows the sixth step of creating of a fake email.  
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                                       Figure 98: Examine SMTP activity for sixth step of creating a fake email 
 
The insider identified the content type of email. Figure 99 shows that the TCPDump 
information is presented destination and source IP addresses; destination and source 
MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; and the content type of email 
entered by the insider. It shows the seventh of creating a fake email. 
Figure 99: Examine SMTP activity for the seventh step of creating a fake email 
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The insider wrote the body of the message (an abusive message). The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 147  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 100 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the body of the message which contained the email abuse. It also shows the eighth 
step of creating a fake email. 
Figure 100: Examine SMTP activity for the eighth step of creating a fake email 
 
The insider terminated the SMTP connection with the mail server by using QUIT 
command. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 204  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.192.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: QUIT. 
Figure 101 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the QUIT command. It shows the ninth step of creating a fake email. 
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Figure 101: Examine SMTP activity for the ninth step of creating a fake email 
 
The mail server terminated the SMTP connection with the insider. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 206  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 44201 [FIN, ACK] Seq=319 
Ack=567 Win=5792 Len=0 TSV=73736 TSER=67860 
 
3. Examination and Analysis Insider's PC 
By using ls -l command, it showed that there was one file. This file was car-insurance-
report and was last accessed on the 30
th
 of November 2009, at 1:56.  Another job 
responsibility for the insider is collecting car insurance reports. Therefore, this file is 
indeed legitimate because there is a relationship between this file and the insider's job 
responsibilities. This file was classified as a BF. Figure 102 shows the name of the file 
and the last date of access.     
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The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on Monday, 30 November 2009 at 02:53:20. Figure 103 shows that 
the content of an abusive email header includes date of email, the source address and 
the recipient address, subject of email and the body of this message. However, the 
insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email because he was out of his 
office, when the email was sent. The insider claimed that his password was stolen.   
 
Preliminary investigation showed that the insider account belonged to Test Company 
and because the insider worked for Test Company, the first step was to review fw-2 
(internal firewall) log. When reviewing the log, it appeared that there was no connection 
between the mail server and the insider. This lead us to examine the mail envelope 
header of the abusive message in order to identify the source IP address of the email 
envelope.           
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                                                                             Figure 103: Examine email abusive 
 
Interestingly, the envelope header of the abusive message showed that the source IP 
address was an external IP address 1.1.0.1. The preliminary result of the investigation 
showed that the abusive email was coming from the outside and using the insider 
account. The next investigation step was to examine fw-1 (external firewall) log in 
order to identify the connection. 
Figure 104 shows firewall‟s activity log. 
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                                                                Figure 104: Examine firewall activity log 
 
 SMTP Connection between the insider and the Mail server 
The log shows that there was an SMTP connection between the mail server 
146.227.192.2 and an outsider computer 1.1.0.1. This information lead to examining the 
email activities between these computers. Therefore, the TCPDump log was useful to 
examine theses activities. 
 Email No.1 
1- An attacker tried to connect the to mail (mail.test.com) remotely at 02:24:25. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump:   
Frame No. 58  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: DNS   Deception: Standard query AAAA mail.test.com 
 
2- EHLO command was used to establish a connection between the outsider 1.1.0.1 and 
the Mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump:   
Frame No. 71  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: EHLO insider.test.com 
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3- The greet was accepted by the Mail and ready to establish SMTP connection with the 
insider. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 73  Destination IP address: 1.1.0.1   Source IP address: 146.227.128.2   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250-mail-server Hello insider.test.com [1.1.0.1] | 
250-SIZE 52428800 | 250-PIPELINING | 250 HELP 
 
4- The insider sent an email by using Mail From command and the insider typed the 
source of email: insider@test.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 80  Destination IP address: 146.227.128.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: MAIL FROM:<insider@test.com>. 
 
5-  After the mail server accepted the sender address as the following detail: 
Frame No. 81  Destination IP address: 1.1.0.1   Source IP address: 146.227.192.2   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250 OK 
the insider sent an email to the victim by using RCPT TO command. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 83  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.10.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT TO:<victim@test.com> 
 
6- After the envelope was finished, the data of the email message just as it is followed. 
The data consists of the email's body as well as the header fields. The command to 
initiate the state that makes the mail server accept the message is DATA. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 88  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA 
 
7- The insider started with header of the message by entering day, date and time of the 
email. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 91  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
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The insider sent From: Bob insider@test.com. The following information is revealed 
from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 95  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.10.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Reply-To: insider@hotmail.com. The following information is 
revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 101  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider sent To: victim@test.com  . The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 103  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Subject: asking for updated car incident report. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 107  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Message-ID Pine. LNX. 4.64.0604032208331.264@insider. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 111  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
The insider identified the content type of email by typing Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; 
charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed. 
  
The insider wrote the body of the message. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
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Frame No. 125  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 105 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the body of the message. 
                                                                               Figure 105: Examine email activity  
 
The insider terminated the SMTP connection with the mail server by using QUIT 
command. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 139  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: QUIT. 
It appeared that it is a business email because there is matching between the insider's job 
activities and this email.      
 
 Email No.2: 
1- An attacker tried to connect the mail (mail.test.com) remotely at 02:33:58. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump:   
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Frame No. 149  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: DNS   Deception: Standard query AAAA mail.test.com 
 
2- EHLO command was used to establish a connection between the outsider 1.1.0.1 and 
the mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump:   
Frame No. 160  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: EHLO insider.test.com 
 
3- The greet was accepted by the mail and ready to establish SMTP connection with the 
insider. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 162  Destination IP address: 1.1.0.1   Source IP address: 146.227.192.2   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250-mail-server Hello insider.test.com [1.1.0.1] | 
250-SIZE 52428800 | 250-PIPELINING | 250 HELP 
 
4- The insider sent an email by using Mail From command to type the source of the 
email: insider@test.com. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 167  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: MAIL FROM:<insider@test.com>. 
 
5-  After the mail server accepted the sender address as the following detail: 
Frame No. 168  Destination IP address: 1.1.0.1   Source IP address: 146.227.192.2   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250 OK 
the insider sent an email to victim by using RCPT TO command. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 172  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.10.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT TO:<manager@test.com> 
 
6- After the envelope was finished, the data of the email message just as it is followed. 
The data consists of the email's body as well as the header fields. The command to 
initiate the state that makes the mail server accept the message is DATA. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
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Frame No. 177  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA 
 
7- The insider started with header of the message by entering day, date and time of the 
email. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 180  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider sent From: Tim@hotmail.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 184  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Reply-To: insider@hotmail.com. The following information is 
revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 190  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider sent To: manager@test.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 164  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Subject: going to car insurance company. The following information 
is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 196  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Message-ID Pine. LNX. 4.64.0604032208332.264@insider. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
                                                                                                                                                                 Appendixes 





Frame No. 200  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider identified the content type of email by typing Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; 
charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed. 
  
The insider wrote the body of the message (abuse message). The following information 
is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 212  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 106 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the body of the message. 
                                                                        Figure 106: Examine email activity 
 
The insider terminated the SMTP connection with the mail server by using QUIT 
command. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
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Frame No. 234  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: QUIT. 
Figure 107 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the content of the packet. 
It appeared that this email was a business email because there is a match between the 
insider's job activities and this email.      
                                                                           Figure 107: Examine email activity 
 
 Email No.3: 
1- An attacker tried to connect the mail (mail.test.com) remotely at 02:43:47. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump:   
Frame No. 240  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: DNS   Deception: Standard query AAAA mail.test.com 
 
2- EHLO command was used to establish a connection between the outsider 1.1.0.1 and 
the mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump:   
Frame No. 255  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: EHLO insider.test.com 
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3- The greet was accepted by the mail and ready to establish SMTP connection with the 
insider. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 257  Destination IP address: 1.1.0.1   Source IP address: 146.227.192.2   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250-mail-server Hello insider.test.com [1.1.0.1] | 
250-SIZE 52428800 | 250-PIPELINING | 250 HELP 
 
4- The insider sent an email using Mail From command and the insider typed the source 
of email: insider@test.com. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 264  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: MAIL FROM:<insider@test.com>. 
 
5-  After the Mail server accepted the sender address as the following detail: 
Frame No. 265  Destination IP address: 1.1.0.1   Source IP address: 146.227.192.2   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: 250 OK 
the insider sent an email to victim by using RCPT TO command. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 269  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: RCPT TO:<victim@test.com> 
 
6- After the envelope was finished, the data of the email message just as it is followed. 
The data consists of the email's body as well as the header fields. The command to 
initiate the state that makes the mail server accept the message is DATA. The following 
information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 272  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA 
 
7- The insider started with header of the message by entering day, date and time of the 
email. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 277  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
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The insider sent From: insider@hotmail.com. The following information is revealed 
from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 281  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Reply-To: insider@hotmail.com. The following information is 
revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 287  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider sent To: victim@test.com. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 291  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Subject: email abuse. The following information is revealed from 
TCPDump: 
Frame No. 293  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider typed Message-ID Pine. LNX. 4.64.0604032208333.264@insider. The 
following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 297  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
 
The insider identified the content type of email by typing Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; 
charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed. 
Frame No. 303  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA fragment 
The insider wrote the body of the message (abuse message). The following information 
is revealed from TCPDump: 
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Frame No. 309  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
Protocol Type: SMTP   Deception: DATA. 
Figure 108 shows that the TCPDump information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and the body of the message. 
                                                                         Figure 108: Examine email activity 
 
The insider terminated the SMTP connection with the mail server by using QUIT 
command. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 321  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 1.1.0.1   
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A victim reported that an abusive email was received from this source: 
insider@test.com. The email was received on September 6, 2009 at 20:33:14. 
634794000. 
Preliminary investigation showed that this email was sent from the insider but the 
insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email. Therefore, the first step was 
to collect legitimate and suspicious activity for the insider from the logs and the 
insider‟s computer. Then these activities were examined in order to provide analysis 
process with insider's activities. The examination process provided the following 




    Email login: 
There were three login activities to the mail server from the insider's computer. The first 
login from the insider's computer was a failed login on September 6, 2009 at 
20:32:13.408412000. This failed login displays when an organisation's user attempts to 
access the organisation's Mail server and the Mail server authentication system is unable 
to recognize the user. The following information was revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 61   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: NO AUTHENTICATE LOGIN 
failed. 
Figure 109 shows that the fail login information was presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and description of events.    
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                                                                Figure 109: Authentication login activity  
 
The second login from the insider's computer was also a failed login on September 6, 
2009 at 20:32:18. 618219000. The following summary information is revealed from 
TCPDump log: 
Frame No. 77   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: NO AUTHENTICATE LOGIN 
failed. 
Figure 110 shows that the fail login information is presented destination and source IP 
addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port numbers; 
and description of events.   
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                                                                              Figure 110: Authentication login activity 
 
The third login from the insider's computer was successfully authenticated on 
September 6, 2009 at 20:32:23.710038000. This login displays when an organisation's 
user attempts to access the organisation's Mail server and the Mail server authentication 
system is able to recognize the user. It indicated that the attacker was successful in 
accessing the mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 88   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: Response: 00000002 OK 
[CAPABILITY IMAP4REV1 LITERAL+ IDLE NAMESPACE MAILBOX-
REFERRALS BINARY UNSELECT SCAN SORT THREAD=REFERENCES 
THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT MULTIAPPEND] User INSIDER 
AUTHENTICATED. 
Figure 111 shows that the authenticated login information is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events.    
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                                                                           Figure 111: Authentication login activity 
 
2. Email Activities: 
An abusive email was sent.  
 
B1.Ex7: 
The victim reported that an abusive email was received from insider@test.com. The 
email was received on December 3, 2009 at 09:49:01.273294000. 
Preliminary investigation showed that this email was sent from the insider but the 
insider denied the allegation of sending the abusive email. Therefore, the first step was 
to collect legitimate and suspicious activity for the insider from the logs and examined 
these activities in order to provide analysis process with insider's activities. The 
examination process provided the following information:          
1. MA: 
 Email login: 
There were two login activities to the mail server from the insider's computer. The first 
login from the insider's computer failed on the 3
rd
 of December 2009 at 
09:47:46.693596000.  This failed login displays when an organisation's user attempts to 
                                                                                                                                                                 Appendixes 





access the organisation's Mail server and the Mail server authentication system is unable 
to recognize the user. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 35   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: NO AUTHENTICATE LOGIN 
failed. Figure 112 shows the filed login.  
 
 
                                                                     Figure 112: Examine login activity 
 
The second login from the insider's computer was successfully authenticated on the 3
rd
 
of December 2009 at 09:47:51.550259000. This login displays when an organisation's 
user attempts to access the organisation's Mail server and the Mail server authentication 
system is able to recognize the user. It indicates that the attacker was success in 
accessing the mail server. The following information is revealed from TCPDump: 
Frame No. 45   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: Response: 00000002 OK 
[CAPABILITY IMAP4REV1 LITERAL+ IDLE NAMESPACE MAILBOX-
REFERRALS BINARY UNSELECT SCAN SORT THREAD=REFERENCES 
THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT MULTIAPPEND] User INSIDER 
AUTHENTICATED. 
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Figure 113 shows that the authenticated login information is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events.     
                                                                Figure 113: Examine login activity 
 
2.Email Activities: 
The logs showed that there was only activity as described below: 
TCPDump revealed that there was one email activity from the insider. This activity was 
an abusive email that sent to the victim on the 3
rd
 of December 2009 at 
09:49:01.273294000. The following summary information is revealed from TCPDump 
log: 
Frame No. 76  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMF   Deception: Malformed Packet. 
Figure 114 shows that the TCPDump information login is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email. 
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The victim reported that an abusive email was received from this source: 
insider@test.com. The email was received on January 10, 2010 at 21:55:26. 
Preliminary investigation showed that this email was sent from the insider but the 
insider denied the allegation of sending an abusive email. Therefore, the first step was 
to collect legitimate and suspicious activity of the insider from the logs and the insider's 
computer. Then these activities were examined in order to provide analysis process with 
insider's activities. The examination process provided the following information:          
1.MA: 
 Insider's computer login: 
It was previously mentioned that the main advantage of enhancing the insider's 
password for the virtual machine (the insider's computer) is to enhance auditing/log. 
The “/var/log/auth.log” command is used to reveal the legitimate and suspicious login 
activities for the insider machine. The first suspicious activities were that there were 
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four failed login activities into the insider's computer. These failed logins indicated that 
there were illegitimate access activities. Then the attacker accessed the virtual machine. 
The second suspicious activities were that after the successful access to the insider 
computer, the insider's password was successfully changed. Figure showed that there 
were many failed activities. Figure 115 shows that the suspicious activities for the 
insider‟s login into the virtual machine.        
                                                              Figure 115: Examine insider’s login activity 
 
 Email login: 
As we have seen in the unknown attack experiment 1, the outsider had already known 
the insider's email password. Therefore, there was one login activity from the insider's 
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computer to the mail server. The login from the insider's computer was successfully 
authenticated on January 10, 2010 at 21:53:25. 758059000. It indicated that the attacker 
was successful in accessing the mail server.  The following information is revealed from 
TCPdump: 
Frame No. 982   Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMAP   Deception: USER INSIDER 
AUTHENTICATED. 
Figure 116 shows that the successful login information was presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and description of events.    
                                                                         Figure 116: Examine email activity 
 
 
2. Email activities: 
After the examination of logins is completed, the next step is to examine email 
activities. The TCPdump log showed that there was only one email activity that was 
performed by the attacker as described below: 
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TCPdump revealed there was one email activity from the insider. This activity was an 
abusive email sent to the victim on January 10, 2010 at 21:55:26. 772200000. The 
following summary information is revealed from TCPdump log: 
Frame No. 1061  Destination IP address: 146.227.192.2   Source IP address: 
146.227.128.4   Protocol Type: IMF   Deception: BODY. 
Figure 117 shows that the TCPdump information login is presented destination and 
source IP addresses; destination and source MAC addresses; destination and source port 
numbers; and the content of the email. 
Therefore, TCPdump log showed that NBE was identified before and after the incident. 
Now, the corporate security should also examine the insider's computer in order to look 
for more evidence to support whether this attack was committed by the insider or the 
outsider.   
                                                                   Figure 117: Examine abuse email  
 
3.Examining and analysing insider's computer 
After examining the email activities, the next step is to examine the insider's computer 
to identify the insider's activities. The corporate security revealed the insider's files by 
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using “ls” command. This command showed that NBF was created or modified before 
and/or after the incident. Figure 118 shows the insider‟s computer activity. 
 
                                                           Figure 118: Examine the insider’s computer activity 
 
Moreover, the corporate security used “ls -a” command to reveal hidden files. These 
hidden files will not be listed in the output of “ls” without specifying “-a” flag. This 
helps to find files that have been moved from their original location, or modified 
recently, which should support ferret out the hiding place in use by a particular attacker 
in a particular incident. Ls -a command showed that there was NBF was created or 
modified before and/or after the incident. 
 
